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With the end of the Cold War alignment paradigm, Asian states have lost, or perceive 
the threat of losing their political patrons. In lieu of traditional alliances, many states are 
embracing multilateral security arrangements. Placing an increased emphasis on economic 
security instead of military security, these states appear to be ranking economic 
developmentahead of traditional security concerns. By focusing on economic growth, both 
domestically and abroad via highly cultivated international economic associations, these 
nations would seem to be subordinating military security as a matter of foreign policy. To this 
end, nations in the region are increasingly viewing multilateral arrangements (both 
governmental and non-governmental) as a means to effect cooperative ventures. 
The Cold War strategies of nuclear deterence, military predominance,and cooperation 
within the U.N. and bilateral alliances no longer adequately address America's national 
interests. In the rapidly evolving security environment, the United States is called upon to 
reaffinn these interests and to formulate additional policies to meet the challenge of a rapidly 
changing international environment. The need for a nuclear deterent continues. The end of 
the Cold Warand the budgetary restraints of the United States calls for a limited down-sizing 
of American military capabilities. But the increasing importance of economic factors in the 
security equation, particularily the prolifferation of trans-national organizations, shows clearly 
theneed for a greater degree of multilateralization--both in political and economic activities. 
The United States watches closely the prolifferation of multilateral institutions in North 
America, Europe, and Southeast Asia. It finds none completely acceptable as a role model 
for cooperative engagement in the East Asia-Pacific Region, but it stands ready to experiment 
with any as a forum for discussion of multilateral approaches to peace and prosperity. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
As the Soviet Bloc faded from global power in the late 1980s and the weaknesses of 
communist ideology were exposed, a new era in international relations began in the East 
Asia/Pacific region. The security arrangements of the Cold War largely disappeared. 
Although some disputes were apparently resolved, others re-emerged. The threat of global 
war was removed. from the Korean Peninsula, but border conflicts, ethnic hatreds and 
religious rivalries flared anew to challenge the stability and peace of Russia and the frontiers 
ofChina. Perceptions of security acquired new parameters. The fate of nations and peoples 
no longer depended on their military might alone--it would now be determined by their 
tenuous control over such factors as environmental pollution and global climatic change, the 
insidious dangers of terrorism, and the wildly dynamic explosion of heretofore dormant 
economic markets. No longer would the recognition of national sovereignty be an adequate 
guarantor of security. As economics became equally important with military factors as 
determinants of peace and prosperity, a transnational or multilateral approach loomed as a 
necessity in seeking a new world order of peace, justice, equality of status, and prosperity. 
This thesis examines first the traditional methods pursued by the major nations in 
Northeast Asia in protecting their national interests during the Cold War period, and 
subsequently the policies adopted by those nations in the contemporary period following 
Tian-an-men and the collapse of the Berlin Wall. The trend towards multilateralism is 
unmistakable. 
Following the hostilities of the Korean War, the United States emerged as the Free 
World's superpower. With its allies, it squared off against the communists and managed to 
preserve a condition of precarious peace. With nuclear deterrence, an incomparable military 
power, a national will to maintain regional stability and a system ofbilateral alliances, the 
world was spared what might have been a global holocaust. 
For four decades, the powers with their territorial base in Northeast Asia--China, Japan, 
the Soviet Union and the two halves of Korea--lived on the edge of a strategic and diplomatic 
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volcano as they asserted their respective national interests. China insisted upon its Five 
Principles of Coexistence as it strove to redress its grievances against the history of the 
nineteenth century and to achieve its rightful place in the family of nations. It disclaimed any 
aggressive ambitions as it struggled to redefine its ideological dogma and to modernize its 
antiquated political and social system. China perceived the United States as its implacable 
enemy. 
Japan, after the tragedy of World War II, acquiesced to its new role as the ally of the 
United States. Under the protection ofthe nuclear umbrella, Japan became the economic 
giant of the East Asia/Pacific region. Japan quietly and carefully reestablished its position in 
Southeast Asia and patched its fences in China. It played both ends against the middle in 
China and with the sponsorship of the United States, created the Self Defense Forces, 
primarily with the objective of protecting its homeland against possible aggression from the 
Soviet Union. 
The Soviet superpower provided the supplementary muscle for its off-again, on-again ally 
China and supplied the armaments and weapons for the Leninist states, North Korea and 
Vietnam. Its armed forces on the China border, its nuclear capability, its ICBMs with the 
potential of reaching the United States and its respectable navy kept the entire East 
Asia/Pacific region in a state of supreme nervousness. 
Nowhere was the threat of the Soviet Union more influential than on the Korean 
Peninsula. The North was backed by China and the Soviet Union, the South was backed by 
the United States. Time and time again such incidents as the capture of the Pueblo and the 
ax murders in the Neutral Zone took both sides to the brink of war. It was primarily the 
symbolism of the Neutral Zone and the framework of the Armistice Commission that gave any 
assurance at all of the continuance of peace. 
There was no doubt that the armed might of the United States, and the willingness of the 
American public to carry the burdens of containment served to preserve the peace in 
Northeast Asia for forty years. Japan, Korea, and Taiwan benefitted from their American 
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alliances, while their prosperity and economic development flourished because of the 
American commitment. 
The whole scene changed with the end of the Cold War. China renewed its old bonds of 
understanding with Japan and came to terms with Russia. China entered into border and trade 
agreements with Russia, and entered into new negotiations over troops, missiles, and arms 
sales. China and Russia normalized their relations with South Korea and used their influence 
to reduce the bellicosity of North Korea. Most of all China adopted a platform for peace and 
stability, and 'defanged' its communist ideology. China proclaimed its need for cooperation 
abroad in order to achieve a better standard of living for its own people. 
In contrast with China's priority for economic advancement, Russia opted for democracy 
first and a rising standard ofliving second. The old communist authoritarian style government 
continued in China, but Russia lost itself politically in a chaos of disorder. The former Soviet 
Union was broken apart. Some of its component states leaned towards the West in Europe, 
but the member states ofthe C.I.S. found themselves fragmented and in obvious danger of 
the rebirth of ancient Russian imperialism. In any case, the Warsaw bloc and the threat of the 
former Soviet Union disappeared, giving the world a new chance to create a world order rich 
with promise of peace. 
The challenge is greatest for the United States, the sole remaining superpower and the best 
hope as the benign stabilizer in the quest for a balance of power in Northeast Asia. The 
commitments of the United States as an Asia-Pacific power remains stronger than ever. Its 
military machine remains preeminent in the Pacific Basin, and its economic power--although 
less dominant than it was during the Cold War-- is still stronger than any of its potential rivals. 
Its alliances remain firm, and it still operates in consonance with the United Nations in peace-
keeping operations. The United States since the Cold War has defined its contemporary 
policy as cooperative engagement. 
To cope with the demands of the new security situation in East Asia and the Pacific, the 
United States has gradually expanded its diplomatic horizons and fallen in line with current 
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trends towards multilateralism. Noting the success ofNATO and the CSCE (Council for 
Security Cooperation in Europe) it has explored the possibility of creating a political system 
in Northeast Asian in which all nations, both communist and anti-communist might 
participate. The negative factors have militated against such a structure in Northeast Asia. 
Other models have been explored based on the experiences of Southeast Asia. ASEAN, the 
Post Ministerial Conferences (PMC),and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), have been 
analyzed as possible formats for security discussion in Northeast Asia. As yet nothing 
acceptable has been found in the final category of economic organizations--such as GATT or 
WTO on a global scale, or APEC, NAFT A, or EAEC on a more limited regional scale. There 
is still hope that features can be found that will lead to fair and freer transnational trade, thus 
reducing the tensions that always contain within themselves the seeds of conflict. 
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I. INTRODUCTION; 
HYPOTHESES AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
My hypothesis throughout this study is that it is in the national interest of the United 
States (U.S.) to participate fully in and give support to the multilateral arrangements which 
Northeast Asian states turn to as their primary means of ensuring regional stability and 
security. 
With the demise in the late 1980's of the Soviet Bloc and the exposure of the 
weaknesses of communism, a new geo-political era was ushered in. Traditional security 
paradigms including those effecting the Asia-Pacific region were drastically altered. Despite 
the passing of the predominantly bipolar world, however, some pre-Cold War issues re-
emerged with a new-found urgency. In that the traditional security frameworks of the past 
four decades are no longer as relevant, new concepts and institutions of security are needed 
to cope with these problems. 
The smaller states have lost, or are threatened with losing their political patrons. 
Some have begun to court new advocates, others have adopted ambitious new agendas, while 
still others appear totally uncertain about their futures. 
The time has arrived to redefine the "national interest" by placing an increased 
emphasis on economic aspects of security, placing military concerns on the "back burner." 
It is no longer enough to guarantee national survival, it is equally important to take advantage 
of every opportunity to provide for national development. 
Although external relations between most nations in the East Asia-Pacific (EA/P) 
region have traditionally been on a bilateral basis, multilateral arrangements (both 
governmental and non-governmental) are increasingly subjects of consideration. Northeast 
Asia is patently influenced by such extra-regional developments as the CSCE (Council for 
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Security and Cooperation in Europe) and the expanding security ambitions of ASEAN 
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations). Within the cooperative economic organizations 
(i.e.: ASEAN, APEC), member nations already have established networks for productive 
communication, built ties for constructive interaction, and formed extensive alliances for 
mutual benefit. 
As the world navigates in the post-Cold War milieu, the major problem which has 
emerged in the EA/P region is the search for a system by which ideologically disparate states 
can best provide for their national goals. From nations with traditional bilateral ties to the 
U.S., to non-aligned nations, to former communist states, to transitional Leninist states, all 
will be ready to fall in line with whatever system emerges. The special challenge to the U.S. 
is to create its own optimum role in such a new world order. The problem for the United 
States is how to reconcile its existing collective security systems, grounded as they are in the 
Realist/Balance ofPower tradition, with this currently popular trend towards multilateralism. 
A multilateral arrangement in Northeast Asia, which could be extended to the entire EA/P 
region, and which in tum could be integrated into an acceptable global system, would clearly 
be in the interest ofthe United States. 
This thesis exammes the trend towards multilateral security arrangements 
encompassing the Northeast Asian region, addresses the varied roles that regional states are 
playing in these arrangements, and examines the effects of the various proposed relations on 
the national interest of the United States. With the dramatic evolution from a military to an 
economic security model, and the passing of the Cold War, redefinition of the traditional 
national interests is inevitable. In the new and developing era, the United States is likewise 
called upon to generate policies to meet the challenges of a rapidly changing international 
environment. The following questions pertain: 
1) What is, and what will be, the effect of this trend towards Multilateralism on 
US perceptions ofNortheast Asian security? 
2) Economic and security blocs begin with sub-regional development, what 
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problems are to be encountered when sub-regional organizations expand their scope 
region-wide? 
3) What will be the role of the United Nations? 
4) Will heretofore extant economic arrangements (forums, organizations, etc.) 
develop into multilateral security arrangements integrating not just Northeast Asia, 
but the entire Asian-Pacific Rim? 
The national interests (political, economic, and territorial) of the Northeast Asian 
states including the United States were apparently adequately served by Cold War security 
arrangements. At least global confrontation was avoided. It is now relevant to examine 
whether the previous system is suitable and effective for the current post-Cold War situation. 
Ifthe nature of the respective national interests have been modified or changed as a 
result ofthe ending ofthe Cold War, it is reasonable to assume that the arrangements to 
protect those interests can likewise be modified. Specifically from the viewpoint of the 
United States, the former system based on bilateral agreements should be advantageously 
expanded to include multilateral participation. 
3 
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II. CONFLICTS OF NATIONAL INTEREST IN NORTHEAST ASIA; 
COLD WAR ERA 
A. OVERVIEW 
Northeast Asian security arrangements may be divided into two periods: the first 
covering the Cold War era prior to the Soviet Union's breakup; and the second, the 
contemporary period, roughly since 1989. In the first period, the confrontation between the 
Soviet Union and the United States, and their respective allies, dominated international 
relations throughout the region ofNortheast Asia. The direct conflict between the ideologies 
and the military potential of the two superpowers were the principle factors determining the 
alliances formed and the balance of power struggles that waged during the Cold War. In the 
second period the adequacy ofthe old security arrangements has been brought into question, 
and a growing tendency is noted towards exploring the value of adding a multilateral 
dimension to the traditional bilateral agreements. 
At the very outset, I shall profile the national interests of the Northeast Asian states 
(China, Japan, the Russian Far East, the Korean Peninsula, and the United States) and the 
degree to which the bipolar system addressed these interests during the Cold War. "National 
interests" are conceived as those critical political, economic, and territorial "activities" that 
have shaped each nation's foreign relations. 
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B. CHINA 
With Mao Zedong and his Communist Party's victory over the Nationalists on the 
mainland in 1949, and subsequent alliance with the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of 
China (PRC) was established and was perceived as a tangible ideological threat to U.S. 
interests in the Asia-Pacific. The ascendancy of the two communist powers set the stage for 
international relations for the duration of the Cold War. Notwithstanding the Western 
perception of a monolithic communist bloc in Northeast Asia, the first thirty years of the PRC 
were marked by turbulence and critical internal change. 1 These tumultuous internal changes, 
in their various political and economic aspects, lasted throughout the era. In spite of China's 
internal upheavals, it pursued its foreign policy goals with unswerving direction and relentless 
ardor. 
Whereas Mao and the Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA) ushered in the modern era for 
China, bringing order to a state " ... on the edge ofanarchy,"2 the resultant growing pains were 
many and harsh. From the disastrous Great Leap Forward in the 1950s to the chaotic 
Cultural Revolution of the 1960s, from turbulent internal succession issues to repeated 
international confrontation and ideological battles, the Chinese establishment confronted the 
U.S. in Korea, the Taiwan Straits, and Vietnam. It also confronted the Soviets in 
1 See Ralph H. Clough, "Recent Trends in Chinese Foreign Policy," National Security 
Interests in the Pacific Basin, ed. Claude A Buss, (Stanford: Hoover Press, 1985), pp.295-
307. 
2 Vivienne Shue adroitly argues that the communist revolution was more successful at state 
building than at orchestrating socialism. Indeed: " ... military victory by the revolutionists 
in 1949 put an end at last to China's prolonged national nightmare at the edge of anarchy. 
Against the sorry backdrop of a century's dynastic decline, civil war, and social decay, the 
victory of the (PLA) fmally swept from the stage all the frowsy remnants of the old 
regime. The Communists' victory brought peace at last, national reunification, and a 
mandate to govern. The social catharsis of a brutal and prolonged revolution cleared the 
way, in short, for the winning party to rebuild the state." From: "Powers of State, 
Paradoxes of Dominion: China 1949-1979," Perspectives on Modem China, Four 
Anniversaries, ed. Kenneth Lieberthal, et al (New York: M.E. Shaipe, Inc., 1991), p.205. 
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Zhenbaodao. With India, and again in Vietnam, China's perceptions of its national interests 
were badly bandied-about during the Cold War period. 
China's policies to promote its international political interests during the Cold War 
period may be characterized as a type oftripolar Great-Power "dance" with the Soviet Union 
and the U.S., sometimes as partners or allies, and sometimes as adversaries or enemies. 
Emerging from its civil war as a divided state, China soon faced international scrutiny 
regarding the legitimacy of the PRC. For example, Taiwan claimed the right to the "China" 
seat on the United Nations Security Council. The lack of a solution to their internal troubles 
brought down the wrath of the West. This, coupled with their heritage as members in good 
standing of the Comintern (1922-1943) and unashamedly pro-Soviet stance won the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) the open ill will of the U.S., a doubtful and wary acceptance among 
smaller western powers, and the approval of the Soviet-Union? 
The bilateral alliances with the Soviet Union was an all-important factor in carrying 
out the PRC's initial agenda. In concluding his relationship with Moscow, "Mao desired to 
borrow strength from the USSR for China's use in both foreign and domestic affairs during 
its period of weakness. "4 By March, 1950, the two nations were bound together by a treaty 
of military and political alliance as well as by subsidiary economic agreements. 
With this support ofthe Soviet Union, China was able to carry out the business of 
rebuilding an economy, a state, and the beginnings of a niche in the modern global 
community. This overwhelming task fell upon the "able leadership of CCP organizers and 
administrators" who, alternating with the charismatic but less capable leadership of Mao 
Zedong, carried out a multifaceted development and reshaping of the very fabric from which 
3 C.P. Fitzgerald, "Chinese History up to 1966," The Far East and Australasian Almanac 
1994 25th ed., (London: Europa Publications, Ltd., 1994), p.186. 
4 0. Edmund Clubb, 20th Century China 3rd ed., (New York: Columbia University, 1978), 
p.316. 
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China was made. 5 The Communist leaders first consolidated political control (I 949-1953), 
and then created their so-called socialist or collectivized economic system (I 954-1957). 
Followed by the Great Leap Forward from 1958 through Mao's death in 1976, the 
agricultural and industrial workers were organized into a disastrous system of production 
resulting in economic ruin and the deaths of an estimated twenty-three to thirty-seven million 
Chinese. 6 
Not one to admit he was ruining the economy, Mao kept up the unrelenting pace of 
change and set out to restore what he perceived to be a decline in the revolutionary ethos in 
the PRC. By the end of the "lost years," China had virtually destroyed itself through the 
excesses of the Gang ofFour and the Cultural Revolution; in Deng Xiaoping's words: 
Their supporters often cited (Mao's) slogan 'To rebel is justified.' This 
was used as an excuse for mass violence. 'To rebel is justified,' they 
said, means that you can beat people up, smash their houses, and loot 
their possessions. Thus what the Gang of Four preached was literally 
anarchy. Before they finished they did incalculable harm to the social 
fabric and economic system of China. 7 
The revolution that had begun compellingly enough had undercut itself and hamstrung 
the nation. With Mao's death in 1976, the door was symbolically closed on a regime that 
could be considered as the most influential and destructive dynasty in the history of China. 
Mao's eventual successor, Deng Xiaoping (perhaps China's most prolific 'on again-off again' 
politician), has proven to be no less influential, albeit in an entirely different manner. 
5 Fairbank, p.343. 
6 Michael Yahuda, "China: Recent History," The Far East and AustraJasian AJmanac 
1.994 25th ed., (London: Europa Publications, Ltd., 1994), p.188. 
7 Deng Xiaoping, as interviewed by Frank Gibney in The Pacific Century· America and 
Asia in a Changing World, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1992), p.298. 
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The cogency of this review of the PRC's internal restructuring is to emphasize the 
balance between domestic affairs and foreign relations in China during at least the first twenty 
years ofthe Cold War. Whereas Great Powers US and USSR were exhausting each other 
in a global balance of power, China without fanfare pursued a cold-blooded course in foreign 
policy, adhering closely to its alliance with the USSR as the key to its security against enemies 
in Northeast Asia. 
Although primarily preoccupied with its ties to the Soviet Union, and with bilateral 
agreements with North Korea, China during this period conducted a plethora of party to party 
relations with fellow communists around the world. China was at the same time engaged in 
war against the United Nations in Korea. Later it was deprived of participation in all the UN 
international organizations because the "China seat" in that organization was occupied by 
Taiwan rather than by the PRC. China also took advantage of every opportunity to show its 
interest in the Third World or to show its concern with ordinary developments in Europe and 
Africa. Although Communist China was regarded as a pariah by its anti-communist 
adversaries, it amply demonstrated its determination not to be isolated or shut offfrom the 
majority of nations ofthe free world. 
China's national interests and their role in shaping the nation's foreign relations are 
most apparent through its participation in international organizations and relationships. 
Participation in these organizations can be seen as an important measure of a nation's prestige 
(or ambitions to that end!) as well as a means by which a country may influence other states, 
access aid programs, and facilitate trade, information, and technology flow. 
China was predominantly excluded from most mainstream international organizations 
for the first twenty years of its existence. 8 Taking their isolation even further, China was 
8 It may be argued, however, that the alliance itself with the Soviet Union had multilateral 
characteristics, based on the supposition that alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization and the Warsaw Treaty Organization are multilateral international 
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repeatedly denied admission to the United Nations until 1971. In 1960, a long-simmering 
quarrel with the Soviets over ideology had developed into disputes over national interests 
(security and economic development), culminating in the withdrawal of technical aid and 
expertise. A tremendous set-back to the still nascent Chinese industrialization, it marked the 
beginning of a Sino-Soviet split that would last, for better and for worse, for almost thirty 
years. In retrospect, the major ideological, military, and economic reasons for the Sino-Soviet 
split were essentially the same for both sides. Specifically for the PRC's leadership, the strong 
desire to achieve self-reliance and independence of action outweighed the benefits Beijing 
received as Moscow1s subordinate. 
China1s ideological and political break with the Soviets was exacerbated by territorial 
issues dating back to the Unequal Treaties. Culminating in 1969 with violent battles along 
their borders, these boundary disputes (specifically Zhenbao or Damanskiy Island) continue 
to be an issue even to this day. During the Cultural Revolution, China1S growing radicalism 
and xenophobia had severe political repercussions for Sino-Soviet relations. Thus 
competition for influence in the Third World, extreme and irreconcilable ideological 
differences, and ongoing territorial disputes drove a deep wedge between the two powers. 
In an attempt to counterweigh the threat from Moscow, the PRC adopted a somewhat 
more moderate course and sought rapprochement with the US. Despite the extreme 
hostilities between the two nations as a result ofthe Korean War, the United States-Taiwan 
Mutual Defense Treaty, and the Vietnam War, China began to think of the Soviet Union and 
its 11 social imperialism 11 in Czechoslovakia and Hungary to be the greater threat to China1s 
interests. Starting with Nixon1s visit and the subsequent Shanghai Communique, the two 
nations set about normalizing relations, albeit slowly. While the two states warmed to each 
organizations. The tangible benefits China gleaned from membership in Moscow - based 
international organizations were in this instance, negligible. In addition, membership in 
the WTO, or the COMINTERN, hardly put the member nation at parity with the epicenter 
of international communism, Moscow. 
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other at a moderate pace, "People's Diplomacy," exchange of liaison offices, and bilateral 
trade all contributed to a growing interaction. This tended to take the brakes off the limited 
relations which China had conducted with such US allies as Japan and the United Kingdom. 
More importantly, China's detente with the United States gained it powerful and 
respected friends and facilitated its access to the United Nations. In 1971 Taipei's 
representatives were expelled from the Security Council and replaced by Beijing's. After 
becoming a member of the UN, the PRC made use of its position and joined most of the 
affiliated agencies including (by the 1980s) the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund. By the end of the 1980s China displayed an overt willingness to open-up to the world, 
to accept economic and technical assistance, and was making a break from its heritage of self 
reliance and autonomy. China's membership by this time in several hundred international and 
regional organizations represented an acknowledgement of its value in cultivating global 
interrelationships.9 In addition to providing Beijing with a variety of forum within which it 
could express it views to the world, membership in these increasing numbers of international 
groups gave Chinese foreign affairs personnel new knowledge and invaluable international 
experience. 
With Deng Xiaoping leading the PRC after 197 6, the state again entered a period of 
remarkable transition. This cycle was first observable in the Third Plenum of 1978. A major 
tum in the history of the People's Republic occurred with reforms which brought about a 
9 China's membership in myriad international organizations were intended primarily to 
facilitate internal development and promote international opportunities. Assistance from 
agencies such as the UN Development Program were a marked divergence from previous 
inclinations towards insular autonomy. Intent on attaining status as a global player, China 
sought and attained membership in such organizations as the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, the World Intellectual Property Organization, and the International Olympic 
Committee. Eager to cultivate international knowledge and experience during the 1970s 
and 1980s, China accumulated memberships in the very spectrum of international 
organizations, from the mundane and esoteric (acrobatics and the study of seaweed for 
instance) to those of global importance. 
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fundamentally new political and economic order. It was this "Fourth Revolution" which 
dramatically marked the beginning of a new international role for the People's Republic. The 
new direction was made all the more clear with the fall of the Soviet communist order. The 
first period during which China had by necessity remained a adjunct player to the bipolar 
alliance system came to an end. Its traditional inclination towards autonomy and self 
sufficiency took on a new complexion when it broke out of its shell and took whatever 
initiatives it determined to be useful in protecting and promoting it national interests. 
In its reincarnation, China took on great power affiliations and participated in third 
world multilateral forums. China still put primary emphasis on domestic economic 
development in this new period through cooperation with the outside world for the better 
promotion of peace and stability. These same trends will be noted in recent conduct of 
China's foreign policy after the end of the Cold War. 
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C. JAPAN 
Throughout the Cold War Japanese national interests and their foreign policy activities 
were a manifestation of its bilateral political and military ties to the United States. In contrast 
to Japan's pre-World War II aggressive militarism and embodiment of the hushido code, the 
nation emerged from the crushing Pacific defeat chastened and refocused, and dependent 
upon the United States. First during the occupation, and later throughout the Cold War era, 
Japanese pursuit of its national interest was to a great extent a result of the country's 
relationship with America. 
Prior to World War IT however, Japanese national security and interests were pursued 
by quite different means. From the blossoming of the Meiji Restoration beginning in the late 
1860s through its imperialistic Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere of the 1930s and 
'40s, modernization of all sectors was the underlying theme of Japanese national interest. 
Highest priority was given to military development, with as much as one-third of the national 
budget accounted for by defense expenditures in the late nineteenth century. This powerful 
military machine projected Japanese power throughout the region, reflecting the national 
consensus that national security depended upon expansion, not merely strong defense. 
Coupled with single-minded foreign policy objectives of enhancing Japan's stature as a world 
power, the lasting effects remain clear to this day. 
A series of successful wars and imperialist campaigns indelibly highlight Japan's 
militarist legacy. A punitive expedition to Taiwan in 1874 and a succession of fruitful 
ventures against Korea, China, and Russia all served to secure by military means the raw 
materials and strategic territories Japan believed necessary for the development and protection 
of the nation. Moving far beyond regional limits, Japan's military achieved the state a 
significant global recognition (although replete with limitations on the extent of military 
expansion, patently ignored) during the 1921-22 Washington Naval Conference, and through 
alliances such as the Tripartite Act (1940) partnership of Germany and Italy. 
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Instrumental in the rise of Japanese militarism, and perhaps most damaging to the 
international image, was Japan's army in Manchuria--the so-called Kwantung Army. A 
hotbed of extreme nationalism and militarist ideas, the K wan tung favored a divided, 
weakened, and accessible China. 10 Ultimately the K wantung Army's rogue actions in northern 
China resulted in a rapid series of conservative and ultra-nationalist illegal activities aimed at 
control of the state. The results were severe: after 1932 the national governments were 
controlled by the military and a bureaucratic elite. Political parties existed, but had no role 
in decision-making. Big-business cooperated cozily with the militarist government. Public 
opposition was negligible in that Japan had become virtually a police state. While the actions 
of the Kwantung spread to all of Manchuria and the Japanese puppet-state ofManchukuo, 
the effort severely damaged Japan's standing in the international community. Because of 
vocal Western protest over actions in Manchuria, and pressed to restore its political status, 
Japan walked out ofthe League ofNations (1933) and continued penetration of China. 
Because of the peasant roots shared by most of the junior officers and the conscripts, 
a close and sympathetic relationship ultimately developed between the military establishment 
and the civilian population. Coupled with the consummate control the military exercised over 
the political and industrial machines, in time most people came to look to the military 
commanders for guidance on military and political matters rather than to their political 
leaders. This unreined ultra-nationalist--militarist element in control of Japan's destiny is 
indisputably responsible for its involvement in World War II: 
... the majority ofJapanese also felt victimized by their own military for 
having dragged them into a war that rationally could only end in 
tragedy, and for conducting that war without regard for the suffering 
that was inflicted on the Japanese people. Consequently the military 
10 The Kwantung's links to the Japanese Zaibatsu industrialists is well known. These 
Zaibatsu had enormous interest in Manchurian raw resources, any unification or 
cooperation between China and Manchuria was seen as threatening to Japanese industrial 
interests. lTitimately the threat was seen as great enough that the Kwantung independently 
engineered the Mukden incident in an effort to eliminate Chiang Kai-shek. 
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was seen as innately inclined to take matters into its own hands, and 
hostile towards human rights and democracy. The profound Japanese 
distrust of its own military has been reflected in the ... debate over 
defense and security throughout the postwar era. 11 
Rather than reviewing the historical proceedings of the War in the Pacific, suffice it 
to say that the United States aerial bombardment, virtual elimination of merchant and battle 
fleets, and subsequent atomic attacks destroyed the power of Japan. With the surrender of 
the general staff and acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, Japan experienced the only 
major military defeat in the country's history. The public was compelled to review their 
national interests. Japan's national ruin had a profound and lasting effect on national attitudes 
towards war, the armed forces, and in particular, military involvement in politics. The 
subsequent disarmament and demobilization of the military, and excision of all its leaders from 
positions of power in the state stand as mute testimony to the changed national consciousness. 
Thus the trauma of defeat allowed strong pacifist sentiments to arise, as was most 
clearly manifest in the United States-fostered 1947 Constitution. "Forever renounce(ing) war 
as an instrument for settling international disputes ... " (Article 9), the constitution specifically 
declares that Japan will never again maintain "land, sea, or air forces or other war potential." 
Although later cabinets interpreted the constitution as allowing the state the right of self 
defense (ultimately the various Self Defense Forces), anti-militarist public opinion remains a 
force to be reckoned with on any defense related issue. 
The dawning of a new strategic era for Japan was foretold in the United States 
occupation. Japan came under an Allied occupation, with the United States predominantly 
assuming the task of demilitarizing and democratizing the state. Major changes were 
instituted in Japan's political, social, and economic foundations. For seven years Japan had 
virtually no control over its foreign relations and became, in effect, a ward of the United 
11 Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-
militarism," International Security Vol.17, No.4 (Spring 1993), p.136. 
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States. When Japan regained its sovereignty and entered the international community again, 
it was as virtually an emasculated nation with neither the means nor barely the inclination to 
defend itself The world Japan now existed in was dominated by the Soviet--US Cold War. 
It was a world in which countries either sided with one camp or the other. National security 
was measured by closeness of alliance with a country's chosen superpower. In Japan's case 
the Treaty ofPeace (signed September 8, 1951 in San Francisco; effective April 28, 1952) 
ending its war with most of the Allied powers except the Soviet Union and China, and the 
Mutual Security Assistance Pact with the United States (signed the same day) assured Japan's 
military security, and its status as a dependent ally, for the next forty years. 
The clearest evidence of Japan's new security policy and revisionist pursuit of national 
interests during this era is seen primarily in the so-called Yoshida Doctrine. Clearly 
representative of Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru's Centrist party inclinations away from 
militarism and towards reconstruction, the "Yoshida Doctrine" itself was the generic 
terminology used to describe Japan's postwar rebuilding efforts. The guiding principles of 
the Doctrine were very real, and very clear in Japan's close cooperation with the United States 
for both security and economic reasons. 12 Other notable manifestations of the Doctrine were 
seen in promotion of a free trade system beneficial to Japan's entrance into the United Nations 
(1956.) 
With its national military security assured by the protective "shield" and nuclear 
umbrella ofthe United States, Japan was able to focus narrowly on reestablishing economic 
viability, and on trying to establish credibility as a peaceful member of the world community. 
12 The United States placed intense pressure on Japan to play a more visible role in 
regional security, desiring an alliance similar to NATO in Europe involving a rearmed 
and militarily active Japanese presence. See John Welfield, "An Empire in Eclipse: Japan 
in the Post-War Alliance System" (London: Athlone Press, 1988), and John Dower, 
"Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878--1954" 
(Cambridge, Mass: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University Press, 1979), both 
as cited in Berger, pp .134--140. 
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The latter goal represented a diplomatic challenge in that Japan had to placate the suspicions 
and intense resentments ofits Asian neighbors. The victims of Japan's brutal colonial rule and 
ruthless imperial aggression were forever fearful of a resurgence of Japan's international 
aspirations. They were now subject to a "reborn" Japan: low-key, conciliatory, and non-
assertive. Japan avoided political issues and was essentially free to concentrate on its 
economic goals. It promoted friendly ties with virtually all nations, sought to keep economics 
and international politics as separate bedfellows, and attempted to maintain a neutral stance 
on East-West Cold War issues. 
For the duration then of the Cold War, Japan was subject to an evolving redefinition 
of national security. National security was now increasingly defined not only in terms of 
defending against military threats, but more broadly embraced a variety of goals. From 
enhancing the now-concrete relations with the United States to improving relations with its 
neighbors the Soviet Union, China, and the Southeast Asian nations; from ensuring Japan's 
energy security to guaranteeing its food and raw materials supplies, Japan's myriad goals were 
now perceived as vital to overall national security. Japanese national security became viewed 
in comprehensive terms. 
Despite the recurring domestic debate regarding the growth and utility of the Self 
Defense Force(s), incremental escalation in force size, technology, and international utilization 
occurred (in time). While some argued this to be a rearming of the nation and a rebirth of the 
Bushido culture (all the while denouncing the militarist past and ultimately claiming a pacifist 
historical tradition), the fundamental pillar in Japan's pursuit remained its bilateral military-
security dependency with the United States. 
Japan's deferment of the bulk of its military security requirements to the United States 
constitutes just one aspect ofits dependency. While the post war strategic indefensibility of 
Japan in the Northeast Asian region, and the consuming fear of communist hegemony made 
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close defense ties with the U.S. attractive and imminently practical during the Cold War era, 
both structural impediments and political considerations made these ties irreversible. 
Japan's structural limitations are threefold: the post-war constitution (specifically 
Article 9); the post-war subjugation of the military to civilian control; and the bilateral 
security ties to the United States. The first two limitations are, whatever the internal political 
dynamics behind their origins, still subject to powerful public memories ofWorld War II and 
to a general acknowledgement of the futility of Japan attempting to solely defend itself The 
combined effects of fear-of-history, and the mammoth costs involved in staging adequate 
defense for the essentially indefensible Japan have served as motivation enough for the public 
to eschew both a rewritten constitution and a restructured government. 
Public attitudes favor a passive over an active stance, alignment with 
the United States over a policy of equidistance between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, political dependence over autonomy, and 
minimal over extensive military spending. 13 
While " ... public opinion has come to accept grudgingly the existence of the SDF and the 
necessity of a modest national defense," 14 the populace views Japan's ties to the United States 
as essential and integral to the pursuit of the national interests. 
In combination with the United States, Japan has throughout the Cold War 
emphasized the smooth and effective operation of the bilateral system. To this end 
Washington and Tokyo established four forums for discussion of security issues: the 
Security Consultative Committee, the Security Subcommittee, the Security Consultative 
Group, and the Japan- U.S. Joint Committee. Working jointly in these forums the two 
countries have been called upon to conduct studies to ensure the effect attainment of the 
objectives of the Security Treaty and related arrangements. The range of topics is 
13 Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan's National Security," International 
Security Vol.17, No.4, (Spring 1993), p.lOl. 
14 Katzenstein and Okawara, p.lOO. 
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impressive and highly topical: joint defense planning, sea- lane defense, the Japan - U.S. 
defense coordination center, exchange on intelligence, common operational preparations, 
interoperability, and specific issues dealing with Japanese facilities assistance to U.S. 
forces in the case of situations in EA/P outside Japan directly effecting state security. 15 
On a purely operational level, U.S. - Japanese security cooperation has been 
extensive. Including most visibly joint military training and technology exchange, the 
United States has since the early 1980s conducted joint command post and communications 
exercises with the GSDF. The most protracted cooperative training has been included the 
MSDF which has participated in joint antisubmarine and mine-sweeping exercises since 
1955 and RIMPAC exercises since 1980. 
While episodes such as the AFX dispute and the Toshiba - Soviet machine tool case 
raise flags on possibly troubled bilateral techno-cooperation, the relationship has a long 
(albeit predominantly one- sided) history. Since the 1954 Mutual Defense Assistance 
(MDA) Agreement, Japan has been the recipient of U.S. grant aid (terminated in 1964) 
and co-production of U.S. developed weapons systems. Some of these include the P-3C, 
the F-15, and the Patriot missile. More recently (1983), Japan was prompted to drop a 
prohibition on export or transfer of dual use technology. By 1988 Tokyo had approved 
the transfer to the United States of SAM - related technologies and naval vessel 
construction/modification technologies. By the mid- 1980s Japan and the U.S. concluded 
an "Agreement on Japan's Participation in the (Strategic Defense Initiative) SDI 
Research," and established a new framework for further bilateral cooperation. 
With military and defense security issues comfortably accounted for by the United 
Stats, Japan had by the end of the Cold War diversified its economic interests and 
15 See Japan- A Country Study, pp. 319, 376-377 and International Military and Defense 
Encyclopedia Vol.3, ed., Col. Trevor N. Dupuy, USA (Ret.), (Washington: Brassey's 
(US), Inc., 1993), p.l373. 
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integrated inextricably with virtually all of its Northeast Asian neighbors. Coupled with 
Japan Is flexible characterization of national security as a comprehensive concept, 
encompassing political, economic as well as military factors, this regional integration has 
led Japan to expand, if only economically, through an interest in multinational/multilateral 
organizations. The next Chapter will address Japan 1 s most recent interest in these regional 
organizations, and the degree to which they are compatible with the nation's security 
agreements with the United States. 
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D. THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST 
The history of Russia's involvement in the Asia-Pacific region dates to the late 
sixteenth century with intense and relevant interaction primarily in the last one-hundred 
years. Involved in the region yes, but always perceived as aliens, as non-Asians. With 
a primarily European point of historical reference, Russians do not generally perceive 
themselves as Asian. As Skak suggests: " ... the oft mentioned Russian xenophobia is, 
perhaps, above all xenophobia towards Asians. Today, Moscow taxi drivers are more than 
willing to blame everything on the iholtye, although the "yellows they have in mind are 
the Muslims of Central Asia rather than the classical "yellow peril" of Northeast Asia. "16 
Again the point is emphasized: even in this post Soviet era, when not preoccupied by 
political intrigue in Moscow, Russians by and large have a difficult time seeing past the 
turmoil in Central Asia. While Euro-Russia is consumed with events closer to home, the 
Russian Far East, by virtue of proximity and gross resource potential alone would do well 
to capitalize on events in its own back yard. 
Russian involvement in Northeast Asia does have a lengthy history, albeit an 
unfulfilled one. The European impact on the Pacific developed slowly, however the lure 
of the Orient was certain and pursued from every possible angle. While northern routes 
were dominated by the north European powers: Russia, Britain, and to a lesser degree 
France, Russia was the only one to come by land across Eurasia. 
Following in the wake of the Mongol Golden Horde, the explorer Yermak was 
dispatched by Tsar Ivan IV ('The Terrible') in 1582 to impose control over the 
independent northern Asian khanates. Spearheading the first major Russian expedition 
across Eurasia, Yermak's main interest was commercial. As with North America's 
16 Mette Skak, "Post-Soviet Foreign Policy: The Emerging Relationship Between Russia 
and Northeast Asia", The Journal of East Asian Affairs Vol. VII, No.1, (Winter/Spring 
1993), p.153. 
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Hudson Bay Company, the Russian adventurers were after furs. Unlike the unbroken 
North American continent though, Eurasia had already been "tamed" via the previous 
incursions of the Mongols. Encountering only small bands of primitive tribesmen, swift 
passage and settlement was thus assured. In their drive to further exploit the mineral 
resources (salt) and establish finn military control, the Russians followed a pattern of 
colonial expansionism and established numerous settlements. 
Although economic motives were primary in drawing the Russians across to the 
Pacific, the vast majority of the settlers were military personnel (Cossacks of European 
descent). 17 Based along a chain of Russian forts reaching all the way to Okhotsk, the 
military became the means for supporting trading posts, and provided the infrastructure 
for administration and tax bases for the collection of tribute. 
Despite premonitory tsarist concerns regarding the loss of control of revenues from 
the far flung fur trade, as early as 1639 Ivan Moskvitin had taken his tsar's empire to the 
Sea of Okhotsk. Russia's first Pacific port, Okhotsk, was established by 1647. Indeed, 
Russian expansion was such that by the close of the seventeenth century they had explored 
Kamchatka, explored the length of the Kuriles, named the Bering Straits, and had 
"discovered" North America. Virtually one-third of total Russian state revenue at this time 
came from their Far East fur trade. 18 During the reign of Peter the Great, Russia had 
become obsessed with sea power, and strove to establish not just a European, but a Pacific 
naval presence as well. 
Whereas the Russians had to this point been virtually unrestricted in their eastward 
expansion, by 1683 the Chinese had recovered enough autonomy following their Mongol 
17 Gerald Segal, The Soviet Union and the Pacific, (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990), p.l6. 
18 Stuart Kirby, "The USSR in Asia," Australasian Yearbook, (London: Europa 
Publications, 1988), p.l016. 
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humiliation so that the Manzhou/Qing dynasty was able to halt the Russians in their tracks 
at the Amur River. Resulting in the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689), Russia had for the first 
time come face to face with a significant Asian power and "lost face" in the process. 
Losing the present-day Maritime and Amur provinces, the southern half of Khabarovsk, 
and Sakhalin (and consequently all of their potential warm water ports), Russia learned an 
essential lesson regarding colonization without an adequate support system. "The early 
lesson for Russia in the Pacific was the need to establish a fmn economic base before 
taking on better-placed rivals. "19 
Partially recouping their losses in the Kiakhta treaty (1727), Russia increased her 
regional strength in part through a new system of Sino-Russian caravan trade and through 
missionary links with China. 20 As though nothing was learned at Nerchinsk, the eighteenth 
century was most significantly marked by Russian expansionism throughout the Pacific. 
Extending their imperial tentacles as far as today's Northern California/1 Russia risked 
conflict with Britain in Canada, Spain in California, and the emergent United States 
everywhere else on the continent. Clearly an overextension of the Russian "power 
projection" capacity, their California trading settlements were soon abandoned, and 
ultimately (1867) Alaska was sold to the U.S. in the Empire's effort to retrench and 
refocus attention on Siberia and the Far East. 22 
Despite the extensive Pacific exploration executed during the eighteenth century and 
19 Segal, p.17. 
20 This new system of Sino-Russian trade by 1760 accounted for 60 percent of all Russian 
trade in the Pacific--7 percent of Russia's total trade. See Victor Mote, "The 
Communications Infrastructure," Siberia and The Soviet Far East, ed. Roger Swearingen, 
(Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1987). 
21 Fort Ross, near San Francisco. 
22 Kirby, p.1016. 
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Russia's not inconsequential contributions,Z3 any lasting impressions she made on the face 
of the Pacific Rim were purely accidental. 
Britain was by this time the dominant empire in the world. Despite 
their small island base, and in contrast to the Russians, the British 
managed eventually to create and then leave a number of successful 
independent states with close cultural links to their European home. 
Russian imperialism left few settlers, although huge areas were 
incorporated into the homeland. 24 
With China's nineteenth century decline, Russia was able to combine her superior 
relative strength and capitalize upon modernization efforts to regain virtually all of her 
geographic losses of the previous two centuries. Between repossessing the Amur lands and 
the Beijing treaty (1860) Russia regained over 430,000 sq km of her previous territories, 
in addition to Sakhalin and the Maritime province. 25 
The disgraceful losses to the Japanese in 1905 (Manchuria) and subsequent Treaty 
of Portsmouth dividing all of the Russian Far East into spheres of influence were the latest 
chapter in an extensive lesson which this time she would not soon forget: 
... defeat by the Japanese was a major blow to the Russians and 
lowered their prestige in the eyes of their neighbors in the Pacific. 
Russia, thus humiliated, was forced to give up some of its territory. 
The psychological damage done by the Russo-Japanese war to 
23 Vitus Bering, a Dane in the service of the tsar, had sailed from Kamchatka between 
1725 and 1743 and plied the Pacific waters thoroughly from his namesake straits south to 
the Indonesian archipelago. Subsequent expeditions by A.J. Krusenstern during the first 
Russian circumnavigation of the globe produced the first extensive mapping of Japan, 
explorations of Polynesia and Hawaii, and a claim to the discovery of Antarctica. The 
eastern limit of Eurasia and northern extent of the Pacific had been found; Russia's 
strategic parameters were being shaped. 
24 Segal, p.18. 
25 Kirby, p.1016. This wholesale recovery of her territories was to a degree contravened 
by Lenin and his revolutionary Soviet government in 1919 repudiating the 'unequal 
treaties' and the tsarist seizure of alien territories. 
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Russia's sense of power in the Pacific continues to this day. The 
essential vulnerability of an overstretched empire that fails to 
modernize is still a powerful image for modern Soviet foreign 
policy in the Pacific. 26 
Pursuant to American administration of the Treaty, Russia lost Liaodong, Port Arthur, the 
Southern Railways in China, and south Sakhalin. The effectiveness with which the 
emergent Japan was being used against both Russia and China was painfully clear. 
Throughout this historical episode, the lessons for Russia were to appreciate the weakness 
of its position in East Asia and also to recognize that Russian influence could be enhanced 
by the manipulations of the complex regional balance of power. 27 
From the point of view of the new Soviet Union, Japan's ongoing campaigns 
represented the efforts of a rapacious neighbor willing to capitalize at all times on the 
Russian Far East's inherent vulnerability. The Soviets had established a Far Eastern 
Republic (FER) in response to Japanese regional aggression, but this was disbanded in 
1922 when the Japanese retreated. 28 
The Soviet Union was now attempting the fullscale development of Siberia. From 
the late 1920's the Soviet Union was making enonnous efforts to develop Siberia and the 
Russian Far East by virtually every means possible including forced labor, colonization 
drives, and construction of the Vladisvostok rail link. Communism was slow in coming 
to the Soviet Pacific though, and the politics of the region remained consistently less 
revolutionary than in the Soviet West. The perception in European Soviet Union was that 
26 Segal, p.23. 
27 Segal, p.23. 
28 The Japanese had attacked Russia in 1918 subsequent to the Bolshevik uprising; in order 
to counter the Japanese in the Russian Far East, exploit the growing international anti-
Japanese sentiment, and primarily to play down the communist component of the new 
regime in Euro-Russia, the Soviet Union created the FER. Segal, p.24. 
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this new generation in the East was still too young to be either trusted or subjected to their 
radical campaigns. The Soviet Far East remained a "frontier outpost" wherein both her 
people, and the overall security could not be trusted. 29 
Overall this was proving to be a period of extreme flux in the Pacific. The former 
colonial powers were fading while important new states were emerging. There was as yet 
no tangible system of international order, neither military, economic, nor cultural. While 
Europe was at least temporarily reprieved by the experiences of World War One, empires 
in the Pacific were only just sorting themselves out. Whereas Japan took an opportunistic 
approach, capitalizing on the inconsistent policies of the Pacific powers, the Soviet Union 
remained distracted by events European. America initially exercised a form of self-
imposed isolation, while China recouped her losses from the extensive internal revolution 
and remained a ripe target for imperialist ambitions. 
With Japan Is attack on China (Manchuria Incident, 1931) the true state of Pacific 
international chaos became apparent. "The failure of international diplomacy, treaty 
obligations, or the League Of Nations to prevent the dismemberment of China was further 
evidence of the absence of international order in the Pacific. With Japan, the United States 
and the Soviet Union outside the League of Nations (until 1934), this already marginal 
body became a total irrelevance for Pacific politics. "30 With the Pacific thus in total 
disarray from a security standpoint, the direction of events there were easily dictated by 
Japan 1 s aggressive imperialist agenda. 
The lack of Soviet concern with the Pacific war is well documented, and her 
participation via the Yalta Conference seems at best a shrewd maneuver on Stalin Is part 
towards regaining lost and forgotten territories. This strange alliance between the United 
29 Segal, p.25. 
30 Segal, p.26. 
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States and the Soviet Union was an attempt to deal a fatal blow to a staggering Japan. 31 
Thus, via Potsdam, Russia entered Korea ostensibly to accept the Japanese surrender there. 
Subsequent to the Japanese defeat in the Second World War, cartographers were 
able to base their charts on a pattern of occupation in the Russian Far East which would 
be for the most part unchanged for the next fifty years. Soviet forces, at a cost of very 
few lives, quickly occupied Manchuria, Sakhalin, Northern Korea, and the Kurile Islands. 
While the physical borders have remained relatively stable, "diplomatic discussions" of 
territorial issues between the Soviet Union and China, and the Soviet Union and Japan 
have continued until today. Most importantly, in a grandiose representation of the classic 
zero-sum game, the Soviet Union gained by virtue of the decline of the other Pacific 
powers and by the expanded opportunities that came from Southeast Asian decolonization. 
The most obvious change in the international terms was the 
emergence of the two superpowers and the cold war. Although 
most of the rhetoric of the iron curtain was Euro-centric and 
inapplicable to the Pacific, the superpower confrontation was at 
least more simple than the interwar diplomacy of confusion, even 
if it was less applicable to the Pacific than to Europe. From the 
Soviet point, their obvious gains were counterbalanced by the even 
greater gains made by their main rival, the United States. 32 
With the stage thus set, and the dawning of the Cold War at hand, a "classical" era 
of Asian-Pacific multilateral security commenced. As the Korean war began, the 
respective camps gelled around the two superpowers, each with a decisive and relatively 
structured security network and agendas purveyed throughout their web of influence. 
What began as a strategically simple construction and maintenance of "defensive 
31 Segal, p.28. 
32 Segal, p.29. 
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perimeters"33 within Northeast Asia became ultimately a perverse zero-sum ideological 
struggle of expansion and containment not just in Asia, but around the globe. 
At the peak of her development in the region, the Soviet Union had cultivated 
clients in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in Southeast Asia, and North Korea in the 
Northeast. She had maintained a (tenuous) alliance with China for period of ten years, 
and had developed a working trade relationship with Japan. Their hard won successes 
were however fleeting. 
The expansion of Soviet military power and political influence generated parrying 
responses not only from the West, but from all the great powers. American containment 
policy checked and impeded the extension of Soviet power throughout the world. In what 
was perhaps was their greatest loss, the Sino-Soviet split became essentially irreversible 
by the late 1950s. Communist China resented the ventures of the Soviet Union into the 
Third World and jealously guarded against attempts by Moscow to interfere in Chinese 
internal affairs. 34 
Bounded by the solidly pro-American Western Europe (and NATO) on the west 
and a rock-solid U.S.-Japan alliance on the east, the Soviet Union was faced with a 
virtually impenetrable coalition against their expansion. Not merely surrounded 
physically, the Soviets were soon faced with a losing battle versus the market economies 
of their opposition: 
33 John L. Gaddis, The Long Peace· Inquiries Into The History Of The Cold War, (New 
York: Oxford University Press,1987), pp.lOOf. 
34 Edward A. Kolodziej, "The Multilateralism of Regional Security in Southeast and 
Northeast Asia: The Role of the Soviet Union," prepared for: Changing East-West 
Relations· Implications for East and Southeast Asia. A Conference Sponsored by The 
Defense Academic Research Support Program (DARSP) and The United States Pacific 
Command, (April 1991). 
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By the early 1980s, the market oriented states of the West and 
Japan, associated in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), accounted for $7.73 trillion of the world's 
productive wealth against $2.46 trillion by the Warsaw Pact, a three 
to one ratio that was widening with each passing year. 35 
Additionally, the Third World was resisting the onslaught of Soviet expansionism. 
Whether due to strong nationalist sentiment (Indonesia for one), or due to "better offers" 
from the Western coalition (Philippines), the Soviets were facing effective obstacles to 
their assembly of a multilateral bloc. Even within their own client states, Soviet control 
was undermined by tenacious historical imperatives such as ethnic rivalries (Indochina) and 
indigenous subversive activities (North Korea). 
Perhaps most devastating to Soviet efforts around the Pacific Rim was the 
formation of the ASEAN organization. While the Soviet Union encountered success in 
Indochina via their ally Vietnam, those very actions galvanized the ASEAN member 
nations36 into a loose-knit regional "security" forum. Despite their disparate political and 
social complexions these states aligned against any further encroachment from Vietnam 
and the Soviet Union. Plagued by doomsayers from the beginning, ASEAN has proved 
to be a remarkable regional institution with certain potential for the future. 
Inevitably the ultimate downfall for the Soviet Union was their military spending 
in support of imperialist ambitions. Rather ironic in that those states most ripe for 
Communist conversion were not coincidentally those most needy for economic aid. At the 
peak, Soviet fmancial assistance to Cuba and Vietnam was estimated to be in excess of $5 
billion. When coupled with their extreme level of military spending (15 to 30 percent of 
35 Kolodziej, p.3. 
36 Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and ultimately Brunei. 
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GNP), this level of economic burden proved to be crippling in the end. 37 Even more 
damaging, in contrast to highly profitable U.S. relations with allies Japan and South 
Korea, was the fact that economic assistance to Soviet clients did not lead to economic 
development. Rather it weakened the Soviet Union even further with no tangible 
economic growth registered abroad. 
In summary, the Soviet Union's Cold War attempts at orchestrating Asian-Pacific 
multilateral security alliances were hamstrung. Blocked by the countervailing military and 
economic power of the United States and its allies, undercut by terminal divisions within 
their own socialist camp, and ultimately broken by her over-committed economic and 
technological resources, Moscow lost its ability to project both Communist power and 
pmpose around the globe and to even sustain it at home. The Soviet Union was stalemated 
in Asia, even before the Cold War came to its inauspicious end. 
37 Kolodziej, p.3. 
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E. KOREA 
No other international "situation" today better typifies the essence of the Great 
Power Cold War than the lingering stand-off on the Korean Peninsula. This military and 
ideological confrontation continues to pit the allies of the United States against allies of the 
(former) Soviet Union and China at a profound and visceral level; the most heavily armed 
and vigilantly defended border in the world. But to what end? As Robert T. Oliver, a US 
political advisor to Rhee Syngman argued in 1952, a divided Korea serves no useful 
purpose for any tangible political ends, a unified Korea poses no threat to any other state: 
It is increasingly evident that in Asia's long history, Korea has been 
a crucial area. Its primary role has been that of a buffer state. 
Never strong militarily and never ambitious for expansion, Korea 
has not in itself been a threat to anyone. Its significance lies now 
(as it has in the past) in the fact that it occupies the strategic 
heartland of north Asia, surrounded by China, Japan and Siberian 
Russia. So long as Korea is truly independent, these powers are 
kept apart and the peace of Asia is safe. As soon as Korea is 
dominated by one of them, the other two are endangered. This 
truism is impossible to avoid. It is the basis for Korean claims that 
(like Switzerland in Europe) it is to the fundamental advantage of 
the great powers to insure two things: 1) that Korea be protected 
against aggression; and 2) that this be accomplished without 
reducing it to a pawn or satellite of any one or any group of outside 
nations. If this contention seems self-contradictory, the answer is 
that it was once done for Belgium and is still being done for 
Switzerland; it must be done for Korea if the consequences of 
general war are to be avoided. 38 
The consequences were to be enormously expensive, both in terms of casualties and 
material losses; the tremendous cost of rebuilding infrastructures on both sides of the 
DMZ; the undermining of an essentially autonomous state; and ultimately the fifty year 
38 B.Y. Choy, A History of the Korean Reunification Movement· Its Issues and Prospects, 
(Bradley University: Research Committee on Korean Unification Institute of International 
Studies, 1984), p.239; as cited in "Introduction," Two Koreas - One Future?, eds., John 
Sullivan and Roberta Foss, (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987; American 
Friends Service Committee), pp.1-2. 
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legacy of a security suzerainty. 39 The question addressed by this section is: has the bipolar 
system satisfied the needs and interests of the Korean state? In many cases the Cold War 
bipolar alignment system (and most instances of colonialism, for that matter) actually 
seiVed to unify many ethnically and religiously factional regions. It imparted stability, a 
sense of national direction, and made available the amalgamated resources uniquely 
available to a great power. On the Korean Peninsula, however, a sovereign state was 
needlessly divided. 40 Unlike the common scenario in which colonialism is perceived as 
creating new nations where none existed previously, uniting diverse peoples together, 
drawing national boundaries, tutoring indigenes in self-government and preparing them for 
the day the imperial power grants independence, all of this had existed in Korea for 
centuries before 1910. 
Although South Korea ultimately reaped economic and technological benefits from 
alliance with the United States, and North Korea approached bankruptcy under its failed 
communist system, there was a persistent feeling of intense nationalism. The spirit of 
nationalism was an outgrowth first of Korea's subordinate relationship with China, and 
later, and more importantly, the Japanese occupation. This nationalism, while disrupted 
in both states while under their respective sponsors, has proved durable in the extreme and 
exists today. Despite the current lack of political or economic congruity between North 
and South Korea, even a cursory historical glance reveals an inherent binding 
homogeneity, which time and great power competition cannot completely erase. 
39 Granted, throughout virtually all of Korean history the state has existed as a virtual 
vassal of China, paying a certain homage to the Middle Kingdom. Within a world view 
incorporating the Confucian sense of filial piety, Korean's have viewed their relationship 
to China as a younger brother to an older brother. 
40 Germany notwithstanding. As previously mentioned, Korea's heritage and relative 
autonomy traces back for millenniums. Germany on the other hand had unity for little more 
than a century. Additionally, the territory of Germany was laced with ethnic and linguistic 
variations quite subject to divisive political stress. 
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This section will examine the foundations of political and cultural orientation on 
the Korean Peninsula at the turn of the twentieth century. Establishing the flavor of the 
national heritage it will analyze the fate of Korea 1 s national interests. Tracing the effects 
of the Japanese occupation and the devastating division by the Cold War, this is the 
groundwork for considering the potentially utility of intra-regional multilateral security 
arrangements for the post-Cold war Korean Peninsula. 
Located as it is at the strategic crossroads of the Northwest Pacific, the Korean 
Peninsula has sustained one of the world Is most enduring political entities. Its people are 
highly literate, with a cultural homogeneity that has a lineage traceable for some fifteen-
hundred years.41 "Indeed, Korea is one of the few nations in the world where ethnic and 
linguistic unity coincide exactly with national boundaries {Japan is another) ... the period 
of national division since 1945 is not only a very small parenthesis within centuries of 
unity, but also a sharp wound to the pride of a people with a long and dignified history of 
self rule. "42 Rather than an enduring status quo, a divided Peninsula must be seen as a 
profound political anomaly; one in which the fundamental national interest has always been 
reconciliation and reunion. 
Beyond linguistic and ethnic heritage, Korea has retained significant legacies which 
bear some relevance in today's geo-political calculus. First and foremost is an inherent 
Confucian consciousness, a perpetual "residue" from the last Korean dynasty which 
permeates the culture today.43 While Japanese occupation and the Cold War alliances have 
41 Gregory Henderson, "The Politics ofKorea," Two Koreas- One Future?, p.95. 
42 Bruce Cumings, The Two Koreas, No. 269, Foreign Policy Association, (New York: 
Foreign Policy Association, 1984), p.8. 
43 Other psychic and structural remnants include yangbans (aristocrats) and commoners, 
scholars and landlords, agrarian bureaucracy, stability and continuity in politics, and 
benign neglect within the Chinese world order. See Cumings, p.8. 
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left indelible imprints on the modern Korean "state", these pre-modern lasting legacies 
must also be considered when formulating the national interests. 44 This residual 
Confucianism is basic. 
With origins in the Yi Dynasty (1393 - 1910), and the definitive influence on all 
state affairs since that time, the Confucian system marked Korea as profoundly as it did 
China. It remains a compelling influence today. A social and moral system based on the 
family, the model was extended to the state and ultimately to the international system. Its 
pervasive principle of hierarchy within a reciprocal web of duties and obligations 
permeates the Korean perception of the structure of the family, the state, and the world. 
By way of filial piety younger siblings honor and follow older siblings, children obey 
parents; the parents provide for and educate the children. Older adults enjoy superior 
prestige and privileges; longevity is a quintessential virtue. Transposed to politics, villages 
followed the leadership of revered elders, citizens dutifully subjugated themselves to an 
emperor or king who was considered the "father" of the state. 
Examples of the Confucian legacy regarding government are clear in the modern 
era: whether in the lasting support given a succession of ruthlessly authoritarian, anti-
democratic South Korean leaders, such as Park Chung Hee during the 1970s; or in the 
adamant public calls for a return to traditional values of filial piety and loyalty in the early 
1990s.45 North of the Thirty-Eighth parallel, fundamental Confucian values are even more 
apparent in "Cult of Kim" worship of the center, of the late Kim II Sung. A statewide 
veneration of the ultimate father figure cwn despot leader. The relevance of the Confucian 
heritage to the efficaciousness of the bipolar alignment system is seen in Korea's 
44 
"Less changed than her economies or rapidly changing societies, Korea's ancient 
political culture thus transmits to both contemporary Koreas more powerful traditional 
influences than come to her from any other parts of her culture." Henderson, p.95. 
45 South Korea· A Country Study, (Washington, DC: United States Department of the 
Army, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), p.XXVll. 
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acquiescence to hierarchical international relationships. The Japanese colonial period 
notwithstanding, Korean international relationships with China, the United States, and the 
Soviet Union have to a large degree been embodiments of the Confucian ideology. 
Japanese occupation brought about a significant social and infrastructure 
modernization to the Korean Peninsula. Following an agenda similar to that pursued on 
Taiwan fifteen years earlier, Japan established a centralized bureaucracy, a unified 
national police force and a national guard; it imparted a governmental structure. Japan 
developed the communications infrastructure by introducing modem railroads, roads, 
postal services and telecommunications. As a result of the Japanese instituting public 
health programs and effecting a general orderly peace, Korea's population effectively 
doubled during the colonial period. 46 
Over the duration of the occupation, the Japanese contributed most to the economic 
development of Korea. First, in the context of the Oriental Development Company, Japan 
facilitated the development of huge industrial infrastructure. Whether establishing banks 
to promote agricultural and industrial development, harnessing rivers in the North to 
produce electrical power, or sponsoring the simultaneous development of myriad 
industries, Japan's positive and lasting contributions to every facet of a contemporary 
Korea are unrivaled in the annals of colonialism. 47 "The strong, highly centralized 
46 John K. Fairbank, Edwin 0. Reischauer, Albert M. Craig, East Asia- Tradition and 
Transfonnation, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989), p.907. 
47 Indeed, beginning in the early 1920s Japan built then state-of-the-art fertilizer plants; 
in the decade from 1927 to 1937, the mining industry grew at nineteen percent per year. 
In 1929 chemicals, metals, and machinery accounted for twenty - six percent of total 
industrial output; by 1944 that figure was forty -four percent. During the 1920s the 
aggregate manufacturing industries grew at a rate of ten percent per year. While Japan 
of course gleaned the profits from this exploitation, unlike most other colonizers, it 
reinvested the larger sum back into the colony, benefitting Korea in the end. See 
Fairbank, et al, p. 912. 
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colonial state mimicked the role that the Japanese state had come to play in Japan--
intervening in the economy, creating markets, spawning new industries, suppressing 
dissent. "48 Beyond the obvious industrial development, Japan imparted worldly education 
and bureaucratic training necessary for management of a modern society. 
Recent researchers ... have begun to point out that the post-1945 
leadership in every area of South Korean life came from Koreans 
who had risen from middle or lower-middle positions during the 
colonial era, often from those who had obtained a higher education 
in Japan. That is to say, during the colonial era, a generation of 
Koreans gained training in modern skills that provided a platform 
for postwar development. 49 
While the Japanese brand of colonialism might be seen as state-building or even as a 
precursor to autonomy, in some aspects the occupation had just the opposite effect. A 
curious departure from the sense one has of Japanese professional development of the 
Korean managerial class (or "bourgeoisie" as Fairbank terms them) is the perception of the 
occupation as a further re-enforcement of Korea's Confucian sense of the world hierarchy. 
Despite the advanced, worldly training and relatively newfound exposure to "Western" 
ideology, Korea's bourgeoisie was from these roots further" ... accustomed to dependence 
on a development-oriented authoritarian government. "50 
Although Korean middle managers and those with significant interest in the national 
industrial plant in a sense profited from their vassal status within the Japanese empire, the 
Korean people fanned the embers of a burning nationalism. While there had developed 
a strong nationalist sentiment earlier, during the troubled, waning years of the Yi dynasty, 
the occupation was an appalling assault on the Korean national identity. Japan, although 
48 Cumings, p.20. 
49 Fairbanks, et al, p.912. 
5
° Fairbanks, et al, p.912. 
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singularly responsible for the explosive growth of the Korean economy, practiced a virtual 
cultural genocide on all things Korean. Japan required Koreans to adopt Japanese 
surnames, eliminated the Korean-language press, and by the late 1930s, even banned the 
Korean language itself. It was this oppressive pressure-cooker then that nurtured a militant 
nationalist sentiment. While older and more established Koreans (primarily the vestiges 
of the yangban aristocracy; enlightened and entrepreneurial landlords) responded to the 
opportunities spawned by Japanese colonialism, younger and more "left-leaning" Koreans 
formed the early communist and nationalist resistance groups. Although intense police 
repression and internal factionalism crippled these activities on the Peninsula, other 
regional states took more than a casual interest. In addition to the festering political 
activism on the Peninsula, Koreans launched an active independence movement in exile. 
Consisting primarily of Rhee Syngman in the United States, Kim Koo in China, 
and Kim II Sung in the Soviet Union, these exiles stridently sought sponsorship for an 
autonomous and sovereign Korea. Several established provisional governments in exile. 
Others, such as Kim II Sung, became renowned leaders of embryonic independence 
campaigns. They cultivated allegiances of varying strength with their host governments 
in opposing the Japanese. Kim Koo in China gained sympathy and support from the 
nationalist government of Chiang Kai Shek. Rhee, with similar ambitions for an 
autonomous Korea, had worked hard to develop a similar response from Washington. He 
gained the sympathies of many Christian missionary communities but the Washington 
government largely turned a deaf ear to his appeals. 
Marxist influence had been felt in the north since the late nineteenth century from 
both China and Russia. Indeed, a group of Korean expatriates had sprouted in the Tumen 
River border region and served as an embryo for the Korean Communist Party. Koreans 
were no strangers to the Russian Far :East; emigrants and workers had settled along the 
trans-Siberian Railway, in the Tum en area, and ultimately were the first :East Asians to 
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participate in the Soviet Revolution, both in the armed forces and in the Comintern. 51 In 
time, the Soviets chose Kim ll Sung, a natural leader and profoundly influential in Korea's 
battle against occupation, to front the Korean communist organization. 
While Rhee and the two Kims were at the helms of stridently nationalist 
organizations (whatever their pedigree) and shared a manifest desire to protect Korean 
national interests of unification and autonomy, they were rivals for leadership of their 
homeland. 52 As World War IT drew to a close ending the Japanese occupation, their 
destinies ultimately depended upon the decisions of the War's victors, the United States. 
Faced initially in the aftermath of WWII with the unwanted burden of establishing 
a post-occupation government in Korea, having to reconcile diplomatic commitments 
51 
"As Lenin turned to the East, Koreans were the most readily available allies, and the most 
anti- Japanese. More Koreans than Chinese attended the Conference of Toilers ofthe East 
held in Moscow in 1922 to counter the Washington Conference ... by World War II, Korean 
factions in the United States and Europe were seeking aid from non - Communist powers, but 
the were small and ineffective compared with the troops and cadets secretly prepared over 
the years by the Soviet Union." See Fairbanks, eta/, pp.910-911. 
52 Cumings points out an interesting accounting for the rabidity of these relationships, 
particularly between the Communists and Rhee's Nationalists. "The resistance to the 
Japanese is the main legitimating doctrine of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
(DPRK); they trace the origin of the army, the leadership, and their ideology back to that 
period. Even today the top North Korean leadership is still dominated , as it has been 
since 1946, by a core group that fought the Japanese in Manchuria. Japan attacked China 
in 1937 and the United States in 1941, and as this war took on global proportions, Koreans 
for the first time had military careers opened to them. Although most were conscripted 
foot soldiers, a small number achieved officer status and a few even attained high rank. 
Virtually the entire officer corps of the ROK army during the Syngman Rhee period was 
from Koreans with experience in the Japanese army. Lower-ranking officers also were 
prominent during the Park Chung Hee period, including Park himself, who had been a 
lieutenant in the Japanese army. At least in part, the Korean War was a matter of 
Japanese-trained military officers fighting Japanese-spawned resistance leaders." See 
Cumings, pp.22-23. See also: Charles M. Dobbs, The Unwanted Symbol· American 
Foreign Policy, The Cold War, and Korea, 1945-1950, (Kent, Ohio: The Kent State 
University Press, 1981), p.2. 
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resulting from the Cairo, Potsdam, and Yalta Conferences, troop withdrawals, and above 
all politico-cultural ignorance, the U.S. intelligence and foreign policy operators were 
pulled in multiple directions. Not prepared in the aftermath of the Japanese surrender (15 
August, 1945) to deal with the newly decolonized Korea, the US had prepared no 
contingencies for the suddenly independent state. 53 Complicating matters was Russian 
influence and presence in the state of Korea. The US, by accepting Russian participation 
in World War II against Japan at the 1945 Yalta and Potsdam Conferences, had invited 
communist occupation of the peninsula. 
Following disagreements with the Soviets at Moscow and in the early stages of the 
occupation of Korea, the US turned the entire Korean morass over to the United Nations. 
The UN-formed Temporary Commission on Korea was designed to unite the country 
through conducting peninsula-wide general elections, thus creating a legitimate national 
government. This action was soundly rejected by both the Soviet occupation authority and 
the Korean communists in the North. The UN Commission went ahead, held the elections 
in the South, and established a National Assembly that would represent the whole of 
Korea. In the North, the Soviets had already begun to transfer power to their surrogates, 
the Supreme People's Party and the Central People's Committee. In the South, the 
National Assembly went ahead, established a democratic constitution and ultimately elected 
Rhee Syngman as the first president of the Republic of Korea (the ROK itself established 
15 August 1948). Shortly thereafter (9 September 1948) the Communists to the north, 
bolstered by communist "refugees" from the south, held elections and established the 
Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK); the 
North/South division seemed permanent at this point .. 54 
53 David I. Steinberg, The Republic of Korea, Economic Transfonnation and Social 
Change (Boulder and London: Westview, 1989), p.48. 
54 John Sargeant, "Physical and Social Geography," The Far East and Australasian, 24 th ed, 
(London: Europa, 1992), pp.422-423. 
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In that the era 1945-1950 as precursor to the Korean War is extremely well 
documented. Suffice it to say that ultimately the tensions between the divided states led 
to war. The US military had withdrawn from South Korea leaving only a small 
compliment behind. The official American policy stated that Korea lies outside the US 
Pacific defense perimeter and would be dependent upon its own resources and those of the 
UN umbrella for its security and development. 55 When the North crossed the 38th parallel 
on 25 June 1950, they met virtually no resistance as they proceeded south towards Seoul. 
"The immediate reaction in the United States was to treat it as a Soviet attempt to 
determine US resolve in the cold war. The confrontation was also considered the first 
major international test of whether a 'limited war' was possible in an age of atomic 
weapons. "56 
Opinions differ considerably regarding the precise motivations of the major players 
as the war started: Steinberg suggests that the participants recognized the dire significance 
of their actions, that Kim D Sung invaded the south only after clearing his actions through 
both economic Moscow and Beijing and that the US committed the bulk of its resources 
only after UN recommendation. 57 Possibly, as George Kennan suggests, an overly anxious 
Kim caught both Moscow and Beijing by surprise. In the interests of US prestige abroad 
and to lend substantive credibility to the Truman Doctrine, the Americans felt they had to 
counter the North Koreans. 58 
Whatever the motivations of the Soviets and the United States, the Korean 
55 Steinberg, p. 51. 
56 Steinberg, p.51. 
57 Steinberg, p.51. 
58 David Mayers, George Kennan and the Dilemmas of ITS Foreign Policy, (New 
York: Oxford, 1988), p.180. 
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Peninsula had ostensibly been one step closer to actualizing its national interests. Freed 
from the tyranny of Japanese occupation, the divided Peninsula was technologically and 
culturally ushered into the twentieth century. The gains of the Japanese occupation were 
ultimately destroyed however. Much of the industrial infrastructure had serviced the 
Japanese war machine, with that narrow market eliminated the Korean economy suffered. 
A moot point however: the subsequent Korean War caused horrible destruction to the 
Korean people and effectively eviscerated their resources. 59 
Most fateful, though, was the seemingly permanent division itself. No matter the 
American interest in Korean self determination or thoughts of an international trusteeship 
for the Peninsula, the now entrenched and radically disparate political elements ultimately 
made unification all but impossible. A dream shared by both North and South certainly, 
but one to be prolonged by their irreconcilable political agendas. As evidenced by the 
Korean War itself, the developing bipolar system and its agents permeating the fabric of 
Korea had little to offer by way of satisfying the national interests of one Korea. Thus the 
peninsular quest of nationalism, the quest for global recognition, and the quest for 
sovereign autonomy were all hamstrung by the division of the Peninsula. 
Categorizing the Northeast Asian alliance system, particularly regarding North 
Korea's ties, as purely bilateral is to grossly oversimplify the international dynamics of the 
trans-Korean War era. The Soviet Union built the communist infrastructure; was active 
in the extensive post-WWll negotiations to resolve the division of the Peninsula on their 
own terms; and was singularly responsible for the arming and training of the North Korean 
59 The United States suffered 142,000 casualties; South Korea: 300,000; North Korea: 
roughly 500,000; China: 800,000. Fairbanks, et al, p.916. "Had the Americans stayed 
out, the northern regime would have won easily; as it happened, however, Kim's regime 
was nearly extinguished. When the war fmally ended, the North had been devastated by 
three years of bombing attacks that hardly left a modem building standing. Both Koreas 
watched as a virtual holocaust ravaged their country and turned the vibrant expectations 
of 1945 into a nightmare." Cumings, p.38. 
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military. However, as their enemies approached the Yalu River early in the War, the 
North Koreans were joined by Chinese Communist troops, committed to driving the 
UN/US Forces away from its borders. This Chinese participation thwarted an outright 
victory by the UN forces and effectively created a Northeast Asian trilateral alliance 
system. 
All forced polarizations aside, the cumulative effects of Chinese suzerainty, 
Japanese colonization, the scramble for concessions by Japan, Russia, Britain, Germany, 
France, and the United States, and ultimately division and civil war at the hands of the US 
and the Soviets left Koreans (northerners and southerners alike) mistrustful of their 
neighbors. These historical patterns led to a common perception of the national destiny 
as limited by the whims of foreign powers, that control of the state was ultimately the 
outcome of greater geo-political constraints. The nationalists notwithstanding, the 
unfortunate result was (when coupled with the previously examined Confucian premise) 
an 11 ••• ingrained Korean habit of sycophantic compliance called sadaejuui, literally 'serve-
the-great-ism' and variously described as flunkyism, toadyism, kowtowing, or simply 
national subservience. 1160 As the agent provocateur for rallying nationalists it was this 
peninsular-wide sense of a second-tier, dependent international status which ultimately 
gave rise to the ideology of chuch 'e. 
Most prevalent in the post-Korean War ideological consciousness of Kim II Sung 
and North Korea, chuch 'e stresses a certain national strength drawn from within, an 
autonomy of ways, means, and character relatively unprecedented on the Peninsula. By 
way of exact definition chuch 'e was nebulous and constantly evolving along with the 
changing nature of the Korean states, perhaps the words of Kim II Sung himself defme it 
best: 
60 North Korea· A Country Sh1dy, ed., Frederica M. Bunge, (Washington, D.C.: 
American University, 1981), p.194. 
42 
In a word, the idea of chuch 'e means that the masters of revolution 
and construction are the masses of the people and that they are also 
the motive force of revolution and construction. (In other words, 
it is an idea that one is the master of one's own destiny and has the 
power to shape it oneself.) We are no. by means the first to 
discover this idea. Anyone who is a Marxist-Leninist thinks this 
way. I have merely laid an emphasis on this idea. 61 
Stressing strength, the enforcement of independence, and revolution from within the state, 
chuch'e became a national obsession for North Korea. Although Kim cultivated chuch'e 
as his personal ideological "trademark", the tenn symbolizes a yearning for national pride, 
self-identity, and independence, values highly palatable for post war South Koreans as 
well. In the words of the state-builder Park Chung Hee: 
(I deplore) our lack of national consciousness, an extreme 
deficiency in the national awareness of the fact that we live 
together; we die together. .. Now is the time to take a new view of 
Korean history. We must grasp the subjectivity (or self-identity, 
i.e., chuch 'e) of the Korean nation, restore a spiritual pillar of 
Korean history and establish a critical but receptive posture for the 
introduction of foreign culture. 62 
In a powerful testimonial to the congruent national interests of North and South Korea, 
within the context of chuch'e, Park's inaugural speech as newly elected president of South 
Korea, 17 December, 1963 makes clear some common ground: 
In order to carry out a great renova~ion movement in search of 
political liberty, economic self-reliance, and a social harmony and 
stability, we must first wage a spiritual revolution on the individual 
level. Every citizen must inculcate in himself an independent 
chuch 'e consciousness, fmnly establish the spirit of self-reliance 
61 From article, front page of "Mainichi shimbun," 19 September 1972, as cited in Byung 
Chul Koh, The Foreign Policy Systems of North and South Korea, (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1984), p.72. 
62 Park Chung Hee, Our Nation's Path, (Seoul: Hollym Corporation, 1962), pp.20-21; 
p.119, as cited in Koh, pp. 74-75. 
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and self-help whereby one becomes the master of one's own 
destiny, and achieve the correct spiritual posture of national self-
identity. 63 
While no references nor allusions to Marxist-Leninism or socialist dogma were made nor 
intended by Park, the fundamental similarities of national interest consistent throughout 
the peninsula are rather poignant. "The single most important ideological dimension for 
both Koreas is nationalism-the burning desire on the part of leaders and citizens alike to 
assert their national identity, to determine their own destiny, and to enhance their national 
prestige abroad in every conceivable way. The much vaunted chuch' e idea is but a 
manifestation of this desire. "64 
The irony of both the particular national interests and their very peninsular 
consistency is the varying degrees to which they have been addressed by the Cold War 
alliance system. In the vigorous pursuit of containment on the one hand, and a steadfast 
dedication to building a model socialist state on the other, the "system" resulted in an ever 
widening chasm dividing North and South. The resultant Cold War end-game found the 
North and South locked in the grip of perpetual economic and military rivalry always 
bordering on a state of war. Thirty years after the Korean War ended, North and South 
Korea still faced each other across the Thirty-Eighth Parallel/Demilitarized Zone. In spite 
of the occasional foreign policy progression, from internationalism to containment to 
rollback and fmally to containment again, the Korean Peninsula remained divided. 
As the international fault lines divided the Peninsula, this heretofore 
inconsequential state moved from the periphery to the center of the Cold War world stage. 
The United States and flfteen allied nations fought side by side with South Koreans; China 
63 Minju Konghwodang sanyon-sa (Four-Year History of the Democratic-Republican 
Party), (Seoul: Minju Konghwadang Kihoek Chosabu, 1967), p.153, as cited in Koh, 
p.75. 
64 Koh, p.235. 
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fought with North Korea, and was backed by the USSR and its other allies. The North 
Koreans sought to push back the South Koreans, and the United States sought to push back 
the North Koreans, and the failure of both in 1953 has frozen the conflict at the point 
extant today. 
Until the 1970s there was little momentum to change this situation. During the 
1960s various American politicos called for major changes in US policy towards Korea 
(foremost was Senator Mansfield, Democrat, Montana; later to become US ambassador 
to Japan) including demilitarizing and neutralizing the Korean Peninsula. By way of 
response the ROK actively supported US foreign policy, to the point of dispatching as 
many as 300,000 troops in support of our efforts in Vietnam. The DPRK's actions 
covered the entire spectrum of foreign policy actions. Ranging from relatively 
accommodating calls for unification under a confederation plan (1960) to extreme and 
hostile acts along the DMZ and the execution of international terrorism against both South 
Korea and the United States, North Korea's activities were highly provocative on the 
international stage. 
With the development of the Sino-Soviet split, not only did the global Cold War 
calculus change, but North Korea lost its joint backing. As US President Nixon embraced 
China, both Koreas watched helplessly as their heretofore steadfast alliance partners sent 
profoundly confusing messages about the future of Northeast Asian security. Would the 
United States or China again intervene if war were to flare up again on the Peninsula? 
As the war in Indochina drew to a close in 1975, there seemed less reason in Asia to 
perpetuate the Cold War standoff. 
The reformulated strategic thinking in Northeast Asia in the 1970s had decided 
benefits for South Korea, and laid the groundwork for peace on its terms on the Peninsula. 
Presuming an abatement in the regional Cold War tension, the Nixon administration saw 
fit to withdraw a division of US soldiers. The North Koreans responded by virtually 
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halting their attempts at infiltration and by significantly reducing their defense budget in 
1971. Further, both Koreas held diplomatic talks at the highest levels (between the 
director of the KCIA and Kim II Sung's younger brother) in early 1972, resulting in the 
4 July, 1972 proclamation that they would seek reunification peacefully, independent of 
outside forces, and with a cooperative effort to creating a semblance of unity between the 
disparate states. 65 Although this initiative was short-lived, it was never forgotten as a 
reminder of what could transpire through enlightened, even-handed diplomacy. 66 After 
1973 and unti11983, tensions and armed skirmishes escalated and persisted along the DMZ 
for the duration of the period. 
Although efforts were made by both North and South to reopen the inter-Korean 
dialogues following Park's assassination in 1979, no real headway was made untill984. 
Reflecting a shifting of priorities on the part of the Great Powers, China and the Soviet 
Union hotb established significant trade relations with South Korea. China encouraged 
North Korea to reconcile with its former foes. Indeed, while "traditional" ties were none-
the-worse-for-wear (Deng Xiaoping and associates visiting Pyongyang for a variety of state 
functions, including endorsements of Kim Jong n as political successor to Kim II Song and 
as leader of the Korean Worker's Party), trans-alliance contacts aspired to engineer peace: 
Henry A. Kissinger, then national security advisor, revealed in his 
memoirs that Kim n Sung was in Beijing during his famous 'secret 
visit' in July 1971; although it is not known if they met, it is likely 
that Nixon and Kissinger encouraged South Koreans to talk with 
North Koreans and indicated to them various benefits that might 
65 Ilpyuing J. Kim, "The Major Powers and the Korean Triangle," Two Koreas-One 
Future?, pp.119-134. 
66 In 1973, South Korea's Park Chung Hee, a dedicated militarist, instituted the so-called 
Yushin constitution, so as to assure himself of subsequent and lengthy terms in office, and 
absolute control of the composure of the National Assembly. Such changes, considering 
Park's personality, were not conducive to the type of compromise and accommodation 
required for peaceful unification. In addition, Park rejected any notion of effecting a inter-
state confederation, perhaps the only realistic means of attaining unification. 
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come their way if they continued on the moderate path. Kissinger 
pursued a plan for four-power talks to resolve tensions on the Korea 
Peninsula, something the North Koreans had resisted because it 
suggested that once again outside powers would once again 
determine Korea's fate. 67 
Although the North sought diplomatic relations and trade with America for the obvious 
benefits therein, the political baggage incumbent with such support from the West was 
unacceptable to exponents of chuch 'e. 
By the mid-1980s North Korea had improved relations with the Soviet Union, 
primarily in response to China's opening to the West and it's Four Modernizations 
programs. 68 Additionally, North Korea had increased importation of industrial goods from 
Japan and the West (primarily Europe). Apparently, interpretations of the chucb'e 
ideology vary according to the type of external assistance received and obligations 
incurred! 69 In any case, by this point North Korea had also made considerable gestures 
67 Bruce Cumings, The Two Koreas, pp.71-72. 
68 
"In 1984 Kim II sung visited Moscow for the first time in 23 years, and also spent 
several weeks touring Eastern Europe. He returned to meet Gorbachev in 1986, in which 
year joint Soviet-North Korean naval exercises were undertaken. In addition, the North 
Korean government granted port facilities and overflying rights to the Soviet fleet and air 
force, reportedly in return for the supply of Soviet MiG-23 fighters and surface-to-air 
missiles. Soviet-North Korean trade grew rapidly, with North Korean imports more than 
quadrupling in the four years between 1984 and 1988." Aidan Foster-Carter, "North 
Korea-Foreign Relations," The Far East and Australasian, 25 th ed, (London: Europa, 
1993), p.437. 
69 North Korea's stated interpretation was that international economic and technical 
collaboration would not contradict chuch' e if done "'on the basis of equal footing and 
mutual benefit.' In September 1973, for instance, Kim told a visiting Japanese leader: 'In 
my opinion, the proper learning of foreign techniques also conforms with self-reliance. 
It is wrong to keep the door shut. .. If we inspect technological branches in foreign 
countries and learn their techniques we will advance more quickly.'" Rinn-Sup Shinn, 
"North Korean Foreign Affairs," p.198. 
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towards establishing multilateral relations with the Non-Aligned Movement nations and the 
Third World. In an effort to counter global imperialism, obliquely a manifestation of 
Korean national interests, North Korea sought to align all the socialist states, the 
nonaligned states, and developing countries together to wage a common struggle against 
imperialism (that is, against the United States and the Soviet Union.). 
However successful North Korea's burgeoning diplomatic efforts were initially, 
they were decidedly undermined during the latter 1980s. Inevitably, the attraction of 
South Korea's far greater economic prospects and the ROK's skillful 'nordpolitic' 
diplomacy challenged the effectiveness of the DPRK' s alliances with both USSR and 
PRC.70 As Pyongyang became increasingly bellicose in the international arena and thus 
a political and economic liability, both Gorbachev and Deng essentially turned their backs 
on the radical regime. Although China was the first to begin trading with Seoul, the 
USSR established full diplomatic relations with South Korea in September 1990. Starting 
in January 1991, the USSR announced its trade with North Korea would be conducted in 
convertible currencies at world market prices. The effects on North Korea were 
disastrous. Effectively cut off from their economic umbilical cord, Pyongyang's total 
trade volume declined by more than US $1 , 1OOm. , almost a quarter, in 1991 . The coup 
attempt in Moscow in August 1991 further weakened USSR-DPRK relations because the 
peipetrators apparently included some of the DPRK' s few remaining friends in Moscow. 
Just as North Korea's relative decline was in large part perpetrated by its isolation from 
key world players, so was close and continuous contact with the United States (and Japan) 
been instrumental in the growth and success of South Korea. Despite scandal ("Korea-
gate") and repeated threats of significant US troop withdrawals (primarily the Carter 
70 As practiced by South Korea, 'nordpolitic' is the replacement of unqualified anti-
communism by a more subtle solicitation of China and the USSR. This was highly 
successful in both its direct and indirect aims: to establish better ties with powerful 
neighbors, and thus to force their ally, North Korea into a more accommodating 
diplomatic attitude. 
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administration, 1977), the US and Korea remained lasting allies. 
With the fall of international communism, North Korea was left standing alone with 
few friends and little to offer the world in the way of enticements. The DPRK was bereft 
of the traditional supports of its Cold War allies. The system created the state and 
ultimately it was the DPRK's attempted manipulations of thereof that led to it's current 
position. Certainly there were the occasional glimmers of hope such as Pyongyang's 
attempts to negotiate with South Korea and their efforts to establish multilateral 
arrangements among the disenfranchised. However, in their quest to fulfill the national 
interests, unification, autonomy, and prosperity, the DPRK and its place in the Cold War 
alliance system was an abysmal failure. 
South Korea, while not entirely satisfied with its fate during the Cold War, was in 
a mood to consider new approaches to relations with the North. It had enjoyed 
phenomenal economic progress and had benefited from the protective military shield 
provided by the United States. It had emerged on the world stage as a viable player. 
However, during the entire period of the Cold War, the Korean Peninsula remained a 
divided state. The dream of unification was unfulfilled. Addressing only the perceived 
national interests of the great powers, the system divided the Peninsula in the interest of 
containment and persists to this day only as a means to excise a rogue, nationalist state . 
. . . bilateral relations between the two Koreas remain essentially 
unchanged, for the appearance of detente on the Korean peninsula, 
generated by the initiation of a dialogue between Seoul and 
Pyongyang, has proved to be totally illusory. The level of mutual 
distrust and animosity between the two Koreas is so dangerously 
high that one begins to wonder if their political reintegration is even 
remotely possible, the putative strong bonds of common language 
and cultural heritage notwithstanding. 71 
71 Koh, p.32. 
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Both sides were ready to try anything which would hold the promise of a new road 
to unity. The system of purely bilateral agreements had been found wanting. The stage 
was thus set in both Koreas for probing into the possibilities of multilateralism. Whether 
contemporary multilateral security arrangements will mend these wounds and cater to the 
interests of the Peninsula remains to be seen. Perhaps unification is a foregone conclusion. 
Assuming that multilateralism avoids the onus of imperialism, the possibility exists that 
a new multilateral forum may facilitate cooperation between North and South. This 
question will be addressed in the next chapter. 
50 
ID. UNITED STATES NATIONAL INTERESTS, ITS ALLIANCE SYSTEMS, 
AND THE COLD WAR IN NORTHEAST ASIA 
Amidst the transformation taking place in international relations, it is 
useful to bear in mind that United States interests in Asia have been 
remarkably consistent over the past two centuries: Commercial access 
to the region; freedom of navigation; and the prevention of the rise of 
any hegemonic power or coalition. 72 
A. PRECEDENT TO COLD WAR 
Although the early history of American involvement in the East Asia/Pacific is well 
documented and has been examined in the greatest detail, it is important to recapitulate the 
milestones in the pursuit of the national interest. From 1844's "Treaty of Amity and 
Commerce" intended to open diplomatic relations between the United States and China, to 
the milieu of agreements settling World War II, America's interest in the East Asia/Pacific was 
driven by a combination of economic and philosophical concerns. 73 Throughout the 
nineteenth century, the United States was profoundly active in maritime exploitation, global 
exploration, and the pursuit of mercantile interests around the entire Pacific. The sheer range 
and impact of the American fleet (including a variety of military, commercial, scientific, and 
moral endeavors) had rendered the Pacific a virtual "American lake. "74 Although Japan and 
Korea remained insular and closed during the better part of the nineteenth century, America 
in time developed intricate trade and diplomatic liaisons with the rest ofNortheast Asia.75 
72 Department of Defense. A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to 
Congress 1992. U.S. Government Printing Office, November 1992, p 2-9. 
73 This treaty was in response to the Treaty ofNanking (1842) between China and Great 
Britain. With the British establishing formal relations with the Chinese, the US' lack of a 
"China policy" was highlighted. More to the point, the traditional means of trade in the 
region were rendered obsolete. It was essential for the United States to reestablish 
commercial equity with the British and other countries active in China. 
74 Wtlliam H. Goetzman, as cited in Arthur Power Dudden, The American Pacific, From the 
Old China Trade to the Present, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p.17. 
75 Relatively open relations were established by Commodores Biddle and Perry in the period 
1846 to 1854; Korea forced into the world by imperialist Meiji Japan in 1895. Formal 
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The pursuit of American interests was evident primarily in three diplomatic ventures: 
the Treaty of Wang Hsia, the Treaty of Portsmouth, and the Washington Naval Conference; 
and two foreign policy philosophies: the "Open Door" and ''Dollar Diplomacy" of the 
McKinley, Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson administrations. Through America's commercial 
trading and whaling interests, the Pacific had become a bridge to East Asia's wealth. 
Consequently, as American citizens ventured forth across the Pacific in search of opportunity, 
the government was obliged to begin practicing foreign policy-making in the region. The 
earliest important measures to protect US interests were the "Open Door" policies and 
"Dollar Diplomacy," relatively effective instruments for protecting the US commercial 
interests in the region. 76 
In time, escalating territorial conflicts between China, Russia, and Japan simply 
overwhelmed the stabilizing influence of mere economic liaison. As Japan's most recent 
imperial period began to flourish, Roosevelt sought to protect America's interests in the 
region and seized the opportunity to balance the powers. Meeting with Japanese and Russian 
representatives in Portsmouth, New Hampshire on August 9, 1905, Roosevelt pushed to 
establish territorial compromise and peace in Liaodong, Manchuria, Korea, and Sakhalin. 77 
relations with the Japanese were established via the Treaty ofKanagawa, (31 March, 1854). 
76 Although the Open Door Note of July, 1900, was ostensibly based on America's Monroe 
Doctrine premise of preserving states' administrative and political integrity, Secretary of State 
John Hay defined the three pedestals of American foreign policy (towards China) as 1) the 
preservation of China, 2) the opportunity for open and impartial trading, and 3) the 
protection of American lives and property. See Dud den, pp.112-13 5; and Thomas G. 
Paterson, J. Garry Clifford, and Kenneth J. Hagen, American Foreign Policy, A History/Since 
1900 2nd ed, (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1983), p.239. 
77 Within the year the Russo-Japanese War had been terminated, Manchuria was reopened 
to foreign and American trade, and Roosevelt had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize; it 
seems clear that his Portsmouth meetings be deemed a success. In that the agreement allowed 
Japan freedom of action on the Korean Peninsula however, it bore an ominous foreshadowing 
offurther Japanese imperialism. 
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Two decades later, the combined challenges of Chinese nationalism, an independent 
foreign policy of internationalism, and a need for international arms controls prompted the 
Harding administration to summon the Washington Conference of 1921-1922. Strongly 
signalling international autonomy, the American government had again rejected European 
entanglements and the League of Nations, preferring other arrangements to ensure 
international security. Concerned with the ongoing difficulties with Japan over China, 
Secretary of State Hughes acted on a British suggestion to convene a conference of all 
nations with interests in the Western Pacific. The administration's goal was to halt any further 
naval buildup in the region before a real arms race developed. 78 For the Americans, the 
Washington Conference proved to be a success, establishing a favorable balance of power at 
relatively low cost and affirming previous administrations' Open Door Policies.79 As 
admirable as these efforts were to thwart destructive competition among the powers, they 
failed to entirely appease Chinese nationalists. They had rebuffed China's efforts to end 
extraterritoriality and to regain control of her import duties. The Treaties however, in 
conjunction with the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), had effectively insured peace in the region 
during this period. 
With the onset of global depression in 1929, Japan suffered drastic economic 
hardships in the civilian sector, inciting a renewed support for the military leaders and right-
wing political zealots. Perhaps the subsequent rise of the Kwantung Army and bloody 
78 All states that is except for the outcast Soviet Union. With the Communist scare over 
bolshevism, the Soviets were a distinct persona non grata in such an international forum. 
79 The Conference spawned three important treaties: the Five-Power Treaty of naval 
limitations which restricted total capital ship tonnage to ratios of 5:5:3:1.67:1.67 for Britain, 
the United States, Japan, France, and Italy. The Four-Power Treaty replaced the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance with a mutual agreement to respect each other's possessions in the Pacific, 
maintain the status quo for fortifications, Japan relinquished control of Shantung to the 
Chinese, and Britain would restore Weihaiwei. The Nine-Power Treaty brought Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, and China in with the five naval powers to assure China's sovereignty, 
independence, and territorial integrity, effectively enforcing the America's Open Door Policy. 
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incorporation of Manchuria best signalled the earliest stages of the Pacific War. The 
vehement disapproval of Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson and President Hoover certainly 
served to further arouse the officers in charge of the Japanese government. 
As European states were sucked into the maelstrom of World War II, Japan found 
itself with a distinct strategic advantage in the EA/P. Germany's victories over Belgian, 
Dutch, French, and British forces had stretched those states' resources beyond their limits, 
providing Japan with the opportunity it had been waiting for. The beleaguered British, Dutch 
and French navies and their colonies faced certain seizure or destruction at the hands of the 
resource hungry Japanese. When President Roosevelt saw that the Europeans (Vichy France) 
were turning over airfields and seaports in Indochina to the Japanese, he responded by 
imposing an embargo an aviation fuel and scrap metals. When Japan allied itself with 
Germany and the Soviet Union, the United States found itself the only tangible opposition to 
the Asian hegemon. As the imperial power continued to spread throughout Southeast Asia, 
Roosevelt again responded by imposing a total economic blockade, freezing all Japanese 
assets in the United States and further cut all petroleum exports to the country. Nothing but 
war or a complete reversal of policy by both sides could break the blockade. It required the 
military victory over Japan to set the stage for the American Cold War policy of Containment. 
B. THE COLD WAR 
With the devastation of Europe and much of Asia during World War II, the United 
States and the Soviet Union emerged as the industrial and political superpowers. An 
expansionist USSR was on a global collision course with an America intent consolidating a 
stable East Asian political environment, and eventually, the containment of communism. The 
unfolding Cold War mandated that the United States determine who were its allies and friends 
around the world. 
In a departure from the previous era's predominantly Sinic-centered Asian policies, 
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Secretary of State Dean Acheson declared that American vital interests in the EA/P were 
based on the islands off the Asian mainland (Japan, the Philippines, and Australia), and on the 
Korean Peninsula. Having done that, the United States tried to formulate the best policies 
possible (global, regional and bilateral) to protect and promote its own best interests and the 
best interests of those who committed themselves to common purposes. Thus the United 
States and its allies committed to the containment of their "common" enemy, communism. 
Accordingly, the emerging strategic task in Asia was to assure that no serious counter-
force could ever be deployed from Asian ports. 80 This strategy was given credence by 
MacArthur's declarations describing the United States' essential operations area as a fan-
shaped sweep of the Pacific including the Midway islands, the former Japanese mandated 
islands, Clark Field in the Philippines, and above all Okinawa. As the foundation of the 
United States' image as~ Pacific power, and the keystone to promoting and protecting its 
interests in Asia, forward presence in and bilateral relations with the Philippines, Japan, and 
South Korea became elemental to the United States' containment strategy in the Pacific. With 
the intensity surrounding the bipolar standoffbetween the United States and the Soviet Union 
rising, joint military planning and general development programs scrambled to meet the 
challenge. 
Here lay the foundation for the establishment of United States 
overseas bases in a ring designed to contain the Soviet Union and its 
satellites. Two wars in the 20th century and the rapid development of 
explosive situations in the post-World War II era had convinced the 
United States that its first line of defense no longer lay in the Western 
Hemisphere. To insure its security, the support of strong allies with 
sufficient courage to permit the United States to establish advance 
bases on their soil was essential. 81 
80 G.R. Sloan, Geopolitics in United States Strategic Policy: 1890-1987, (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1988). 
81 Capt. Edward F. Dissette, USN, "Overseas Bases- How Long for this World?," United 
States Naval Institute Proceedings Vol.86, No.7, (July 1960), 
pp.23-30. 
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Additionally, the United States most visible mechanism for promoting and protecting 
its interests was the placement of its forces abroad. The presence of United States troops, 
ready to fight and committed to the defense of foreign soil as part of the United States 
comprehensive system of alliances for mutual defense, was one of the most important 
contributions to the United States political posture during the Cold War. 82 Even if these 
forces were only tokens of United States military power at the time, they illustrated the 
determination ofthe United States to maintain a military posture in support offriends and 
allies on the one hand, and containment on the other. These forces were to "serve as a trigger 
to release the full war potential of the United States" as needed. 83 
The positioning of United States military forces overseas was consistent with the 
strategic thought of using a thin line of forward deployed combat-ready forces, scattered 
along the entire periphery of the Free World to contain the Soviet Union. The leaders of the 
United States had come to recognize that the United States could not go it alone in containing 
the Soviet Union, either in an isolationist sense or by assuming the entire military burden for 
the defense of the Free World. This posture, rather pretentiously, assumed that other nations 
of the free world accepted and were willing to fulfill their role as part of the mutual security 
system.84 
When the United States 'brokered' the end ofthe Second World War, it was compelled 
82 Clinton E. Granger, Maj (USA), "Global Deployments," Military Review, (October 1964), 
p. 9-14. 
83 ibid. 
84 In support ofthe perimeter defense strategy, the United States deployed forces forward 
in the Pacific theater to South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam, along 
with deployed naval units. While the Pacific force manning level declined from 231,000 
troops in FY1964 to 110,000 in FY1992, the percentage of United States troops committed 
to the Pacific theater has only declined from 31% in FY1964 to 28% in FY1992. In contrast, 
while United States troops committed to the Atlantic theater have declined from 436,000 in 
FY1964 to 243,000 in FY1992, the percentage ofUnited States troops committed to this 
theater has risen from 58% in FY1964 to 62% in FY1992. 
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"to pick up the pieces" of the victims of repeated colonial occupation by European and 
Japanese forces. This support initially ranged from political backing for Indonesians fighting 
the Dutch for independence, to the maintenance of a neo-colonial grasp on the Philippines, 
to the military occupation and reconstruction Japan and Korea. Determined to suppress 
undue political dynamics in the region, the United States assumed the imperial burdens of 
maintaining peace and stability in large portions ofboth Northeast and Southeast Asia.85 
Following the embarrassing debacle of vacillating US support for vying regimes in 
China (alternately Mao's Communists and the Nationalist Chinese), the rise of the 
Communists forced Washington's hand. Torn by the uncertainties ofthe Chinese situation 
and by domestic "infighting," the US assumed a policy in 1949 of partial disengagement or 
Nonrecognition of the People's Republic due to the presumed Sino-Soviet alliance. Soon 
however, the outbreak of hostilities in Korea in June 1950 captured America's attention and 
all ofEast Asia became the main theater of Cold War operations. 
After the Korean War broke out, the United States renewed its efforts to pursue 
security alliances on a world-wide bases. The United States needed more bases in the Pacific 
to protect the seaward fringes of Asia, namely Japan and the Philippines. The pattern of 
communist expansion in the EA/P was matched by the establishment and development of 
United States overseas bases in the Philippines, South Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Taiwan, and 
Thailand. These bases became the foundation for the Eisenhower-Dulles strategy of massive 
retaliation. 86 
As the military confrontation escalated in Korea, Indochina was viewed as similarly 
85 Lea E. Williams, Southeast Asia-A History, (London: Oxford University Press, 1976). 
86 Massive retaliation required diversified, comprehensively equipped military bases for the 
deployment and logistical support of nuclear weapons or weapons equipped platforms. 
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vulnerable to Communist expansion. 87 When Chinese troops augmented the North Koreans, 
the scope of the communist agenda was finally clear to Washington; the US began funneling 
military equipment and supplies to the French in Vietnam. The French experience in 1954 
(first Indochina War) prompted the US to attempt the construction of a new defense 
perimeter to block any further advance by the Communists. 
C. COLD WAR ALLIANCE SYSTEMS 
This so-called defense perimeter would be based on a web of security alliances and 
relationships around the globe. Designed to forestall and defeat the advance ofpredatorial 
communism, this "containment" policy and series of security relationships was the major tool 
of American foreign policy from the close of the Second World War through the eventual fall 
of communism in 1989.88 
Although containment's founder never set forth in one place the full scope of his 
strategic vision, scholars maintain that George F. Kennan's view of the concept is internally 
cohesive and broadly consistent over time. The first stage of Kennan's containment strategy 
argued for an active U.S. policy to maintain the world balance of power in the special 
circumstances following World War II. Their goal was to prevent the Soviets from acquiring 
control of the remaining centers of world industrial capacity; the heart of Europe, Japan, and 
the United Kingdom, all which had been crippled by the war. Second, limit Soviet influence 
outside the areas currently under Soviet control. In other words, divide and weaken the 
Soviet power. 89 In time, Kennan hoped that the Soviet view ofinternational politics could 
be modified to permit a negotiated settlement with the West, reducing Cold War tensions and 
87 Williams. 
88 Terry L. Diebel, "Alliances and Security Relationships," Containment: Concept and Policy 
Vol.l, eds. Terry L. Diebel and John Lewis Gaddis, (Washington: National Defense 
University Press, 1986), p.189-215. 
89 Diebel. 
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establishing a global balance which could ensue without constant and intensive American 
involvement. 
Kennan's concern however, was that if the United States began amassing a system of 
anti-Soviet alliances, it would not stop until all states were accounted for; a virtual zero-sum 
game of international allegiance gathering. There would be: "no logical stopping point until 
that system has circled the globe and embraced all the non-communist countries of Europe, 
Asia, and Africa. "90 Perhaps more significantly, Kennan opposed anti-Soviet alliances due to 
the emphasis on uni-dimensional military containment. The use of alliances would militarize 
United States relationships with much of the world. Diverting allies energies from the tasks 
of political and economic development would effectively undermine their resistance to the real 
threats of ideological subversion and political infiltration. 
In response to Kennan's containment theory, the National Security Council began 
working in early 1950 on the now-infamous NSC-68. NSC-68 became the blueprint for 
waging the Cold War for the next twenty years and grounded in two fundamental premises: 
90 Diebel. 
First, the global balance of power had been 'fundamentally altered' 
since the nineteenth century so that the Americans and Russians now 
dominated the world: 'What is new, what makes the continuing crisis, 
is the polarization of power which inescapably confronts the slave 
society with the free.' It was us against them. Second, 'the Soviet 
Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new 
fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute 
authority,' initially in 'the Soviet Union and second in the areas now 
under its control.' ... 'In the minds of the Soviet leaders, however, 
achievement of this design requires the dynamic extension of their 
authority and the ultimate elimination of any effective opposition to 
their authority .... To that end Soviet efforts are now directed toward 
the domination of the Eurasian land mass. '91 
91 Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 
1991), pp.96-97. 
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NSC-68 moved to the inevitable conclusion that the United States: 
... must lead in building a successfully functioning political and 
economic system in the free world,' for 'the absence of order among 
nations is becoming less and less tolerable. 
The key to impose order around the globe and to deter an attack on the United States 
was to become more than merely militarily dominant, but lead the world towards socio-
economic development. The emphasis shifted from a simple anti-Soviet stance to anti-
Communist. 
While always concerned that the United States might overextend itself, Kennan said 
that America needed allies to share the burdens of free world leadership, and that the United 
States needed a strong defense posture to sustain allied cooperation. Nevertheless, Kennan 
was against alliances as primary tools of American national security policy: 
... I had little confidence in the value of written treaties of alliance 
generally. I had seen too many instances in which they had been 
forgotten, or disregarded, or found to be irrelevant, or distorted for 
ulterior purposes when the chips were down. 92 
In the end, Kennan's concept of containment of the Soviet Union was overshadowed 
by the need to use all means to contain Communist ideology. Virtually all areas of the world 
were deemed vital to the overall balance of power. In that the USSR was building a system 
of communist allies, it was essential for the US to form its own web of states to contain 
spreading Communist power. 
Therefore, under the Truman-Acheson administration, alliances were cultivated to 
provide the framework for defense relationships among the world's leading "free" countries. 
These alliances were intended to contain the aggression of any communist military force. 
92 Diebel. 
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Under the Eisenhower-Dulles administration, alliances were expanded to include those 
nations who were not necessarily vital to maintaining a global balance of power, but who 
could be seen as vulnerable to a predatorial USSR. They were the products of specific 
situations: Japan, South Korea, the Republic of China, and the states signatory to the 
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. 
Detente with eastern communism blossomed during the Nixon administration as an 
era of enlightened negotiation began. Nixon and Kissinger visited Moscow and Beijing, 
removed the United States militarily from Vietnam, and reduced United States military 
commitments abroad (Nixon Doctrine93). Brezhnev and Nixon established a detente policy, 
and trade relations were renewed with Beijing as a goodwill gesture to the Chinese (not to 
mention American business as well). In the Carter administration, the restoration offormal 
diplomatic relations between Beijing and Washington was announced in 1978. In return, the 
United States abandoned its treaty of mutual defense with Taiwan. Regarding East Asia at 
least, detente made containment (and NSC-68) temporarily irrelevant. 
With the vitriolic rhetoric of the Reagan administration, the Cold War returned with 
unprecedented intensity. Traditional alliances were bolstered by unprecedented military 
escalation, and the Cold War focused on the developing/non-aligned world. The United 
93 Dr.Claude Buss offers the following analysis of the Nixon Doctrine: "By way of 
elaboration of the Nixon Doctrine, various spokesmen for the administration explained that 
the United States would remain strong in the Pacific as an encouragement to its friends and 
a deterrent to war, but would no longer immerse itself in the internal affairs of others. The 
United States would support nationalism, economic development and modernization in 
accordance with its interests and commitments. It would not turn its back on any nation of 
the region but would avoid the creation of situations in which there might be such dependency 
on the United States as to enmesh the United States inevitably in what were essentially Asian 
conflicts and problems. The United States wished to extend assistance to the greatest extent 
possible but in an orderly and judicious manner; it wished to participate as one Pacific nation 
among several in economic development and the maintenance of stability in Asia." See Claude 
A. Buss, The United States and the Philippines, (Stanford: AEI-Hoover Policy Studies, 
1977), p.l 0 I. 
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States provided security assistance to any country which would remain anti-communist and 
support the United States, regardless of that state's own philosophies. 
A third system of postwar security commitments was negotiated under the Reagan 
administration. Geographically, these commitments concentrated on the Third World. 
Involving no treaties, the new commitments were based on arms transfers and military 
training, economic aid, informal diplomatic contact, and facilities construction.94 Not being 
treaty-bound allies in the traditional sense, these "friends" were subject to considerable 
"freedom of action" as far as inter-state interaction is concerned. These nations included 
Burma, Indonesia, and Malaysia in the Southeast Asia sub-region. 
D. THE COLD WAR TREATIES 
The United States' bulwark treaties with the EAIP were negotiated in 1951. 
Attempting to negotiate an early and lenient peace treaty with potential Cold War allies the 
Japanese, John Foster Dulles found that the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand 
demanded United States co111ITlltments as protection against a rearmed Japan. Those nations 
refused to enter into a multilateral pact with their recent enemy and required independent 
bilateral agreements with the United States. These three treaties, signed separately in 1951, 
remain in effect today. 
The second set of treaties were negotiated under the Eisenhower-Dulles 
administration. Far more 'containment-oriented' than the earlier treaties, Dulles' alliance 
system is clearly seen as containing the Soviet Union and its Chinese ally at their extant 
perimeter. 95 The alliance with South Korea had been drafted to underwrite the armistice 




against Communist power at the Thirty-Eight Parallel. 
The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, on the other hand, was an American 
scheme to hold the line against further communist gains in Indochina after the First Indochina 
War. Related was the United States' first ventures into multilateral security arrangements in 
the EA/P. By negotiating the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, and the establishing 
the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the US was on one hand banding together 
states for mutual benefit, and on the other attempting to encircle aggressive communism. 
SEATO was doomed to failure from the start. Loosely formed on the NATO model, 
membership of SEATO included Britain, New Zealand, Australia, France, Pakistan, the 
United States, and only two of the Southeast Asian states, Thailand and the Philippines. The 
collective responsibility of participants in the organization was essentially restricted to uniting 
to block an open invasion of the region by any communist power using conventional warfare 
and conventional tactics. 96 Suffering from wavering member support and a decided lack of 
unanimity, the organization proved ineffective and was eventually disbanded in 1977.97 
Differences in cultural foundations (indeed, the very spectrum of cultural diversity among 
member nations), and an essentially different kind of security confrontation undermined 
SEATO from the beginning. 
Lastly, the mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China, was signed to give 
communist China second thoughts about invading the nationalist China island of Taiwan. 
96 For more on SEATO see chapter VI; also: Williams, Southeast Asia-A History, or David 
Joel Steinberg, In Search of Southeast Asia, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 
pp.3 87-445. 
97 Steinberg, p.445. See also: Ulrich A. Straus, "Southeast Asia in Containment Strategies 
for the 1990s," Containment: Concept and Policy Vol.2, eds., Terry L. Diebel and John Lewis 
Gaddis, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1986), pp. 520-521. 
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These collective security arrangements (with the exception of the Taiwan Treaty 
which was terminated in 1974) to this day continue to be defined as the underpinnings of the 
United States national security strategy. As stated in the Secretary of Defense' 1992 Annual 
Report to Congress: 
Our (extant) security alliances provide a clear demonstration of our 
commitments, help to deter potential aggressors, enhance regional 
stability by lowering the potential for conflict, reduce expenditures, 
and reassure allies that they do not have to rely solely on their own 
resources in order to protect themselves from external threats. 98 
The following bilateral treaties represented the United States national interests in 
Northeast Asia during the Cold War era and continue to do so today: 
1. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States and 
Japan 
The Treaty ofMutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, 
currently in force, was signed at Washington, January 19, 1960.99 While: 
and 
and 
Desiring to strengthen the bonds of peace and friendship traditionally 
existing between them, and to uphold the principles of democracy, 
individual liberty, and the rule of law, 
... desiring further to encourage closer economic cooperation between 
them and to promote conditions of economic stability and well-being 
in their countries, 
... considering that they have a common concern in the maintenance of 
international peace and security in the Far East, 
the operative clause of the treaty in the event of armed attack is: 
98 Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and Congress, (Washington, D. C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1992), p.15-18. 
99 This treaty superseded the previous Security Treaty between the United States and Japan 
signed at San Francisco on September 8, 1951. 
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... each party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in 
the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous 
to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the 





Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall 
be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United nations 
in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such 
measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the 
measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and 
security, 
... for the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the 
maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the 
United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval 
forces offacilities and areas in Japan, 
... this treaty shall remain in force until in the opmwn of the 
Governments ofthe United States of America and Japan there shall 
have come into force such United Nations arrangements as will 
satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of international peace and 
security in the Japan area ... 100 
2. The Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of 
Korea 
The Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and Republic of Korea was 
signed at Washington on October 1, 1953. This treaty was signed by the United States in 
exchange for the Republic of Korea's cooperation in arranging an armistice to end the Korean 
war. While: 
Reaffirming their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all 
governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the 
100 Department of State, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements Vol. 11, 





... desiring to declare publicly and formally their common 
determination to defend themselves against external armed attack so 
that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of 
them stands alone in the Pacific area, 
... desiring further to strengthen their efforts for collective defense for 
the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a 
more comprehensive and effective system of regional security in the 
Pacific area, 
the operative clause of the treaty in the event of armed attack is: 
In addition, 
... each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on 
either of the Parties in territories not under their respective 
administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one ofthe parties 
as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, 
would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it 
would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its 
constitutional processes. 
... the Republic of Korea grants, and the United States of America 
accepts, the rights to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in 
and about the territory of the Republic of Korea as determined by 
mutual agreement. 101 
Beyond treaties and formal diplomatic liaison, other forms of "security" assistance 
have shaped the relationships between the United States and alliance partners in the EA/P. 
In the past, this assistance has been used to win friends and bind cooperative nations closer 
to the United States. According to the nature of shared interests, the United States 
supplemented friends and alliances with loans (FMF program) for industrial-base and weapons 
development cooperation, payments for overseas basing and access agreements, 
demonstrations of military capability to deter regional threats, training to enhance defense 
101 Department of State, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements Vol.5, 
Pt.3, (1954), (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 2368-2376. 
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capabilities, and where necessary joint or combined deployment of military forces. 102 Such 
assistance facilitated communications and inter-operability with allied military forces, enabled 
forward presence, supported crisis response capabilities, and defended mutual national 
interests. 
The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program is a low-cost 
grant aid program that provides military education and training to some 5,000 foreign military 
and civilian defense personnel from over 100 countries each year. IMET exposes future 
leaders of many foreign defense establishments to American thought and culture. 
Indoctrinating them to US national security affairs and the relationship between the military 
establishment and civilian government. 
With the end ofthe Cold War, IMET has been expanded to provide 
education for military and civilian officials from some former Warsaw 
Pact countries. The IMET program is one of the least costly and most 
effective programs for maintaining United States influence and 
assisting foreign countries with their development of self-defense 
capabilities. 103 
IMET has facilitated the crucial understanding between the US and allied military personnel, 
enabling future inter-operability and cooperative security relations. 
United States bilateral and multilateral economic assistance to developing countries 
traditionally has focused on both short-term national security goals and longer-term economic 
social development goals. 104 The development goals have rested largely on moral and 
humanitarian precepts, such as meeting the basic human needs of poor people, as well as on 
United States national interest needs, such as protecting and expanding markets for United 
102 Secretary of Defense, Annual report to the President and Congress, (Washington, D. C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, February, 1992), p.IS-18. 
103 Secretary of Defense, Annual report to the President and Congress (1992), p.IS-18. 
104 Richard L. Hough, Economic Assistance and Security, (Washington, D.C.: National 
Defense University, 1982). 
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States exports and securing access to strategic materials. 
Strategic interaction is fostered at a less tangible level as well, through cultural 
exchange. Just as ]oint' military leadership training facilitates official cooperation, cultural 
exchange promotes sensitivity among nations, reducing the likelihood of misunderstandings. 
'People to people' contacts, it has been assumed, make it possible for nations to 'know' one 
another better; the danger of war between them is, as a result, correspondingly reduced. 105 
Cultural exchanges have been expanding between the United States and other nations. 
Cultural exchanges have been used to support the United States own purposes by bearing 
witness to its own great capabilities, ultimate good intentions, and sincerity in winning the 
hearts and minds of people. These exchanges range from exchange students and Fulbright 
scholars to prestigious non-governmental organizations (such as the Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Council, Asia Foundation, Asia Society, Ford Foundation), and official programs 
such as the United States Information Agency (USIA), and the Peace Corps. 
Cultural exchanges between academia have been an effective tool in the pursuit of 
national security. Increased understanding between academia of different nations have 
provided an alternative, non-governmental, route towards the formulation of foreign policy. 
In addition, cultural exchanges provided by the Peace Corps (grass roots level), have 
enhanced international goodwill through providing volunteers for development assistance in 
education, agriculture, health, small-enterprise development, and natural resource 
programs. 106 
105 John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International 
System," The Cold War and After, ed. Sean M. Lynn-Jones. (Boston: The MIT Press, 1992), 
p.1-44. 
106 United States General Accounting Office, Peace Corps: Meeting the Challenges of the 




In the absence of indigenous international security structures to arbitrate the 
amorphous post-World War II Asian milieu, the United States, as victor, was in position to 
reaffirm its interests in "the American lake." In response to the aggressive specter of 
communism spreading throughout Asia, the US sought to maintain the Pacific as a firm 
buffer, both physically and figuratively. For the next forty-five years, throughout the Cold 
War, the United States pursued its national security interests in the EA/P on a variety of 
planes. At the highest level, the US cultivated a system ofbilateral alliances- treaties- and 
relationships with 'like-minded' states in the region. Enforcing these treaties and interests 
through the maintenance of credible military presence (augmented in response to tension or 
actual conflict), US forces were forward-based throughout Asia: Guam, Japan, Korea, the 
Philippines, and the Indian Ocean. The United States' nuclear umbrella and conventional 
military operations provided a security blanket for the entire region. It implemented military 
assistance programs, supplied dual use technology, and infused civilian bureaucracies with 
technically trained and culturally sensitive ex-military personnel. 
Although these alliances were purportedly based on common interests: democracy, 
free market economics, anti-communism, etc., it is elemental that definitions of these concepts 
vary markedly between the US and its allies. The fact that the greatest threat to the US and 
its allies during the Cold War was the nuclear power ofthe Soviet Union sublimated those 
incongruities and strengthened, to a degree, the bilateral alliances. While disputes have 
always existed regarding the correct amount of security assistance is required by an alliance 
partner, of more concern to the US alliance partners are the four-year fluctuations and 
vacillations in foreign policy. The American track-record this century is not quite enough to 
assure Asian friends and allies that someday the United States will not return to isolation. 
The fact that the American bilateral alliances with Northeast Asian partners still exist 
speaks to their durability. In that the current geo-political and economic environment has 
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evolved to a degree unimaginable in 1945, however, gives cause to reconsider whether these 
arrangements provide the best possible security for the basic national interests of the United 
States. 
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IV. CONFLICTS OF NATIONAL INTEREST IN NORTHEAST ASIA, 
POST-COLD WAR 
A. CHINA 
China's emergence as a rising economic superpower and potential regional hegemon 
should not come as a surprise. Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms and modernizations in 
China's southern states have brought extra-ordinary success. However spectacular their 
successes have been, China must still confront political and military security issues arising 
from the passing of its former bilateral ally, the Soviet Union. The PRC is faced with the 
daunting task of shaping the Asia-Pacific Region into what it considers an acceptable new 
order. The end of the Soviet-United States global balancing act has left the region open for 
a new world order in which all the nations of the Pacific Rim will have a creative role. 
The Chinese do not want a total withdrawal ofthe American military and economic 
presence in the Asia-Pacific region. Grounded in fears of domestic political unrest and the 
failure of economic reforms, the Chinese authorities are concerned lest a total American 
retreat from the region would leave the field open to a re-militarized, antagonized, and 
potentially hegemonic Japan. Uncertainty about the future is enough to account for the spate 
of Chinese diplomatic activity, and is sufficient for China to explore the possibilities of a 
greater degree of multilateralism in Northeast Asia. The Chinese are not entirely free from 
concern about a possible American or Russian hegemony. 
This section addresses both contemporary China's response to the changing security 
environment and the means by which the country is better able to effect its modernization 
program. Through an increased participation in regional and multilateral organizations 
(economic, security, governmental and non-governmental), China hopes to be able to better 
satisfy the totality of its national interests. 
The term "Fourth Revolution" refers loosely to China's response to the modern 
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Western world. 107 Faced with the dawning of the twenty-first century and inevitable 
integration with a world they largely cannot control, China is modernizing its social and 
economic infrastructure through moderate, step-by-step policy changes. Whereas previous 
steps to modernization were decidedly 'guided' from the top leadership, this current stage of 
transition is revolutionary. It represents a genuine mandate from the people; a mandate 
sanctioned wholeheartedly by the very top leadership. As Deng re-emerged in 1976, he 
established a new social contract. He underwrote continued CCP legitimacy and rule by 
promising a reversal of Cultural Revolution excesses and injustices, restoring order, 
reestablishing China's international prestige, jump starting productivity, and improving the 
overall quality oflife. 108 His was a remarkably far-sighted and fundamentally radical strategy 
based on the cruel realities of China's status in the world. 
This is systemic change brought about by China's increasing 
conformity, not to the self-proclaimed standards of the Middle 
Kingdom, but to the patterns of information flow, political and 
economic decision making, resource allocation, and distribution of 
authority judged necessary to compete in the modern world. 109 
This Fourth Revolution has been characterized by multiple 'westernizations' oftheir 
social, political, and economic culture. These fundamental changes include: an increasing 
market orientation of economic potential, from ownership through production and investment 
down to demand; the decentralization of administrative responsibilities (decision-making 
107 This section draws significantly upon Gerrit W. Gong's, "China's Fourth Revolution," 
The Washington Quarterly Vol.17: No.1 (Winter 1994): pp.29-43. See also Wang Jisi, 
"New Momentums of China's Asia Connection," Prepared for the Workshop on Links 
Between Economic and Security Relations; Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation 
(IGCC), San Diego, California; (13-15 May, 1993). China's previous revolutions (of the 
'modem' era) were of course: Sun Yat-sen's 1911 structural modernization, establishing 
sustained contact between the West and China; Mao Zedong's 1949 revolution 
transforming China into a 'people's republic'; and Deng Xiaoping' s 1978 modernization 
effort establishing 'socialism with Chinese characteristics' . 
108 Gong: p.32. 
109 G 30 ong: p. . 
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structures and processes); a shift from ideologically based cultural legitimacy to one of rising 
standards ofliving and nationalism; perhaps most significantly, an unprecedented opening of 
the world and China to each other. 110 
This last change is the most dramatic. Global contact has been established via cross-
border and domestic flows of information, and has spread a new ideological ethos heretofore 
unimaginable. Whether by telephone, television (satellite broadcast), fax, or radio, whether 
by electronic stock quotes or through the beeping pagers at their sides, there is an intense 
awareness being ingested by the Chinese of their (potential) place in the modern world. The 
external/international standard is now the domestic standard, and the new openness both 
fuels and facilitates the competition to accede to the world political, economic, and social 
arenas. 
This process now permeates China's coasts, cities, and their 
neighboring areas. It is increasingly penetrating China's interior 
villages and towns. This interaction of inside and outside is now two-
way and irreversible. It recognizes the link between China's domestic 
social and political stability and its dependence on international trade 
to maintain current standards of living. 111 
In order to facilitate international trade, to maximize the Fourth Revolution and fully actualize 
national interests, thus requires China's full and equal participation both in the global 
economy, and in the global polity. 
11° China's dramatic economic expansion and the opening of her doors to the world are 
clearly interrelated and co-dependent. Close economic ties beyond China's borders have 
made the entire Fourth Revolution possible. For instance: from 1979 to 1982, China's 
foreign investment totalled $1.17 billion USD; in 1992 alone, this figure reached $11.2 
billion. From 1979, when China had 36 contracts with 2 countries ($51 million value) to 
1991 with 8,438 contracts and 147 countries ($36 billion) to 1992 with 48,746 new 
contracts worth $57.5 billion. From 1978 to 1992, China's total the trade volume with 
world increased from $20.66 billion to $165.6 billion. Impressive growth; an even more 
impressive gesture towards global rapprochement. See Gong: p.31. 
111 Gong: p.34. 
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In stark contrast to China's need for an integral role in world political and economic 
sectors as a means to domestic development is their intractable fear of foreign intermeddling. 
Whereas China has traditionally seen multilateral security arrangements (MSA's) as tools for 
major powers to practice 'hegemonies', China's own participation until recently has been 
criticized as xenophobic. 112 While the potential for a unipolar international system has only 
been concerned in connection with a U.S. dominated Western-democratic-industrialized 
coalition, the current domestic focus and foreign policy inclinations of the Clinton 
administration would seem to indicate otherwise. 113 With the disappearance of the Soviet 
Union and the restrained role of President Clinton, China finds its own politico-military 
security in no immediate danger for the time being. 114 China is in the fortuitous position of 
being able to give top priority to domestic economic development. The obvious corollary 
follows that China's diplomacy can maximize its economic interests in this interdependent 
world. 
The essence of security strategy is about how to relate means to end 
in pursuing national security. Beijing's new thinking has changed both 
the meaning of end and means and the means-end relation in the 
security strategy. Security is no longer defined in military terms alone. 
As Chinese defense analysts argue, the connotation of 'security' 
becomes broader and more inclusive. Aside from military security, 
threat should also be defined in economic, technological, and 
ideological dimensions. 115 
m Japan's 'Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere', the Soviet Union's 'Asia Collective 
Security System', and to a similar degree the United States' ties to NATO and the U.S. 
series of bi-lateral security alliances in the Asia-Pacific. See Wang Qi, "The Chinese 
Perspective on Multilateral Security Arrangements (MSA) in the Asia-Pacific Region--A 
Premature Time Schedule" (Draft), Prepared for the Workshop on Links Between 
Economic and Security Relations; Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC), 
San Diego, California; (13-15 May, 1993): pp.2-4. 
113 Paul H.B. Godwin, "China's Asian Policy in the 1990s: Adjusting to the Post Cold-
War Environment," East Asian SeCJirity in the Post-Cold War Era, ed. Sheldon W. Simon, 
(New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), p.119. 
114 Wang Jisi: p.4. 
115 Peng Guangqian, et al, Iunshi Zhanlue Iianlun (A Concise Book of Military Strategy), 
Department of Strategic Studies of the People's Liberation Army Academy of Military 
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As they say in Beijing, only a prosperous socialist society can resist contamination from 
western democratic influence. 116 
It is no surprise then to see China linked, via its most prosperous regions, to regional 
economic organizations. In the South, the sub-region whose economic success has become 
the fodder oflegends, interdependence via investment from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, 
and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has made China virtually a full 
member of the latter organization. 117 Indeed, given the region's shared interests, the 
overwhelmingly positive nature of their trade and investment, and the need to coordinate the 
effects of their shared explosive growth, it is hardly coincidental that the Chinese have 
become active participants in what is perhaps the most ambitious Pacific attempt at 
multilateral institution building to date, the seventeen member Asian- Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC). 
That these economic organizations can have substantive impact on international 
politics is clear. For instance, in the case of the PRC and Taiwanese (ROC) relations, a major 
friction generator since the late 1940's, geo-economic imperatives have begun to temper 
political conduct. In part due to an annual $6 billion two-way trade between the PRC and the 
ROC, ROC's $1 billion worth of investments in the mainland, and some 1.5 million annual 
Taiwanese visitors to the PRC, and in part due to their participation in multilateral 
arrangements such as APEC, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the ASEAN 
Sciences, (Beijing: Jiefangjun Chubanshe, 1989): pp.35-36. As cited in Weixing Hu, 
"China's Security in a Changing World," Pacific Focus Vol.8, No.1, (Spring 1993), 
p.l18. 
116 Wang Jisi: p.4. 
117 
"Intra-Asian trade between China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand grew 58 percent from 1986 to 1992, and now 
accounts for 30 percent of those countries' total trade." See Robert A. Manning, "The 
Asian Paradox," World Policy Journal Vol.lO, No.3, (Fall 1993) 
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Ministerial meetings, the old sibling rivalries and hostilities have eroded to some degree. 118 
While APEC and ASEAN's potential as security tools are addressed elsewhere in this paper 
and remain as yet in question, any organizations capable of assembling such diverse groups 
of nations such as China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong into multilateral forums have earned 
considerable credibility. 
Indeed, China has shown dramatically improved foreign policy strategy through 
pursued membership in regional intergovernmental economic organizations. Chinese Foreign 
Minister Qian Qichen attended both the November 1991 Seoul APEC ministerial meeting 
(with officials from Taiwan and Hong Kong) and the 1993 APEC 'Pacific Summit' in Seattle. 
Augmented by their regular A SEAN participation beginning in 1991, the Chinese appear to 
be taking regionalism and multilateral participation as seriously as their rhetoric would 
indicate. 119 
China's activities in the United Nations and associated organizations are clear 
examples of its vision for multilateral participation. After regaining its UN Security Council 
seat in 1971, China has maximized its access to developmental funds and services. Previously 
limited to the give-and-take of assistance within the global communist network, post-Mao 
China was now able to more adequately underwrite its modernization efforts. Through its 
implementation of the substantial resources of the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP120) China has since 1979 made the dramatic transition from the reformist stance of 
the Mao era to the fully participatory Deng regime bent on full blown Western-style economic 
development. Despite opposition from many Third World nations and the Soviet Empire, the 
118 Manning, p.60. 
119 Weixing Hu: p.l21. 
12° Founded in 1966, UNDP is a voluntarily funded organization that administers most 
United Nations technical assistance. This assistance is in the fonn of loans and grants, 
advisory services, demonstration and training equipment, pre-investment planning, and 
management training for a variety of fields to the developing countries. 
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UNDP (along with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) distributed billions 
of dollars and credits to China for hundreds of projects and programs in the pursuit of 
development and modemization. 121 Despite China's resultant, sustained economic success, 
the country's population size ensures a relatively low GDP and guarantees a continuing need 
for investment capital and technology transfer. 122 In that the United Nations' resources are 
not unlimited, and China's eligibility as a 'developing' nation may be questionable, it is 
expected that the Asian Development Bank will increasingly fulfill China's funding 
requirements. 123 China's affiliation with the United Nations and affiliated organizations has 
facilitated its modernization in three distinct ways. First, China has been able to draw on the 
experience and 'corporate knowledge' of these organizations in order to more effectively 
analyze, plan, and train personnel for its extensive restructuring. Second, participation in 
these organizations brings China into contact with enormous pools of capital, enabling it to 
make the initially unprofitable and costly infrastructure and developmental changes, and 
weather the inevitable monetary and trade imbalances. Third, and perhaps most importantly, 
China's participation in these organizations brings it into an economic framework within 
which it can communicate, negotiate, and bargain with the advanced capitalist states.
124 
121 Soviet dissatisfaction was of course an ideological issue. The Third World's questioned 
the degree of real need, contending that China had in the process of its metamorphosis 
engineered "a radical shift from overstating its role as a Third World aid donor to 
understating its actual economic strength and garnering large fmancial payoffs to a degree 
at Third World expense." Samuel S. Kim, "China, International organizations, and 
Multilateral Cooperation," unpublished paper presented at the Conference on Patterns of 
Cooperation in the Foreign Relations of Modem China, Wintergreen, Virginia, August 10-
15, 1987, p.44. See also: William R. Feeney, "Chinese Policy Towards Multilateral 
Economic Institutions," China and the World, 2nd edition, ed. SamuelS. Kim, (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1989), p.252. 
122 Gerald Segal, "China's Changing Shape," Foreign Affairs Vol.73, No.3, (May/June 
1994), p.45. 
123 Feeney, p.259. 
124 Feeney, p.258. 
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Beyond China's economic integration with the East Asian economic dynamos, the 
PRC has taken steps to initiate regional and multilateral cooperation with partners around its 
borders. A variety of "ambitious" plans are cited as to developing economic ties between 
northern China and adjacent foreign regions. These include a monolithic Northeast Asia 
Economic Cooperation region encompassing north China, Japan, the Korean Peninsula, 
Mongolia, and the Russian Far East. This huge zone of prospective prosperity includes some 
familiar names: the Tumen River Circle, the Vladivostok Circle, the Yellow Sea Circle, and 
the Chinese-Russian-Mongolian Borders Area. 125 These projects and developments are of 
course many years and billions of dollars away from completion; if the success of Shandong 
Province in its booming economic relations with South Korea are foretelling though, these 
other regional developments have unlimited potential. 
Fundamental to any of this economic development between neighboring states are the 
prerequisites of a peaceful international environment and the easing of international tensions. 
China's interests obviously lie then in facilitating good regional, multilateral relations. For 
example, as previously mentioned, multiple tensions on the Korean Peninsula undermine 
multilateral efforts of all kinds. These impediments create roadblocks to progress on such 
developments as Tumen River. Any role that China assumes as an peaceful intermediary with 
the North Korean regime intuitively contributes to subsequent opportunities for economic 
development. Territorial disputes between Japan and Russia handicap Vladivostok 
developments as well (although China's role as an intermediary in this dispute remains a bit 
nebulous). More relevant are China's growing economic ties with the ASEAN nations. 
Contingent as they are on Beijing's relations with those governments, a negotiated settlement 
of the Spratlys territorial dispute would facilitate even greater cooperation. 
This last area of simmering dispute raises the flag on China's ostensibly positive 
12
·" Luo Bengu, "The Northeast Asia Economic Cooperation Region: Its prospects, 
Pattern, and Process," Dongheiya Yangiu (Northeast Asian Studies) No.4, (1992), pp.7-
13. As cited in Wang Jisi, p.14. 
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participation in region-wide multilateral security arrangements. China has proposed a solution 
for "Putting aside disputes, co-exploitation first." At international conferences on the Spratlys 
in Indonesia (January 1990, and July 1991 ), Beijing suggested attacking the easier problems 
first, and leaving the sovereignty issues for a later date. In the specific case of Vietnam, the 
two sides agreed to resolve their problems on a bilateral basis, not within the context of a 
regional forum. 126 More to the point, China has stated elsewhere that they care not to 
negotiate the Spratlys within any other than a bilateral context. They chose only to deal with 
one country at a time; albeit from a peaceful stance. Perhaps China still experiences a certain 
insecurity with the multilateral format; the possibility of diluted security strength would 
certainly weaken their position. The positions they have assumed in Southeast Asia will more 
likely be replicated should similar situations arise in Northeast Asia. 
China has emerged from the post-Cold War global milieu as the region's rising star. 
This is not so surprising as we witness the PRC's economic adventurism and amicable liaisons 
with virtually all the Asian-Pacific Rim states. With the Soviet threat eliminated, 127 and 
Western security alliances either static or subject to an uncertain ambivalence due to a 
perceived obsolescence, China is virtually free to develop their economic interests and 
international ties. Phenomenal economic growth in the South, and fledgling development in 
the north have encouraged international economic forays throughout the Asia-Pacific. 
Through constructive participation in existing multilateral arrangements such as ASEAN, 
APEC, the PECC, and the ADB, the PRC has facilitated and contributed both to regional 
economic growth, and vicariously to Asian-Pacific security stability. 
126 Weixing Hu, p.121. 
127 Residual Russian threat is a concern; the former Soviet states in Central Asia pose 
a real threat with regards to ethnic and religious conflict. Additionally, the still-
proliferated nuclear weapons technology deployed in these states represent a genuine 
danger. However, in terms of China's modernizations in the Asia-Pacific, the Russian Far 
East more significantly represents a potential trade and co-development partner. 
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Questions remain concerning the depth of commitment the PRC is willing to make to 
the growth of multilateral security arrangements; are they playing merely to facilitate trade 
and development, limiting security discussions to one-on-one bilateral forums? Or are they 
willing to negotiate binding security agreements within the multilateral context as well? The 
proof will be in the resolution of watershed issues like the Spratlys (ASEAN nations), and 
their level of participation in resolving North Korea's nuclear weapons problem. 
China's foreign policy regarding the Asia-Pacific revolves around transforming their 
economy and maximizing development; only by achieving a certain economic and 'lifestyle' 
parity with the West can they hope to preserve the PRC. Through peaceful, cooperative 
relations with their regional neighbors, including participation in regional multilateral 
economic and security arrangements, they may attain these goals. 
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B. JAPAN 
This section explores the potential for contemporary Japanese participation in Asian-
Pacific multilateral security arrangements. Within the relatively stable security framework of 
the Cold War era, Japan found itself freed from overwhelming military self-defense 
expenditures through the support of their superpower alliances. Rather than crippling their 
economies attempting to compete in escalating geo-political confrontation, the Cold War 
alliances allowed Japan the opportunity to develop its economic sectors. It is clear that new 
strategies for integrated security must be found if the spectacular economic progress of Japan 
is to be continued. 128 
Japan is the now-classic example of a nation making a dramatic postwar ascent as an 
economic superpower. However, its success is decidedly uni-dimensional; there has been 
little comparable growth as either an international political or strategic leader. This self 
imposed phenomenon is the result of the Yoshida Doctrine, Article Nine of the Constitution, 
Japan's 1% GNP defense budget limitations, its Comprehensive Security Doctrine, and its 
Three Non-Nuclear Principles. Ttremendous debate rages both within Japan and 
internationally regarding its future global security role and its obligations as a powerful 
economic state. 129 
Japan finds itself tugged in two distinct directions. Its security ties to the United 
States, specifically the Peace Treaty of 1952 and its successor the 1960 Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security, persist beyond the end of the Cold War. The military element of 
128 Hajime Izumi, "Japan's Role in the New Asia-Pacific," Korea and World Affairs, 
Vol.XII, No.3, (Fall, 1993), p.498. 
129 See Eugene Brown, "The Debate Over Japan's Strategic Future: Bilateralism Versus 
Regionalism," Asian Survey, Vol. XXXIll, No.6, (June, 1993), for a comprehensive 
analysis of the domestic political dynamics within Japan regarding the country's 
international role. 
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the bilateral relationship between the two countries is decidedly one-sided; the United States 
has cultivated a strategic partnership cum dependency which Japan has been all too willing 
to facilitate. Additionally, Japanese "bilateralists" continue to emphasize the centrality of the 
U.S. -Japanese relationship in Asian security dynamics; indeed: 
... the U.S. must stay in the Pacific. Nobody can replace it. Japan 
must educate its people and support the U.S. and the basic structure 
in Asia, whose main pillar is the U.S. presence. 130 
A sentiment echoed throughout the EA/P, a continued American presence is doubly reiterated 
by those Japanese mindful of their own vulnerable security. 
In the aftermath of the Cold War, the threats to Japan remain as tangible as ever. The 
continuous turmoil within the former Soviet Union, the still-lethal military vestiges hauntingly 
vulnerable to the whims of political uprising (and the source of widespread regional 
proliferation), and the frightening potential of its past dependencies (North Korea) remain 
imposing threats. China, although a tremendous beneficiary of extensive Japanese 
investment, is unstable and ripe for political and military adventurism. Traditionally an 
element of concern for Japan, Sea Lines Of Communication (SLOCs) disruptions can 
potentially cripple virtually every sector of Japan's economy, particularly disruption in the 
South China Sea. 131 Finally, from the perspective of geographical proximity to potential 
military adversaries, Japan remains a virtually indefensible nation. For Japan to 
wholeheartedly reject bilateral security relationships with the U.S. would be tantamount to 
strategic suicide. 
130 Toshinori Shigeie, former director of the National Security Mfairs Division in the 
Foreign Ministry, as interviewed by Eugene Brown. Brown, p.554. 
131 The straits and passages of Southeast Asia grow increasingly critical for the movement 
of Japan's raw materials and manufactured goods. Some 60 percent of Japan's oil imports 
and easily 40 percent of foreign trade make their way through the Straits of Malacca and 
the Lombok Straits. Chaiwat Khamchoo, "Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Security: 'Plus 
ca change ... '," Pacific Affairs Vol.64, No.1, (Spring 1991), p. 7. 
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Thus for Japan to reject military ties to the U.S. and assume responsibility for its own 
military security needs requires Japan to address at least two key considerations. First is the 
constitutional and political limitations inherent in the Japanese system. Despite the occasional 
"rallying" of conservative extremists to rearm, establish national autonomy, and to build a 
Japan - centered strategic bloc, this idea remains extremely unpalatable to the nation as a 
whole. Additionally, with the internal turmoil currently bedeviling Japanese politics, any 
change as significant as constitutional revision seems all but impossible. 
Second is the future ofthe Japanese political party system. The political demise of 
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has resulted in the empowerment of a succession of 
weaker and weaker coalition parties, each less able to effect lasting change than the last. For 
these politicians to consider a bold gesture such as rearmament and military/strategic 
autonomy when even relatively minor SDF participation in United Nations peace-keeping 
operations creates domestic shockwaves suggests a level of competence in the leadership 
which is simply not there. Those Japanese calling for an end to the reliance on the U.S. must 
realize that going 'alone' will leave their country largely defenseless. 
The Northeast Asian security scenario and the demise of the Cold War is complicated 
by the perceived international"floundering" of the United States. The foundations of Japan's 
long-stable security paradigm are perceived to have cracked and fallen asunder. 132 It is all 
well and good to ally with the United States - but against whom and for what reason? With 
the United States international credibility and multidimensional strategic superiority coming 
into question, the Japanese must ask: is this heretofore bedrock alliance really a prudent 
avenue to follow for Japan's future? With on-going tensions between Japan and Russia over 
the Northern Territories issue, China's build-up of her military capabilities, sea-lanes disputes 
in the South China Sea, prolonged difficulties in Indochina, and of course the always volatile 
Korean Peninsula problem, the question really becomes: What choice does Japan have? It 
132 Brown, p.543. 
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would be far better for Japan to build upon the extant bilateral ties with the United States, 
adding to them whatever additonal resouces, unilateral or multilateral, might be available. 
Relevant long term alternatives for Japanese security requirements are provided by 
other multilateral combinations created elsewhere in Asia. Spawned by the recognition of the 
inherent value of intra-Asian economic cooperation and a direct response to the need for 
effective communications between nations of the region, a variety of specialized regional 
economic forums have arisen. Designed to foster economic cooperation and mutual growth, 
these forums have the very real potential to develop into the cornerstones of multilateral 
security arrangements. "At the very least, comprehensive regional organizations of a 
primarily economic nature, such as the institutions of the European Community (EC) and the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), provide a venue for the exchange of views 
and tentative understandings among top-ranking officials of member's countries." 133 Whatever 
the motivations, peaceful and constructive cooperation is an effective foundation for any 
security arrangement. Ironically, "prior to 1992, Japan's leaders had maintained that the 
geopolitical diversity of the Asia-Pacific region militated against the creation of a multilateral 
security architecture for the region. "134 Subsequently however, Prime Minister Miyazawa and 
Foreign Minister Nakayama Taro indicated that perhaps the time had come to take a new look 
at some type of multilateral arrangement. 135 
The Japanese factor in Asian-Pacific security forums can be explored from a variety 
of perspectives. In plotting Japan's future security engagements it is essential to recall the 
history ofthe state's concerted involvement in "multilateralism" in the Asia-Pacific. Call it 
multilateralism or call it imperialism, the vital precedents of the Greater East Asia Co-
133 Norman D. Palmer, The New Regionalism and the Pacific, (Lexington: Lexington 
Books, 1991), p.3 
134 Brown, p.551. 
135 The Far Eastern Economic Review (PEER), August 1, 1991, p.11. 
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Prosperity Sphere cannot be ignored. Past history would seem to confirm that Japan would 
not be averse to a multilateral Pacific security arrangement in the future. 
While the Japanese interest in regional economic and security forums seems a noble 
and constructive departure from the limited parameters of its "sub-hegemonic" alliance with 
the United States, the Japanese legacy bears heavily on the collective consciousness of the 
region. The dynamic and powerful expansionist heritage that Japan established during the 
first forty years of this century has not disappeared. Leaving permanent scars wherever they 
went, Japan's past continually haunts relations with regional neighbors. 136 Despite the 
powerful lessons learned as a result of World War II, and the effective, permanent end to 
Japanese hegemony brought about by that war, the "myth" 137 persists to this day: 
When presented as a policy option, this myth is distinctive because it 
finds virtually unanimous support from all the parties involved -
Asians, Americans, Russians, and Japanese. What makes this 
unanimity astonishing is that the myth itself rests on two radical and 
extremely questionable assumptions about international reality in East 
Asia: (1) that Japan is an incorrigible 'military-holic' nation, incapable 
of behaving in a responsible manner as part of a collective security 
arrangement, and (2) that the United States will continue to operate 
to maintain security in the Western Pacific within the framework of 
the last four decades despite the enormous shifts in economic and 
political power that have occurred. To assert that Japan cannot share 
the burden of maintaining international order in the same manner as 
other world powers is prima facie untenable. 138 
, 
Japan's earliest post-war attempts to overcome the imperialist legacy correspond with 
its initial membership in mainstream multilateral organizations. In 1956 Japan joined the 
136 R. Mark Bean, Cooperative Security in Northeast Asia, (Washington: National 
Defense University, 1990), p.40. 
137 Donald C. Hellman, "Contemporary United States-Japan Security Relations: Old 
Myths, New Realities," Asian-Pacific Regional Security, ed. June Teufel Dreyer, 
(Washington D.C.: The Washington Institute Press, 1990). 
138 Hellman, p.56. 
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United Nations, a popular move which to many Japanese symbolized the pacifist state's 
dreams for a peaceful world order. U.N. membership was perceived as guaranteeing a 
permanent unarmed neutrality for Japan. Additionally, membership in the multilateral 
arrangement was seen by some as an effective means to soften the total dependence on the 
U.S. for military security. While the United Nations effectiveness as arbiter of world peace 
has tarnished some in the interim, Japan continues to regard it as an important forum for arms 
control, specifically nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Japan has since 1969 been a 
member of the U.N. Disarmament Committee (Geneva) and has been a persistent proponent 
of global arms reductions, consistently pushing for the prohibition of nuclear weapons testing, 
the cessation of the nuclear arms race, and positive cooperation in the international efforts to 
achieve nonproliferation. 139 
Beyond its efforts to use the United Nations as a tool to effect a smooth international 
military playing field, Japan has been an active participant in the range of social, cultural, and 
economic development agencies. Including memberships in the United Nations Economic and 
Social Council, the U.N. Environmental Program Council, the Industrial Development 
Council, the World Food Council, the United Nations Development Council, the U.N. 
Children's Fund, and the Economic and Social Commission for Asia (ESCAP), Japan has been 
able to effect change and lead regional development under the auspices of the multilateral 
arrangement. 
As post-war Japan has grown economically, its participation in both regional and 
global economic organizations has grown accordingly. In addition to the essential Asian 
developmental organizations such as the Colombo Plan and the Asian Development Bank, 
Japan has become involved integrally in the International Monetary Fund, the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Throughout the 
139 Japan· A Country Sh1dy, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 
pp.338- 339. 
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Cold War era then, Japan may be seen as having participated on a global level in fostering 
international stability and development, and that the country maximized its security interests 
(primarily economic) in a politically palatable, domestically acceptable manner. Japan sought 
to make an international contribution by addressing issues of concern to the industrialized 
nations, but more vividly by orchestrating cooperation and policies with the developing 
nations. 
With the effective decline of the Cold War security paradigm and the potential 
withdrawal of American military assets from the region, the security premise permitting 
Japan's international activities requires another look. Japan's regional "backyard" has become 
a potential free-for-all of myriad economic and security interests. The Pacific Rim is an 
intensely dynamic environment wherein even the smallest players have tangible economic 
interests and resources enough to obtain the most powerful tools of war. If the need for 
stabilizing influences is apparent, then the need for a unifying forum should be numbingly 
obvious. In Japan's case: 
The conventional policy of relying solely on the Japan- U.S. security 
system will not suffice in the post-Cold War era, when it has become 
important to build mutual trust and suppress regional conflicts. 140 
Japan's best interests lie then in expanding benignly in the region and to continue 
contributing constructively to regional stability, albeit at a more local level. Already involved 
economically throughout the EAIP with extensive investment and manufacturing interests in 
virtually every Asian state, Japan has more recently taken an active and visible role in regional 
security and regional organizations. But Japan is not willing to go as far as European states 
in building a multilateral institution. As recently as I 991, then Prime Minister Kaifu rejected 
suggestions for a European model (CSCE) based Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Asia (CSCA) emphasizing the need to resolve each regional issue within its specific 
140 Unnamed Japanese Defense Agency Official, as cited in Gwen Robinson, "Leading 
Role Planned in Regional Security," Asia-Pacific Defense Reporter 1994 Annual 
Reference Edition, p.39. 
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context. 141 Together with Japan's Foreign Minister Nakayama, the two leaders confirmed the 
Japanese position that the EA/P differs geographically and strategically from Europe, and that 
CSCE - style multilateral security arrangements, while appropriate for Europe, will not 
produce stability in the EA/P region. 
The emphasis on the need to develop some type of indigenous organization was 
underscored at the ASEAN Post- Ministerial Conference (PMC) in 1992 when Nakayama 
"stated that making comprehensive use of existing international forums for discussion would 
guarantee long - term regional stability" and that "the countries concerned are working 
towards a comprehensive settlement of the Cambodian conflict and that a framework for 
international cooperation focussing on the Korean dialogue was emerging. "142 
Acknowledging the need for regional security networks as a complement to existing 
ties with the U.S., Prime Minister Miyazawa in 1992 in Washington D.C. pointed to APEC 
as a suitable forum for pursuit of regional economic issues, and to the ASEAN PMC as the 
relevant forum for regional security issues. Since 1991 when Japan first endorsed the PMC 
format for regional security discussions, the idea has received strong support from the rest 
of the participants. Japan's interest in both the ASEAN format and the member nations is 
quite apparent in its level of participation. Japanese aid to the ASEAN countries totaled 
about US$1.9 billion in Japanese fiscal year 1988 vice US$333 million for the United States. 
Japan was the number one foreign investor in the A SEAN countries as of 1989. 143 Despite 
Japan's acceptance and apparent enthusiastic support, ASEAN endorsements are not 
universal: 
141 Makoto Kawanago, "Regional Security and Japan," paper presented at the 1st 
Northeast Asia Defense Fomm, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, Research Institute 
for Peace and Security, 3- 5 November 1993, p.5. 
142 Foreign Minister Nakayama, at the ASEAN Post - Ministerial Conference, Kuala 
Lumpur, July,1991, as cited in Makoto Kawanago, p.5. 
143 Japan· A Country Study. 
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The kind of security issues that a regional forum is meant to address 
would be more productively and appropriately handled in a wider 
multi-lateral body ... China refuses to discuss the South China Sea issue 
in any international conference and has instead proposed a Sino-
ASEAN dialogue that would place ASEAN at a disadvantage. 
China's refusal points directly to the inadequacy of the PMC 
mechanism. 144 
Chinese recalcitrance notwithstanding, Japan's increasing participation in ASEAN and 
expanding investment in the member nations represents a tremendous vote of confidence for 
the multilateral arrangement, and in fact reiterates the basic philosophies of the Fukuda 
Doctrine ( 1977). It is a basic recognition of the susceptibility of Japanese economic interests 
in these states to internal disturbances and external conflict. By bolstering regional economies 
(development, expanded assistance, technical cooperation) Japan is better able effect stability 
and protect its interests. 145 
Increased multilateralism of security discussions in the EA/P will by necessity involve 
Japan in an ever-increasing role. In light of Japan's tremendous foreign investments, 
developmental assistance, and previous cooperative efforts in the EA/P region, the country 
is a pivotal "player" for any discussions of international security affairs: 
No nation can do more to foster economic development and 
integration in the region than Japan. It has become an economic role 
model for the most rapidly developing economies of the region, and 
144 
Leszek Buszynski, "ASEAN Security Dilemmas," Survival Vo1.34, No.4, (Winter 
1992-93), p.103. 
145 
Under the Fukuda Doctrine Japan pledged to: 1) never again become a major military 
power, 2) promote constructive nonmilitary ties with the members of ASEAN, and 3) act 
to promote cooperative relations between ASEAN and the nations of communist Indochina. 
See Brown, p.552 and Khamchoo, p.lO. In addition, Taketsugu Tsurutani 's Japanese 
Policy and East Asian Security, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), p.129, explores 
the ties between the Fukuda Doctrine and Japanese economic security. 
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will remain, by virtue ofits capital and eventually its domestic market, 
a key source of regional growth. 146 
An essential caveat to note, however: any acceptance of Japn as a regional leader will 
depend upon its close linkage with the United States. The American alliance is generally 
regarded as a brake on Japan's ambitions. If that brake were to be removed, a more expansive 
security role for Japan would by no means be acceptable. Assuming that further participation 
in any regional multilateral security arrangements would be complementary to extant U.S.-
Japanese security alliances, and that Japan's participation would be in accordance with 
constitutional limitations, it is clear that Japan's security interests intermesh with those of its 
Asian neighbors, and that the attainment of these interests may be found in multilateral 
arrangements. 
146 Hajime Izumi, "Japan's Role in the New Asia- Pacific Era," Korea and World Affairs 
Vol.XVII, No.3, (Fa111993), p.502. 
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C. THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST 
Russia in the post Cold War environment appears to be taking a more constructive 
and potentially cooperative approach in its involvement with the Pacific Rim nations. Arising 
from Mikhail Gorbechev's reformist policies of glasnost and perestroika in 1986 and 1987, 
these philosophical and structural changes in the Soviet Union have had critical domestic and 
international implications. Implications which have fundamentally altered the methods by 
which Soviet foreign policy is effected and by which national interests are pursued. 
While the glasnost philosophy of "openness" has in some cases permitted the overt 
voicing of Russian nationalism to surface (vociferous clamor for a more closed or insular 
Russian/Soviet Union state147), it also embraced a recognition of certain limitations of the 
Soviet state and the need for cooperative relationships with neighbor states. The regional 
implications were dramatically illustrated in Gorbechev's 1986 Vladivostok and 1988 
Krasnoyarsk speeches which in effect announced the opening of the Soviet Far East to 
economic development and the integration of this segment ofthe Soviet economy with the 
entire Pacific Basin. 148 
While there was certainly a lag between the articulation of new foreign policy 
147 With particular regard to territorial issues, Nationalists and Ultra-nationalists see 
concessions of "traditionally" Russian territories as further debasing of the " ... great 
Russian nation. For example, Sergei Baburin, a conservative member of the Russian 
Parliment, has denounced negotiations with Japan as constituting a 'path to the destruction 
of the Russian state.'," Interfax June 11, 1992, in Foreign Broadcast Infonnation Service 
(FBIS), June 12, 1992, p.23; as cited in Paul Marantz, "Moscow and East Asia: New 
Realities and New Policies," East Asian Security in the Post-Cold War Era, ed. Sheldon 
W. Simon, (Annonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), p.37. 
148 Two critical documents for examining revised Soviet intentions in Asia are 
Gorbechev's 1986 Vladisvostok speech and his 1988 Krasnoyarsk address. See The 
Current Digest of The Soviet Press, XXXVIII, No.30 (27 August 1986), pp.1-8,32; and 
XI, No.38 (19 October 1988), pp.1-7; as cited in Kolodzief, p.19. 
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perspectives and their manifestation as concrete policy initiatives, Gorbechev's contributions 
to the normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and Northeast Asia can not be 
overstated. 
Gorbachev was the first Soviet leader to understand and acknowledge 
East Asia's emerging importance in the larger international setting. He 
was the first to recognize that the economic dynamism of this region 
made it no less important to the Soviet Union than Europe ... Thus he 
realized that if his country were to rectify the fundamental 
deformations in its foreign policy and to find sustenance for 
perestroika in the outside world, the Soviet approach to East Asia 
would have to change. 149 
Gorbachev normalized relations with China, easing the pressures of that thorn in the 
side of Soviet international relations. Second, he dramaticaiiy narrowed or suppressed the 
heretofore dominant East-West dichotomy. Third, and the most dramatic from the perspective 
of Soviet/Russian regionalization., was the beginning of demilitarization of its satellites in East 
Asia. Additionaiiy, the establishment of Soviet-South Korean diplomatic relations in 
September of 1990 was indicative of the priority of economics in Gorbachev's Asia-Pacific 
policy, and sent ample message regarding the status of relations with former "socialist 
aiiies. "150 
What emerged was a struggling giant seeking cooperative and equitable solutions to 
joint problems with its Asian neighbors; a country ready to base national security on regional 
ties and aiiiances; a country ready to participate in a multilateral context rather than via a 
heavy-handed imperialist unilateral paradigm. 
149 Robert Legvold, "The Collapse of the Soviet Union and the New Asian Order," NBR 
Analysis, Vol.3, No.4, (September, 1992), p.9. 
150 
"In 1991, Moscow continued to supply oil and gave a moratorium on payment in hard 
currency in view of the North's severe financial difficulties. In return the two sides agreed 
on a list of goods and services North Korea will supply to pay its debt. According to 
preliminary estimates, the trade turnover between the two countries in 1991 decreased to 
a mere 25-30 percent of its 1989 volume." Vladimir I. Ivanov, "From the USSR to Russia 
on the Pacific," Southeast Asian Affairs, 1992, p. 75. 
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Although the means had changed dramatically, the desired ends had not. Gorbachev's 
efforts assumed the continuation of the Soviet Union's superpower status and its network of 
alliance relationships. The inherent incongruities of this position ultimately resulted in the 
Soviet collapse. 151 As dramatic and as unprecedented as this historic change was, the 
transition of 19 August 1991 has left the Asia-Pacific rim community with a remarkable 
opportunity. While Gorbechev failed miserably in his domestic policies, wrecking the Soviet 
economy and ultimately destroying the communist system he was bent on restoring, his 
foreign policy was considerably more productive. 
In part through constructive initiatives and vision, and in part by 
accepting the inexorable decline of Soviet power with good grace, he 
succeeded in breaking the fetters of earlier policies, improving 
Moscow's ties with its Asian neighbors, and opening up 
unprecedented opportunities for even better economic and political 
relations in the future. Russian diplomacy now has the opportunity to 
build upon these past successes and to take advantage of the new 
fluidity that has replaced the frozen positions of the past. 152 
This transformation of Russia from hegemonic adversary to potential partner of the United 
States provides the best hope for the future of regional relationships based on multilateral 
cooperation. 153 
The heartbreak of widespread internal dissension and the fall of the communist state 
prompted an in-depth review of the national interests. The international threats to Russian 
state security and the well-being of communism are inconsequential when assessed in the light 
of domestic sources of instability. During the bulk of the Cold War era the needs of the 
population and the basic national interests of the Soviet Union counted for very little in the 
formulation of foreign policy. More frequently Soviet foreign policy was shaped by 
151 Leszek Buszynski, "Russia and the Asia-Pacific Region," Pacific Affairs, Vol.65, 
No.4, (Winter 1992-1993), p.486. 
152 Marantz, p.31. 
153 Ivanov, p.84. 
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ideological preoccupation (or competition), by the never-ending quest for empire, by super-
power rivalries, by the pursuit of influence in the Third World, and by the parochial interests 
of Party elite and the military-industrial complex. Domestic economic requirements were 
decidedly second to the ideological needs of the 11 state. 11 
The long-term results of this interpretation of the national interests are now becoming 
clear--political paralysis, hyperinflation, economic collapse, civil disorder, civil war, and 
potentially the breakup of the Russian Federation. For the Russian state to survive the post-
Cold War minefield, its foreign policy must target not so much the expansion of foreign 
power but rather to create external conditions conducive to domestic transformation. 
Emphasizing the primacy of domestic needs, the the state's foreign policy must facilitate a 
transition to a successful free market economy. 154 
In regard to the Asia-Pacific region, this orientation translates into the 
following goals: the sharp expansion of trade; the obtaining of credits, 
technology, and investment, especially from South Korea and Japan; 
the use of trade and foreign investment to develop the Russian Far 
East so that separatist tendencies will not grow in this key region and 
so that the Russian Far East will contribute to the process of 
economic rebirth throughout the country; the elimination of 
perceptions in the region that Russian military might is a threat to 
other states; the establishment of stable, cordial relations so that 
Russia will not become the target of hostile coalitions (e.g., a Sino-
Japanese alliance); and the preventing of North Korea from obtaining 
nuclear weapons, since this would encourage nuclear proliferation and 
might lead to Japanese militarization. 155 
Despite his 11 Atlanticist11 perspective, Boris Yeltsin has in the post-Soviet era managed 
to sustain a fair degree of policy continuity with Gorbachev's Northeast Asian normalization 
trends. 156 Far from neglecting Asia, the current leaders have made major efforts to improve 
154 Marantz, p.32. 
155 Marantz, p.32. 
156 Marantz, pp.39-41. 
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relations with China, South Korea, and Japan. Economic revitalization and a search for a 
positive strategic role in the region remain the core of Russian policy in the Pacific. Indeed, 
in Yeltsin's November 1992 speech to the National Assembly ofthe Republic ofKorea he, 
offerred this bit of diplomatic fodder: "Nowadays, our policy is being transferred from West 
European and American lines to the Asia-Pacific region, and my visit here is the first move 
in this process. "157 Like Gorbachev, Yeltsin's priorities in the region are found in domestic 
economic survival, reduced defense potential, and the search for new partnerships. 
What drives Russian policy now is maintaining a willingness to build 
a stable wealthy nation on a foundation of markets, individual freedom 
and initiative, private property, political pluralism and liberal 
democracy. The country's foremost (challenge) is to mainatain its 
national identity and preserve territorial integrity - neither more nor 
less. Economic revitalization in the Far East is the critical condition 
for realization of both goals. This will make Moscow respnsive to 
international influences to the extent that cooperation rather than 
rivalry with thew United States and its East Asian partners, will be 
viewed as matching Russian natioanl interests. 158 
Thus the possibility of transitioning regional relations to a framework of multilateral 
cooperation is very real. Russia may have retreated from its imperialist forward boundaries 
to its traditional national territories, but it remains a Pacific nation whose principal objective 
is to be engaged constructively with regional systems. 
Whereas Russia remains strong enough to defend the traditional Soviet national 
interests through the use of force and military assets (however waning), the state's true 
interests are better served by shared responsibilities. In that reduced global threats have 
revised the strategic thinking ofNortheast Asian nations, cooperative multilateralism for the 
sake of peace and stability has emerged as a tangible paradigm for Russians in the region. 
157 Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 1992, November, 1993; as cited in Alexei D. Bogaturov, "Russia 
in Northeast Asia: Setting a New Agenda," Korea and World Affairs· A Quarterly 
Review, Vol.XVll, No.2, (Summer 1993), p.300. 
158 Bogaturov, p.302. 
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Transitional regional relationships are no longer based on post-World War II premises, but 
rather on democratic values, economic might, and collaboration. 159 
While the growth of true Asia-Pacific multilateral security efforts is still an infant 
enterprise, the broad-minded inclusion of the spectrum of Pacific "players" as seen at the 
Association of South East Asian Nations- Post Ministerial Conference (ASEAN-PMC)in 
July, 1994 bodes extremely well for this potential. Russia's participation indicates a high 
level of confidence, and expectation, from its Pacific neighbors. 
The issue of Russian participation in an Asian-Pacific security framework seems all 
but a certainty. However, there remain many relevant questions concerning the Russian Far 
East's future. Among these are the volatile issue of the break-up of the CIS. An independent 
Russian Far East would still be a significant player in the quest for a balance of power in the 
EAIP. While a far-detched notion to some observers, the concept of a politically autonomous 
and resource-rich state actualizing years ofEuro-Russian ambivalent neglect has tantalizing 
potential. 
Another issue of essential import to any Russian participation m economic 
multilateralism is the development of the Russian Far Eastern market. What do Russians 
in Asia have to offer as a member of an Asian economic forum? Do they have the means to 
be a cooperative member? If the Russians cannot participate constructively within the realm 
of economics, any consideration of security cooperation is moot. At this juncture their 
primary economic activity is the rather indiscriminate sales of military resources. What will 
they have to offer the world tomorrow? Will they be able to affect a productive defense 
conversion? Will they then have any security relevance? Does the fact that the Soviet-type 
159 Bogaturov, p.315. 
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socialist economy is entirely incompatible with the rest ofthe regional trends automatically 
sound a death knoll for economic integration?160 Only the keepers of the deep Asian pockets 
know for certain. Again, Russia is welcome into the fold of multilateral security 
arrangements, provided it measures up to economic standards for membership. 
160 Ivanov, p.74. 
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D. THE KOREAN PENINSULA 
At this juncture the division of the Korean Peninsula has never been more stark, the 
polarity of socio-economic conditions between North and South never greater. The two 
Koreas are a study in contrasts. The South is a relatively free and democratic society in which 
the vast majority enthusiastically support an elected civilian regime. In the North, a dictatorial 
regime maintains itself through military and police control of an apathetic people. South 
Korea's rapidly expanding and dramatically successful economy is contrasted by the North 
slipping ever deeper into a mire of debt and depression. 
Most importantly, the South has expanded its prestige in the international community. 
By cultivating trade relationships, international financial investment, and establishing 
diplomatic inroads on a global scale, South Korea has been most successful in protecting and 
promoting its national interests. North Korea on the other hand, has by way of chuch'e 
fanaticism and a disregard for the sensibilities the global community finds itself effectively 
isolated. Its former ties to China and the Soviet Union have suffered with the fall of 
communism. Whereas South Korea's security relationships have brought it a high degree of 
national security and prosperity, North Korea's relationships have led to isolation and 
bankruptcy. Additionally, the Cold War system has made the ultimate national interest, 
reunification, all but impossible. In the light of the severity of the schism between North and 
South, and the failure of previous bilateral arrangements to bridge the gap between them, the 
time has come to explore the possibility for multilateral security arrangements to bring about 
peace, stability, and prosperity for the entire Korean peninsula. 
South Korea's interest in multilateralism has its roots in the early development of its 
Nordpolitik approach to foreign relations. Not entirely comfortable within the constraints and 
limitations of the bilateral security agreement with the United States, the South sought to 
supplement this traditional relationship by broadening its contacts with its Asian neighbors. 
The traditional relationship with the United States was increasingly perceived in some sectors 
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as excessive, anachronous and even mendicant. By seeking its own self-reliant global posture, 
and expanding its multilateral potentialities, the South could reduce its sense of dependency 
as well as effect a more independent role in the increasingly complex international structure 
of the region. 
As time distanced Northeast Asia from the hostilities of the Korean War, the vintage 
alliances faded in favor of new dynamics. The United States was establishing varying degrees 
of detente and/or rapprochement with Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and China. South 
Korea, reading the "writing on the wall," was prompted to diversifY both security and 
economic interests. During these early stages, North Korea maintained an apparent military 
superiority, making any withdrawal of UN/US forces from the South unthinkable. It was this 
continued security assurance which allowed the second aspect ofNordpolitik: the expansion 
and diversification of South Korea's trade relations on a global scale. At the same time that 
Seoul was broadening its economic horizons, it pursued improved diplomatic relations with 
former socialist rivals the Soviet Union and China and broached negotiations with 
P'yongyang. 161 
South Korea's growth on the world scene as a viable player was recognized in 1988 
during the first year of President Rob Tae Woo's tenure. This was a heady period for South 
161 Of the total direct investment in South Korea from 1962 to 1986 (US$3. 63 I billion), 
Japan accounted for 52.2% and the United States for 29.6%. The South Koreans 
themselves began investing overseas in the 1980s. By 1987, out of a total overseas 
investment ofUS$1,195 million (745 projects), US$574 million was invested in developed 
countries and US$621 was invested in developing countries. Trade relations during this 
period are a direct reflection of South Korea's stated policy of expansion, liberalization, 
and diversification. In the years following the 1988 Seoul Olympics, South Korea's trade 
surplus exceeded US$11 billion and foreign exchange revenue had increased sharply. 
Seoul's trade with communist countries exploded in 1988. Its trade with Eastern Europe 
was US$215 million, trade with China nearly US$1.8 billion, and trade with the Soviet 
Union US$204 million. By 1988 South Korea's annual trade pushed past US$100 billion, 
making it the world's tenth largest trading nation. See Daniel Metraux, "The Economy," 
South Korea· A Country Study, (Washington, DC: United States Department of the Army, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), pp.137-195. 
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Korea. Its economy was blossoming, as was evidenced by its sponsorship ofthe Summer 
Olympics. Fundamental principles of democracy were put into practice. President Roh made 
his diplomatic debut as the first South Korean executive to address the United Nations 
General Assembly (18 October, 1988). In that speech, Roh made the first of many South 
Korean proposals for multilateral security arrangements in Northeast Asia. Roh's address 
called for a six-nation conference to discuss ranging issues including peace, stability, progress, 
and prosperity in the region. A dramatic gesture symbolizing Korea's pursuit of 
"internationalization," it bespoke of Korea's desires to broaden the field of international 
diplomacy. 
Other examples abound attesting to South Korea's interest m multilateral 
arrangements. Even before United Nations membership in 199 I, the South actively 
participated in various subsidiary UN organizations and agencies. It maintained permanent 
missions to the UN, the UN Economic and Social Council, the UN economic and Social 
Council for Asia and the Pacific, and the European Community. Particularly noteworthy was 
the South's participation in the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC). As a 
founding member, Seoul adhered to the program ofliberalizing trade relations throughout the 
entire Asia-Pacific region. The South Korean contingent to the PECC presented a workable 
model for the representation of national interests. Its national committee brought together 
academic, business, and government representatives into a single national contingent able to 
comprehensively communicate Korean interests from the variety of perspectives. In this 
forum the Koreans attracted a goodly amount of favorable attention. 162 
From those early beginnings South Korea went on to be an active participant in other 
regional organizations, notably the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). It is 
currently a dialog partner in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and a 
162 The PECC and other multilateral organizations are discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter V. 
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participant in the ASEAN-PMC and ARF processes. It now looks forward to some sort of 
CSCE-type arrangements specifically oriented to Northeast Asia. 
South Korea's activism in developing a multilateral arrangement to address Northeast 
Asian security issues is fortuitous. Consider the primary security concerns of the region: 
North Korean nuclear development; the DPRK's economic development; and reunification 
of the Peninsula. Although the major players will certainly play important roles in these 
issues, the keystone states remain the two segments of Korea. Actions towards resolution 
of security problems on the Peninsula (specifically the nuclear dilemma) may well serve as a 
major precipitant for regional conflict unless they are restrained by diplomatic control. 
Success in negotiating these disputes has the potential to produce a viable diplomatic 
framework for future agenda. As Korean Institute for Defense Analyses Fellow Young-Sun 
Song has written: 
... if any country who has been or is likely to be engaged in a power 
rivalry in the region were to initiate this kind of forum, its intention 
and credibility would be in question. The initiator in the region must 
be least threatening to the member states. Among the nations in the 
region, including the United States, South Korea best meets this 
criterion. Historically Korea has never been an aggressor against any 
ofthe four states. Militarily, South Korea is also the least offensive. 
Further, South Korea has not been and is not in the conflict with any 
of the four states. All the other four are far more likely to get 
involved in conflicts pertinent to economy, territory, and even power 
rivalry. Again, South Korea's middle-power leadership role does not 
undermine anyone else's roles or functions. Nor does it imply South 
Korea to assume or wield all or most of the influence. It simply means 
that among all the states involved, South Korea is in the most 
favorable position to be a facilitator and arbiter at best. 163 
The pivotable role must be taken by South Korea. A potential drawback though is that 
North Korea may refuse to negotiate in any such forum. South Korea as nexus to a regional 
163 Young-Sun Song, "The Architecture of Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast 
Asia: ROK's Perspectives," paper presented at The 1st Northeast Asia Defense Fomm, 
Korean Institute for Defense Analyses, Seoul, South Korea, November 3-5, 1993. pp.12-
13. 
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security arrangement may sound wonderful under Young's thesis, but do not expect North 
Korean participation. 
Whereas the perceived drawbacks and dynamics ofthe Cold War system prompted 
South Korea to diversify and answer its national needs through internationalization, North 
Korea has become insular and defensive. It is a country with little means and few friends to 
help meet its needs. As recently as 1990 there appeared to be diplomatic progress when Kim 
U Sung appeared to be ready to permit limited investment from South Korea. Inter-Korean 
trade grew by 1992 to a rate US$200 million annually. South Korea was by this point the 
North's fourth largest trading partner. As economic liaison grew, so did political contact. 
The first ever talks between the Koreas' heads of state took place in September, 1990. In 
1991 both Koreans states joined the United Nations as separate entities. 164 
Although North Korea had previously fostered multilateral relations in the Third 
World through its participation in the Non-Aligned Movement, its contacts were lukewarm 
at best and oflimited utility. A genuine change of heart seemed imminent in North Korea's 
membership and participation in the United Nations and its specialized agencies (i.e.: F AO, 
WHO, UNESCO, etc.). This new attitude was strengthened by the 'Agreement on 
Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation' pact ratified with South 
Korea (February 1992), and the Joint Nuclear Control Committee (also with the South, 
December 1991 ). There appeared to be solid reason for confidence in improved North 
Korean relations. 165 Simultaneously, peaceable forms of economic interaction were seen in 
164 Lest North Korea's cooperation be interpreted as overt diplomatic altruism, it should 
be mentioned that the South's newly amiable relations with China and the Soviet Union 
played a role. They would no longer veto South Korea's unilateral application for 
membership. Thus both Korea's joined the UN in September 1991. 
165 On December 13, 1991, the two Koreas adopted a comprehensive nonaggression accord 
that, similar to CSCE agreements in Europe, stipulated a number of confidence building 
measures designed to prevent the sudden outbreak of armed hostilities. Although the 
divided Peninsula is perhaps the Asian scenario most suited to "European-styled" solutions 
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the Tumen River Development Project, a cooperative international border development with 
Russia, China, and North Korea. Other evidence of North Korea's opening to the outside 
world were in some one-hundred joint ventures designed to bring in Western capital and 
technology. Approximately 70% of these companies were owned by Korean residents of 
Japan stillloyaJ to North Korea. 166 While slow in starting and modest in extent, cooperative 
arrangements such as these are basic to North Korea's receptivity to multilateral relationships 
in Northeast Asia. However, with North Korea's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty in March of 1993, receptivity for expanded trade, investment, aid and 
international goodwill took a tum for the worse. 
Committing in apparent good faith to the NPT in 1985, North Korea rendered little 
real cooperation until concerted concessions were made by the United States and South 
Korea in 1991 and 1992. Once the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections 
were agreed to and were underway in 1992, North Korea displayed its traditional reticence 
and proved difficult to deal with. In March, 1993, the North gave notice that they were 
withdrawing from the NPT. 
While the West has employed traditional power rhetoric and bully tactics to resolve 
the North Korean nuclear intransigence to little effect, the real solution may come from Asia 
itself. At the peak of the diplomatic crisis over North Korea's violations of the NPT, the 
Clinton administration enlisted the expertise of former president Jimmy Carter. President 
Carter travelled to P'yongyang ostensibly as a concerned citizen on 15 June, 1994, two days 
after the North withdrew from the IAEA. Despite bipartisan skepticism from Washington, 
the former president seems to have served as an "honest broker" in this dangerous standoff 
(the Helsinki Process, CSCE), the agreements ultimately were doomed. See Hideya 
Kurata, "Progress Toward a System of Confidence-Building Measures on the Korean 
Peninsula," Japan Review of International Affairs Spring 1992, pp.92-93. 
166 Aidan Foster-Carter, pp.427-428. 
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Indeed, Carter's four-day singular effort was more productive than any international 
posturing or sabre-rattling. Kim II Sung indicated to President Carter a willingness to shut 
down his nuclear plant; not a solution in itself, but as President indicated, it marked "a new 
opportunity to find a solution." Carter's liaison with Kim opened the door for further 
negotiations under Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gallucci. These continuing talks not 
only addressed the NPT situation, but also the gamut of security, political, and economic 
issues which have isolated North Korea in the past. Perhaps most importantly from the 
Peninsular point-of-view, the Carter meetings led to Kim II Sung and Kim Young Sam 
agreeing to meet together in an inter-Korean summit. Had Kim II-Sung not died, this would 
be the first time that heads-of-state from the two Koreas met, marking a potential turning-
point in Korean relations. 167 This meeting may yet occur between Kim Young-Sam and Kim 
Jong-II. 
The fragile accord reached between the United States and North Korea appears to be 
a long-term solution to diffusing the DPRK's nuclear ambitions. While awaiting tangible 
results will demand patience among the US and its allies, chief negotiator Robert Gallucci's 
solution is a remarkable departure from hostile policies ofthe past. Although not based on 
trust, it is designed to produce trust. Agreeing to IAEA monitors, discontinued production, 
and ultimately the dismantling of its existing reactors, the North will be rewarded with 
replacement (albeit incompatable with weapons production) light-water reactors from the US 
and its allies. Combined with other confidence building measures, including South Korea's 
mopening its borders for much broader economic relations with the North, these recent events 
provoke a glimmer of hope for the future. 
This agreement notwithstanding, there is still no historical basis for expecting any 
167 See "War or Peace For Korea?" The Economist, June 18, 1994, pp.39-40; "Korea's 
Bomb Stops Ticking, 11 The Fronomist, June 25th, 1994, p.31. For a synopsis of President 
Carter's role as international negotiator, see: Maureen Dowd, "Despite Role as Negotiator, 
Carter Feels Unappreciated, 11 New York Times, 21 September 1994, A4. 
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lasting North Korean cooperation under any circumstances. However, recent overtures from 
ASEAN indicate a certain regional confidence and are perhaps reason for hope: 
ASEAN (with all pride and humility) has played its part by inviting 
North Korea to its inaugural ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum). It was 
not the nuclear issue that comes into hand but the mere fact that a 
nation of a million strong force must have the respect and 
compromising tolerance from others. The acclaimed August 13 
breakthrough on nuclear talks between North Korea and the US in 
Geneva may appease most. But it has not resolved other major issues 
such as conventional military threats, spillover of any internal 
revolution and reunification by force or peaceful means. This is where 
Asia, or closer still; China, Japan, South Korea, East Russia and even 
Taiwan, ROC, should bilaterally or in multilateral approach, offer 
assistance and soothe their troubled neighbor. This is in effectjuche 
(chuch'e) in its wider (non-North Korean) context playing a part. 
Relying totally on Asia's own resources and millenniums of oriental 
diplomacy (the non-belligerent aspect naturally) to solve an Asian 
problem. 168 
Although South Korea has endorsed the suitability of the ASEAN/ ARF forum as a possible 
framework for developing trust, transparency, and ultimately preventative diplomacy, 
cautious goals would seem to be in order regarding involvement of the North. 169 
North Korea's record in other arrangements indicates that it will contest the provisions 
of membership and interpretations of the rules. It has not earned the trust of other 
members. 170 In light of this record, ASEAN officials are contemplating general guidelines for 
168 
"The King Is Dead ... Kim Is Dead ... ," editorial, Asian Defence Journal, 9/94, p.4. 
169 Any endorsement of regional security arrangements by South Korea are inherently 
suspect in North Korea's eyes. However, in that Pyongyang has in the past sought 
membership in the ARF, it remains a viable possibility. See Zain Amri, "ASEAN 
Regional Forum: Towards Cooperative Or Collective Security In The Asia-Pacific?," 
Asian Defence Journal (ADJ), 9/94, pp.6-7 and Zain Amri, "The ASEAN Regional 
Forum: Hope For Success But Tread With Care," (ADJ), 8/94, pp.22-26. 
17 c There has been considerable speculation regarding the potential for continuity of North 
Korean policies in the wake of Kim II Sung's death (2 July 1994). While it is 
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ARF membership stating, among other things, that members must be in good standing with 
the NPT. 171 A forlorn hope for the ARF arrangement to work in Northeast Asia lies in its 
structure. A true multilateral forum wherein all members are roughly at parity, North Korea 
may perceive the organization as non-threatening to individual state sovereignty. As the ARF 
has no binding decision making power, it is without any true power. It is primarily intended 
to promote security dialog and to increase mutual reassurances, not to enforce decisions. As 
members develop the habits of open discussion and mutual consultation, the idea is for 
peaceful relations to follow. 
As in the past, South Korea will continue to perceive benefit from multilateral 
arrangements, both for security and economic ends. Therefore its participation and continued 
contributions are assured. The fundamental attitudes of the North have been uncooperative 
and historically unreliable. However, despite the continued antagonism between the two 
halves ofthe divided Peninsula, it is an improbable but worthy goal to attempt to facilitate 
multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific. It seems the sole alternative. Whether these forums or 
processes can fulfill the final national interest, reunification, remains to be seen. 
acknowledged that Kim Jung II will accede to head-of-state, little is known of his political 
inclinations. Statements from P'yongyang in the weeks following Kim II Sung's death 
indicated that II ••• all revolutionary tasks set forth from the late Kim would be carried on 
by his son ... that North Korea's unification and foreign policy lines would not change ... II 
The younger Kim's legacy of propagating international terrorism implies the perpetuity of 
North Korea's dark heritage. Others suggest that Kim will be too busy consolidating his 
regime domestically to risk disruptive relations. His primary concern will be to flrst infuse 
domestic stability as a means to prove to the international community that his is not merely 
a transient regime. See 11 DPRK To Continue To Follow 'Policy Lines', 11 Seoul, The 
Korea Times (English), 19 July 94, p.2, (SK1907050194, East Asia FBIS, 19 July 1994, 
pp.37-38); Seoul, KBS-1 Radio Network (Korean), 1100 (GMT) 19 July 1994, 
(SK1507033694, East Asia FBIS, 19 July 1994, p.38). 
171 Zain Amri, ADJ, 8/94, p.26. 
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V. PROTECTING THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES: 
THE TREND TOWARDS MULTILA TERALISM 
As the United States navigates the turbid ocean of post-Cold War international 
relations, it is essential to remember that this nation's guiding light must be its elemental 
values and fundamental national interests. During the Cold War, the national interests 
presumed containment of global communism and maintenance of the bilateral alliance system. 
With the tangible threat of communism all but eliminated today, new strategies must be 
pursued. 
A. CONSTITUTIONAL TASKING; INTERPRETATIONS 
To define the most basic and enduring national interests, we must return to the 
Preamble ofthe Constitution, the keystone ofthe American value system. Specifically: 
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect 
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the 
common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the 
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and 
establish this Constitution for the United States of America. 172 
Thus, the United States' fundamental, long-term national interests may be literally summed 
up as follows: 
-Unity ofthe nation; 
-Domestic justice; 
-Domestic tranquility; 
-Defense of Americans; 
-Economic prosperity; 
-Liberty. 
While the pursuit and application of these interests is the domestic responsibility of 
172 The Constitution of the United States. 
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the courts and the legislators, the latter three are of particular relevance to US interests 
abroad. The security of the United States as a free and independent nation, and the protection 
of its fundamental values and institutions internationally is the responsibility of the American 
government acting on behalf of the American people. The diplomatic burden then is to pursue 
these interests by the most efficacious means possible, while still respecting the sovereign 
interests of foreign states. 
In the post-Cold War era, the Clinton administration has been faced with (whether 
welcome or not) the singular responsibility of redefining America's international role. 
Although this presidency was driven by a professed domestic agenda, the urgency of global 
demands has in fact elicited generally useful statements (if not operational guidance). The 
1993 National Security Strategy (NSS) defined United States global interests and objectives 
as follows: 
-The security of the United States as a free and independent nation, and the 
protection of its fundamental values, institutions and people; 
-Global and regional stability which encourages peaceful change and progress; 
-Open, democratic and representative political systems worldwide; 
-An open international trading and economic system which benefits all 
participants; 
-An enduring global faith in America - that it can and will lead in a collective 
response to the world's crisis. 173 
The 1993 NSS goes on to specifically define US national interests in the EAIP region as 
follows: 
-Maintenance of a strategic framework which reflects the United States status 
as a Pacific power and promotes its engagement in Asia. The key to the United 
States' strategic framework has been, and will continue to be, its alliance with Japan; 
173 The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, (Washington, DC: 
US Government Printing Office, November, 1993), pp.2-9. 
108 
-Expansion of markets through bilateral, reKional, and multilateral 
arrangements; 
-Support, contain, or balance the emergence of China onto the world stage to 
protect United States national interests; 
-Through constructive engagement, foster the peaceful unification process on 
the Korean peninsula; 
-Encourage the normalization of Indochina and the expansion and development 
of the Association of East Asian Nations. 114 
These may be distilled into the following key concepts: 
-maintenance of the US/Pacific alliance system, particularly with Japan; 
-greater investment in multilateral arrangements; 
-watch China carefully, react accordingly to protect and promote US national 
interests; 
-unify Korea through peaceful means; and, 
-participate in ASEAN as a means to invest in Southeast Asia. 
A slightly more tangible and goal-oriented framework was suitably elaborated by 
Winston Lord during confirmation hearings as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs on March 31, 1993. He designated the following ten major goals for American 
policy in Asia and the Pacific: 
-Forging a fresh global partnership with Japan that reflects a more mature balance 
of responsibilities; 
-Erasing the nuclear threat and moving toward peaceful reconciliation on the 
Korean Peninsula; 
-Restoring firm foundations for cooperation with a China where political openness 
catches up with economic reform; 
174 The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, 1993. 
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-Deepening our ties with ASEAN as it broadens its membership and scope; 
-Obtaining the fullest possible accounting of our missing in action as we normalize 
our relations with Vietnam; 
-Securing a peaceful, independent and democratic Cambodia; 
-Strengthening APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) as the cornerstone 
of international economic cooperation around the Pacific Rim; 
-Developing multilateral forums for security consultations while maintaining 
the solid foundations of our alliances; 
-Spurring regional cooperation on global challenges like the environment, refugees, 
health, narcotics, non-proliferation, and arms sales; and, 
-Promoting democracy and human rights where freedom has yet to flower. 175 
Based on these official statements and the Preamble of the Constitution, fundamental, 
long-term national interests ofthe United States in the EA/P region are summarized as the 
protection of American lives and property, promoting economic prosperity, and fostering 
international goodwill. Ultimately it is the challenge of diplomacy to devise strategies to 
protect and promote these interests. Here is where the trend towards multilateralism becomes 
so apparent. 
B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ASIAN MULTILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS 
During the Cold War era, many countries of the East Asia/Pacific were able to 
capitalize on the relative stability of the alliance system, taking the opportunity to develop 
explosively their economic sectors. With traditional security concerns largely accounted for 
by Great Power alliances, these states were enabled considerable freedom for domestic 
development (to say nothing ofthe virtually assured markets of their alliance partners). The 
175 Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 
"Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 31 March, 
1993," ITS Dq>artment of State Dispatch, Vo1.4, No.l4 (5 April, 1993), pp.216-221. 
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results have been nothing short of spectacular in Japan, South Korea, and the ASEAN states. 
The United States was clearly the leader in determining the direction of international relations; 
in the post-Cold War era, its influence will be paramount in shaping the growing 
multilateralism. 
Spawned by the recognition of the inherent value of intra-Asian economic cooperation 
and effective communications between nations of the region, a variety of specialized 
economic forums have arisen. Originally designed to foster mutual economic growth, these 
forums have the very real potential to develop into multilateral security arrangements. "At 
the very least, comprehensive regional organizations of a primarily economic nature, such as 
the institutions of the European Community and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), provide a venue for the exchange of views and tentative understandings among 
top-ranking officials of member's countries." 176 Whatever the motivations, peaceful and 
constructive cooperation is an effective foundation for any security alliance. 
Definitions of multilateral security vary as widely as there are observers. The dawning 
of the global community gave rise to the "granddaddy" of the multilateral security 
organizations, the United Nations. In his interpretation ofthe U.N.'s charter, Michael Doyle 
succinctly translates the essence of multilateral security: 
a noble effort to preserve 'succeeding generations from the scourge of 
war, to unite our strength to maintain international peace, to ensure, 
by the acceptance of principles and institution of methods, that armed 
force shall not be used, save in the common interest.' According to 
tradition, a workable system that makes the security of all into a 
collective responsibility requires commitment on the part of states to 
protect all states ('peace is indivisible') and a distribution of power 
176 Norman D. Palmer, The New Regionalism and the Pacific, (Lexington: Lexington 
Books, 1991), p.3. 
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among states such that no state is capable of effectively resisting the 
collective enforcement of peace. 177 
This definition obviously represents the ideal. The international system has since 1945 been 
shaped by three global challenges: the advent of nuclear weapons and the subsequent 
transformation of security capabilities and strategies of the major powers from defense to 
deterrence; the transition from a multipolar world into a United States-Soviet Union 
bipolarity; and the post-colonial movement for self determination. These all served to 
undermine efforts towards collective or multilateral security. 178 
Unfortunately these undermining factors reduced the United Nations to a mere facade, 
while real power concentrated primarily with the United States and the Soviet Union. Rather 
than fostering a cooperative world, the United Nations facilitated a global degeneration into 
"spheres of influence"; an uncertain balance between an absolute Soviet bloc and the tenuous 
threads ofWestem democratic alliances. 179 The UN's role as arbiter of security was reduced 
to the limited, albeit valuable role of diplomatic mediation, and to the thankless task of 
providing peacekeeping forces for disputes where both parties agreed to introduce them. 180 
Ironically, with the passage of the Cold War, we have come to appreciate the element of 
stability inherent in the late "unlamented" bipolar system. 
Throughout the Cold War, the dominant "multilateral" security organizations were the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw 
Pact) nations. These were collectives of bilateral security relationships, each massed around 
177 United Nations Charter, quoted in Michael W. Doyle, introduction to Esca1ation and 
Intervention· Mu1ti1atera1ism and Its Alternatives, eds. Arthur R. Day and Michael W. 
Doyle, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986), p.2. 
178 Doyle, p.3. 
179 John L Gaddis, The Long Peace; Inquires Into The History Of The Co1d War, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p.52. 
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a Soviet or U.S. nexus with a singular purpose of resistance to their ideological opposites. 
With the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Communist Bloc, there is no unity; 
there is less reason for these organizations to exist. 
It is interesting to note that when the NATO format was detached from the North 
Atlantic/European scenario and applied to a fundamentally different region, it ceases to be 
viable. The Manila Pact's Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was founded in 1954 
based on the NATO model with the dual ambitions of opposing further Communist gains in 
Southeast Asia, and ultimately of sanctioning a U.S. presence in Vietnam. Suffering from 
wavering member support and a decided lack of unanimity, the organization proved 
ineffective and was eventually disbanded in 1977. 181 Differences in cultural foundations 
(indeed, the very spectrum of cultural diversity among member nations), and an essentially 
different kind of security confrontation undermined SEATO from the beginning. 
Other proposals for East Asia looked to the Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (CSCE) as their model. This was particularly true in the wake of the disintegration 
of the Eastern European bloc in 1989. Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans argued most 
enthusiastically for the conceptual Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA). 
This support is based on the Palme Comrnission182 thesis that security is achieved in concert 
with other countries, rather than in opposition. Although receiving an element of academic 
181 In Search of Southeast Asia, ed. David Joel Steinberg, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii 
Press, 1987), p.445. See also: Ulrich A. Straus, "Southeast Asia in Containment 
Strategies for the 1990s," Containment· Concept and Policy Vol.2, ed., Terry L. Diebel 
and John Lewis Gaddis, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1986), 
pp.520-521. 
182 Palme Commission, "Common Security: A Program For Disarmament," The Report 
of the Independent Commission on Disannament and Security issues, chairman Olof 
Palme, (London: Pan Books, 1982). See also: Stuart Harris, "Architecture for a New Era 
in Asia-Pacific," Pacific Research, (May 1990), pp.8f. and John Fry, The Helsinki 
Process; Negotiating Security and Cooperation in Europe, (Washington, D.C.: National 
Defense University Press, 1993). 
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support, it failed to work for the Asia-Pacific region. The Euro-model based proposal were 
all undercut by Asia's diversity. 183 
Although Northeast Asia is even less fertile ground than Southeast Asia, 184 subsequent 
suggestions for security arrangements based on the CSCE model also surfaced with some 
regularity. Notably these included proposals from the Soviet Union's Mikhail Gorbachev in 
July 1986 during his noted Vladivostok speech. 185 The main elements of Gorbachev's 
proposals were for economic cooperation, but he suggested a Helsinki-style forum, naval 
arms control, and confidence building measures. While any Soviet proposal for regional 
security structures was sure to be interpreted as a hegemonic gesture around the Asia-Pacific 
rim, some Soviet actions may have been actual attempts at reconciling common East-West 
interests. 186 The former Soviet foreign minister Shevardnadze called for an "All Asian Forum" 
as a multilateral negotiating mechanism in the Asia-Pacific. 187 Whatever their intent, the fact 
that Soviet suggestions met with little international acceptance indicates that it is unlikely that 
any Russian-based security conception will succeed. The economic and political dilemma in 
Russia limits any influence it might have in terms of building security arrangements in the 
Asia-Pacific region. 188 
183 
"Asia Unleashed," The Economist, (3 April, 1993), p.l5. 
184 Whereas Southeast Asia is home to myriad cultures and ethnic backgrounds making it 
unsuited to European-modeled common security arrangements, Northeast Asia would seem 
a relatively homogenous host with ancient and common Sinic cultural links throughout the 
region. However, sociological permutations and intense historical baggage have in part 
rendered similar gestures at security structures futile. 
185 Other profferings include an interview with the Indonesian journal Merdeka in 1987 
and a speech in Krasnoyarsk in September 1988. Geoffrey Wiseman, "Common Security 
in the Asia-Pacific Region," The Pacific Review Vol.5, No.I, (1992): p.43. 
186 Wiseman, p.IOO. 
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On yet another occasion, Foreign Minister Evans advocated the use of the United 
Nations security apparatus as the supporting mechanism for common security. Of particular 
interest in Northeast Asia, Evans' countryman Prime Minister Bob Hawke once postulated 
a security system based on " ... a set of arrangements and relationships which together maintain 
regional security ... some of these arrangements will be formal, others informal. Some will be 
bilateral, others trilateral or multilateral." 189 
A thoughtful proposal for a CSCE type arrangement in Northeast Asia came recently 
from Canada. The Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark proposed the 
a North Pacific Sec.:'Urity Cooperation Dialogue (NPSCD) at a conference in Victoria, British 
Columbia in April 1991. 190 This proposal for a sub-regional multilateral security dialogue 
offered a focused and unique option. The NPSCD would represent hath official 
governmental representatives and non-governmental organizations (see next section) within 
a 'dual-track' format: 
On the non-governmental track a group of academics discussed what 
kind of security framework might be constructed. On another track, 
officials from the policy planning staffs from the seven states in the 
North Pacific ... discussed similar matters, albeit on an 'unofficial' basis. 
The two tracks often crisscrossed during the meetings, and at the end 
plans were laid for further workshops on specific issues, leading to 
another general meeting. 191 
To avoid any prejudice by association with previous Soviet proposals, the Canadians avoided 
the language of the C SCE, yet the collection of security issues for consideration contained 
189 Bob Hawke, "Australia's Security in Asia," Lecture to the ·Asia-Australia Institute, 
University of New South Wales, Sydney, 24 May 1991. News release, p.3 and speech by 
Senator Evans, "Australia's Regional Security Environment," Conference on Strategic 
Studies, 31 July 1991, pp.10-12. As cited in Wiseman, p.44. 
190 United States, China, Japan, (at the time) Soviet Union, North and South Korea, and 
of course Canada. 
191 Gerald Segal, "North-East Asia: Common Security or a la carte?" International Affairs 
Vol.67, No.4, (1991), p.764. 
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'hot' topics similar to the Soviet suggestions: the environment, confidence-building measures 
such as the exchange of military information and officials, and ultimately discussions of arms 
control and deployment limitations. 192 Segal regards the NPSCD as somewhat of a minimalist 
tangent with its sub-regional focus and specific issue-by-issue approach. Perhaps; however, 
given the limited success of" grand schemes of multilateral cooperation," this more specific 
approach may hold greater potential. 
For all the clamor for myriad security arrangements for the entire Asia-Pacific rim, 
repeated meetings of government officials rarely accomplish any more than rhetorical banter 
calling for more meetings, ad infinitum. The limited NPSCD concept promises to be more 
productive. 
The precedent for Asia-specific regional organizations and formalized interactions is 
well established. Including economic associations, professional/technical organizations, and 
international organizations particularly active in Asia and the Pacific, most of these are 
relatively restricted either by geographic (i.e.: sub-regional) or topical scopei 93 Three 
economic organizations stand out: these are ASEAN, the South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and the South Pacific Forum (SPF). Some other 
organizations have attempted to meet their needs in an all-regional context. These include 
the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC), the Economic and Social Commission 
for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), the Colombo Plan, the Asia Pacific Economic Co-
Operation (APEC), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). 
It is important to note that the preponderance of regional international liaisons are 
within a network of bilateral ties. They constitute, as Palmer quotes Secretary of State 
George Shultz, a "web of cooperative realities" between governments of the region, and a 
192 Segal, p. 764. 
193 Palmer, p.22. 
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growing number of contacts among private businesses, professional groups, and individuals. 194 
Less visible than the large international/regional organizations, these limited bilateral ties are 
inevitably forming the networks upon which the "regionals" will depend for their success. 
Robert Scalapino has termed this process "Asianization" and states that this congealing 
process "has been under way for several decades and has not yet reached its full momentum." 
It is, as he goes on to say: 
... a widening and deepening network ofties between and among Asian 
states of diverse political and cultural nature. Although this process 
has not eliminated the importance of peripheral powers, notably the 
United States ... to the region, it has introduced a major new, and partly 
independent dimension into the scene. Whether in conflict or in 
concert, the Asian states are creating or recreating relations between 
and among themselves, both hierarchial and equal. Interdependence 
within Asia as well as with external parties is growing. 195 
To organize and direct these economic interdependencies has been the challenge. As 
previously suggested, early attempts at orchestrated co-operation in Asia have generally been 
in terms of emulating the trading bloc of the European Community. Including Kojima and 
Kurimoto's proposal for a "Pacific Free Trade Area" and Drysdale and Patrick's conceptual 
"Organization for Pacific Trade and Development," these attempts made it clear that 
organizational models developed elsewhere would not easily work in the Pacific Region. 196 
The crux of the problem has been in accommodating the tremendous socio-economic and 
political diversity of the Pacific Rim. "These differences and complicated political factors 
mean that region-wide economic co-operation cannot be built on formal inter-governmental 
194 Palmer, p.22. 
195 Robert A. Scalapino, "Regionalism in the Pacific: Prospects and Problems for the 
Pacific Basin," The Atlantic Community Quarterly, Vol.26, No.2, (Summer 1988), p.l78; 
as cited in Palmer, p.24. 
196 Andrew Elek, "Asia Pacific Economic Co-Operation (APEC)," Southeast Asian 
Affairs, (1991), p.35. 
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structures (alone), something more imaginative was needed to commence the process and 
continues to be needed to advance it." 197 
Accordingly this need was fulfilled first by conferences of academics in the Pacific 
Trade and Development (P AFT AD) series, and then by preeminent businessmen at the region-
wide Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC). A crucial step was made towards true 
regional planning by involving policy makers during the Pacific Economic Co-operation 
Council (PECC) meetings in Canberra in 1980. Although many countries from the region 
were apprehensive about entangling themselves in any kind of international "authority" (given 
their recent emergence from under the colonial veil), the PECC seemed to offer hope without 
formal commitments to an economic co-operation process. 198 
A tripartite made up ofbusinessmen, academics, and public officials, PECC's diverse 
composition was able to highlight regional interests in trade, agriculture, fisheries, minerals 
and energy, investment, transportation, and tourism. Combining the macroeconomic 
perspective with information exchange and access to policy makers, PECC theoretically 
benefitted all the region's economies. 199 Whereas PECC was highly successful at building 
local consensus and outward looking economic co-operation at the functional level, to effect 
true change an additional tool was needed at the political level. 
An outgrowth of the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and MAPHILINDO, the 
Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was fonned in 1967, ostensibly in response 
to the perceived threat of regional communism. Residing primarily in Indochina (Laos, 
Cambodia, Vietnam) this threat to internal security included revolutionary insurgents who 
197 Elek, p.35. 
198 Stuart Harris, "Varieties of Pacific Economic Cooperation," The Pacific Review, 
Vol.4, No.4, (London: Oxford University Press, 1991), p.303. 
199 Elek. 
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looked primarily to Maoist-China for inspiration and material support. 200 This founding in 
security issues is a curious paradox, as Rolls points out, in that ASEAN's founding charter 
(the Bangkok Declaration) emphasizes the promotion of economic growth, social progress, 
and cultural development. 201 ASEAN membership includes the non-communist countries of 
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Brunei. 
All security interests aside, ASEAN has served primarily to foster econorruc 
cooperation among its members. 202 Out of deference to nationalism and sovereignty interests, 
ASEAN for the most part remained uninvolved until recently in security issues. However it 
"has forged a unity out of countries that were once suspicious of each other. Its meetings are 
warm, consensus emerges through sophisticated diplomacy, and its statements have clout. 
ASEAN nations vote together as a bloc in almost every international forum. "203 Antolik 
proposes that ASEAN is at once an "amalgam" and, more importantly, a political process. 
It is " ... a non-aggression pact resting on adherence by its members to the principles of 
restraint. .. respect. .. and responsibility. "204 
This process has gone well past the realm of a mere non-aggression pact, ASEAN 
now encompasses cooperative agreements in politics, economics, and has begun to venture 
_:·Donald E. Weatherbee, "Security as a 'Condition' in Southeast Asia," from Change, 
Interdependence and Security in the Pacific Basin; The 1990 Pacific Symposium, ed. Dora 
Alves, (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1991), p.283. 
201 Mark G. Rolls, "ASEAN: Where from or Where to?," Contemporary Southeast Asia, 
Vol.13, No.3, (December 1991), p.317. 
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204 Michael Antolik, ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation, (Armonk: M.E. 
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into realm of security discussions. Its early list of accomplishments is impressive, yet 
surprisingly limited. ASEAN suggested a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPF AN) 
in an attempt to contain the aggression of any outside power. It failed to materialize. 
Economically, ASEAN has coordinated inputs of technical assistance to the region, resulting 
in a substantial increase in foreign funding. Additionally, ASEAN has been influential in 
negotiating access to overseas markets and in initiating economic self-help programs. 205 This 
regional cooperation has resulted in explosive intra-ASEAN trade where previously complex 
negotiations had failed. 206 
Internally ASEAN must foster further economic solidarity through reduction or 
elimination of intra-regional tariffs. Despite excessive tariffbarriers between ASEAN nations, 
the recent Singapore Summit produced a glimmer of hope. Known as common effective 
preferential tariffs (CEPTs), the CEPT " ... requires ASEAN states to standardize and 
progressively reduce intra-ASEAN tariffs on a wide range of manufactures, processed and 
semi-processed products. By the year 2000, no tariffs on the agreed categories will exceed 
five percent. "207 
Such housekeeping measures will be essential if ASEAN is to perform well as a 
regional political arbiter and become more influential in matters of security. 
Latter day Cobdenites seek to encourage a stable and more cohesive 
political environment by increasing economic interaction on the 
often ... accurate presumption that political conflict is less likely among 
countries with close economic relations. In such circumstances, 
economic cooperation is an instrument to a further objective, and such 
200 Haas, p.l46. 
-·J~ Haas, p.l47. 
207 H 23 aas, p. . 
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motivations are not absent from regional economic cooperation in the 
Asia-Pacific region. 208 
These economic imperatives prompted ASEAN to expand its efforts in the security 
field, initiating the Post Ministerial Conferences (PMCs). The PMC is an annual forum 
between the foreign ministers of the ASEAN nations and their counterparts from outside 
nations, generally those with which ASEAN has close economic relations. Their "dialogue 
partners" are Japan, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the European 
Community and South Korea. Recently the PMCs have added as "observers": Russia, China, 
Vietnam, Laos, and Papau New Guinea. These meetings ofthe vast majority ofthe Pacific 
Rim strategic players have the potential of becoming a tremendously important forum for 
exchange ofviews on a variety of regional and global issues. 209 While this forum works well 
for projecting ASEAN concerns and interests to the developed world, it also forces the 
participants to address such perennial Western as democracy, human rights and the opening 
of local markets to Western trade. 210 
The rest of Asia has taken an active interest in ASEAN. In 1991, following the 
signing of the October Paris Peace Accord which ended (theoretically) the conflict in 
Cambodia, many observers thought that ASEAN had lost, in the same manner as NATO, its 
fundamental mandate for existence. Quite to the contrary, ASEAN's now durable and 
established structure is seen as a potential forum for broader, region-wide security 
discussions. Perhaps most importantly, it has also received substantial support from the 
United States. 
208 Harris, p.305. Note: Richard Cobden was a nineteenth century English statesman who 
advocated free trade and international peace. He believed that economic cooperation between 
nations would beget peaceful political relations. 
209 Palmer, p.37. 




Japan first proposed that regional security be a primary issue of discussion at 
subsequent PMCs. This idea was been taken on enthusiastically by the rest of the participants 
who were all concerned about security and perceived a need for this type of forum. As 
Sarasin Viraphol ofthe Thai Foreign ministry notes: "The security situation in Asia is now 
more complex (and) the need for a multilateral forum stems from the need to address a much 
wider array ofissues."211 The ASEAN-PMC meeting in July, 1993 was the first time that the 
security issues were actually placed on the agenda. Foreign Minister Gareth Evans went so 
far as to call this episode a "historic milestone. "212 
Foremost among the current regional security topics and of special interest to the 
United States are China's increased military strength and outspoken territorial claims in the 
South China Sea, growing concerns regarding the unification ofthe Korean Peninsula and 
North Korean violation of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty; debates over the power vacuum 
left by reduction of U.S. bases in the Philippines; the future role of Japan in contributing to 
regional security; and finally, concerns over Indian Naval activities in the Andaman and 
Nicobar island groups. 213 These issues, even though in Northeast Asia, are of tangible 
concern to the ASEAN nations. Additionally, with ASEAN states crucial to sea-lines-of-
communication (SLOC) and Spratly Islands disputes, the ASEAN-PMC represents a very 
viable apparatus for regional security dialogues. 214 
Detractors of the ASEAN-PMC treat the PMCs with a certain cynicism. 
At first even Japan and the United States participated only out of diplomatic 
m Sarasin Viraphol as quoted in Michael Vatikiotis' "Forging Stronger Links," FEER, (29 
April 1993), p.26. 
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courtesy. It was felt that: 
The kind of security issues that a regional forum is meant to address 
would be more productively and appropriately handled in a wider 
multi-lateral body that would engage the United States and Japan 
directly. China refuses to discuss the South China Sea issue in any 
international conference and has instead proposed a Sino-ASEAN 
dialogue that would place ASEAN at a disadvantage. China's refusal 
points directly to the inadequacy of the PMC mechanism. 215 
Challenges to ASEAN'S role in the region arose originally with the fading of its 
original raison d'etre, anti-Communism. Later tests came from economic regionalism in other 
parts of the world, primarily the European Communities "borderless" market and North 
America's fledgling Free Trade Agreement. From these the ASEAN states still face the threat 
of protectionism excluding their vital export markets. Although instituting their own counter-
protectionism via a Japan-led economic bloc may prove beneficial in the short run, the 
preferable procedure for ASEAN interests is to compete in the free global market for trade 
and foreign investment. 216 
By no means an ASEAN redundancy, APEC was launched from the valid concerns 
with the floundering Uruguay Round of the GATT process. Designed to supplement GATT 
regarding the more intangible forms of international trade restrictions, APEC's purpose was 
to stem the trend towards protectionism and to avoid a fragmentation of the world market 
into regional trading blocs. 217 From its origins in Australia, APEC initially included the 
ASEAN nations, New Zealand, Japan and Korea and was rapidly expanded to include the 
People's Republic of China (PRC), Hong Kong, Taiwan, the United States, and Canada. 
Although APEC has focused exclusively on issues of economics and trade, there has 
215 Buszynski, p.l03. 
216 Buszynski, p.l 03. 
217 Those not specifically addressed by GATT's charter, such as the series of Multi-Fiber 
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been a recent push for its role to be expanded in the world security arena. Australian Prime 
Minister Paul Keating has suggested that APEC should be an international security forum. 
Although this proposal has received limited support from within Asia, the Clinton 
administration appears to view APEC as a potential cure-all for any issue, including security, 
coming out of the Pacific Rim. There is virtually no support from the ASEAN sector nations, 
witness Mahathir's outspoken absence from the recent APEC meeting in Seattle. They fear 
encroachment upon their economic "territory. "218 Perhaps APEC's limiting element in 
becoming a regional security forum is it's own immaturity as an institution. Still evolving, 
APEC is primarily a single issue forum without the central organization, support, or mandate 
(as yet) to orchestrate a regional security program. 219 In spite of the United States' 
enthusiastic yet seemingly inappropriate support, the recent "Pacific Summit" proved 
singularly ineffective. 220 
With the decline of the Soviet Empire and the potential threat of declining American 
assets in the region, the Asia-Pacific is a potential free-for-all of myriad economic and security 
interests. Even the smallest players have tangible economic interests and resources to 
potentially obtain the most powerful tools of war. If the need for a peaceful, stabilizing 
influence is apparent, then the need for a unifying forum should be all the more so. 
The efforts to establish a multilateral regional security forum so far have been 
unsuccessful. Most established "organizations" were not designed to deal with security 
issues at an international level (i.e: PECC). SAARC, on the other hand, failed because it 
addressed the interests of only one country, India. Some efforts were handicapped by 
misdirected orientation (i.e: CSCE/A: designed for the relative homogeneity ofEurope vice 
218 Buszynski, p.l02; see also Suhaini Aznam,"The Shadow ofDili," FEE&, (7 May 1992). 
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diverse Asia-Pacific). Still lacked the necessary infrastructure and support to hold ongoing 
security discussions (i.e: APEC). 
Eventually the members of ASEAN formalized an 18 nation group known as the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) for the sole purpose of addressing regional security issues. 
With the inclusion of the Russians, the Chinese, and most importantly for the local sponsors 
of the conference, the Vietnamese, a dramatic and mature step forward was made in the 
search for an adequate security venue. However, its first meeting in (July 1994) in Bangkok 
revealed its weaknesses. The whole meeting lasted only three hours, during which limited 
time nothing serious could be accomplished. The long term viability of the Forum certainly 
remains a question. 
Despite blithe official pronouncements of the conviviality of the three 
hour meeting, it was obvious that the dialogue had exposed 
irreconcilable differences, especially on territorial issues. Participants 
reported that four conflict areas were repeated referred to in the 
discussions -- the overlapping territorial claims in the South China 
Sea, Cambodia, Burma and North Korea. But ARF chose to bury 
these issues, its final statement referring only to North Korea. 221 
The limited functional utility ofthe ASEAN "multilogue" process was once again highlighted 
by China's refusal to be drawn into any discussion of Spratly territorial issues, instead using 
the forum to reiterate the PRC's sovereignty over their claimed islands. While some analysts 
suggest that it is just such intractable conflicts that will ensure ARF's remaining merely a "talk 
shop". On the other hand, "With so many conflicting interests, a forum that stresses the 
processes of dialogue and consultation and aims for transparency and confidence-building 
would seem more realistic than one that strives for specifics on issues of conflict. "222 While 
the initial criticisms are wide-ranging and many following this the initial ARF meeting, the 
attending ministers at the very least agreed to investigate other concrete ways to facilitate 
221 
"Better ARF than War," IPS News Service, 08/01/94 (1530), America On-Line. 
222 Kusuma Snitwongse, (Director of the Institute of Security and International Studies, 
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security cooperation prior to next year's meeting in Brunei. 223 Standing alone as it does, the 
ARF seems a logical sounding board for those pursuing Asian-Pacific Rim security in the near 
future. 
Embracing Russia, China, Vietnam, Laos, Papua New Guinea, Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand, and the European Union as it has indicates a willingness to address/confront 
both sub-regional and at least regional issues. With the inclusion of former communist states 
a variety of crucial stumbling blocks are apparently overcome. The regional Communist 
history and its tenacious legacy have traditionally had the potential to undermine any ASEAN-
based organization. Their inclusion indicates both an appreciation for the tremendous 
economic potential in these states and an understanding of their import in addressing regional 
security issues. 
The American perception ofthe need for a dedicated Northeast Asian security forum 
should not be understated. In that most of Asia's hot spots are either in the Northeast or 
involve Northeast Asian states, the need for a collaboration of security interests is clear. The 
logic is compelling. All of the regional players (if not the world) have an intense desire to 
peacefully resolve the North Korean nuclear weapons issue. All would prefer a 'soft landing' 
for North Korea, and virtually all have an interest in a reunified peninsula. 224 
Crucial issues include: 'risk management', what to do with the refugees when the 
North Korean regime collapses; possible coordinated military scenarios ifthe Kim regime 
'goes over the edge'; military transparency issues, defense spending, doctrinal discussions, 
223 These include, among others, nuclear non-proliferation, peace-keeping cooperation, 
exchanges of non-classified military information, maritime security issues and preventative 
diplomacy. 
224 Despite the economic powerhouse (read: opportunities) that a unified Peninsula would 
represent, pundits point out that a one-state Korean Peninsula would cease to be an adequate 
buffer on the east for the Chinese, and that the potential economic dynamo is in fact an 
intimidating competitor for the Japanese. 
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maritime safety, arms sales, missile proliferation, nuclear safety; Japanese plutonium 
processing; and lastly, cross-border environmental concerns, everything from fisheries rights 
to the devastating issue of acid rain. 225 
Clearly the need for a Northeast Asian subregional forum exists. The question is: how 
to shape it? Obviously the possibilities are many. Established economic organizations 
(ASEAN, APEC, PECC, etc.) have already garnered active participation from all the regional 
actors, but can their forums diversify to incorporate hard-edged military/security issues? 
More importantly, by what means can these multilateral economic forums enforce agreements 
made within their context? ASEAN has shown that economic and security issues can be 
discussed together, but can their decisions be enforced? 
Another set of regional organizations which have shown promise in moving nations 
to cooperate--if only at an academic and advisory level, are the Non-Governmental 
OrRanizations (NGO\) 226 Also known as Track II or Second Track economic and security 
processes, these extra-governmental forums have developed roughly parallel to and by design 
in support oftraditional governmental organizations (U.N., ASEAN, APEC, etc.). These 
must not be rejected out ofhand by American decision-makers. 
The seminal forerunners oftoday's NGOs regarding economic cooperation are found 
in the Pan-Pacific Union of 1907 and the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) of 1925. 
Cutting the mold for today's NGOs, these organizations (particularly the IPR) brought 
together a diverse yet complementary mix of academics, businessmen, labor officials, 
225 See Robert A Manning, "The Asian Paradox," World Policy Journal, Vol.10, No.3, (Fall 
1993): pp.SS-64. 
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journalists, politicians, bureaucrats, and statesmen for the purpose of discussing and 
researching regional issues. After falling victim to McCarthyism and a U.S. cold war 
mentality, the IPR was soon replaced by P AFT AD and PBEC which stressed the same three 
modes of utility: representation, information, and communication. 227 
Developing in the early 1970s, the PBEC, PAFTAD, and PECC organizations were 
primarily committed to regional economic cooperation. By developing and disseminating 
cooperation schemes, conducting extensive economic studies and analyses, and by working 
closely with governmental officials they have been able to facilitate cooperation. By taking 
their independent work directly to officials and to full blown "First Track" governmental 
organizations, they have stimulated international discussion and convincingly demonstrated 
the benefits of trade liberalization. Most importantly, these NGO's made clear that 
"meaningful and productive dialog on complex and important policy matters is possible 
notwithstanding the extraordinary disparity in the sizes and interests of the numerous parties 
involved. "228 
From these roots have sprung a plethora of NGO's filling out the Second Track 
process, to the point where some estimates suggest as many as three NGO conferences per 
month meeting to discuss Asian-Pacific security and economic issues. 229 From tiny seminars 
fielding but a few dozen participants discussing specific issues to major academic conferences 
with hundreds of participants and a spectral range of topics. Notable among the NGOs are 
227 Woods, p.313. 
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the Asia Pacific Roundtable,230 the ASEAN ISIS (see previous footnote), the Pacific Forum 
(Honolulu), the Seoul Forum for International Affairs, and the Japan Institute of 
International Affairs (Jl/A). Together this core group has been joined in research by 
institutes from Japan, South Korea, China, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, 
Indonesia, Australia, and the United States into a consortium known as the Council for 
Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). 
The fundamental purpose of CSCAP is to provide " ... a more structured regional 
process of a non-governmental nature ... to contribute to the efforts towards regional 
confidence building and enhancing regional security through dialogues, consultation, and 
cooperation. "231 CSCAP may be seen as a clearing house for the collective work of the 
member NGOs. Guiding themes are two-fold: First, the Council must be a non-governmental 
institution, yet that it may include government officials, but in a non-official capacity. While 
political autonomy is essential in order to take "full advantage of the extraordinary vitality and 
fecundity ofthe (NGOs) engaged in the 'second track' process,"232 official involvement at a 
personal level is considered useful both for credibility and for access to official resources. 
The second purpose is to facilitate dialog, coordinate and support research, and contribute 
to resolution of differences between states and peoples. 
While CSCAP and its member organizations have "attracted some state recognition 
of their roles as unofficial agents of diplomacy" and economic cooperation, their challenges 
are many. 233 First is to retain professional credibility. As in U.S. political circles, the line 
230 Now a offshoot of the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN 
ISIS). 
231 Desmond Ball, Richard L. Grant, and JusufWanandi, Security Cooperation in the Asia 
Pacific Region, (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1993), as quoted in Ball: p.21. 
232 Ball, p.21. 
233 Woods, p.319. 
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between an objective non-governmental economic research group and an agenda-bound 
professional lobbying organization can be a thin and fuzzy one indeed. The injection of 
tainted and skewed counsel will threaten the reliability of the entire Second Track process. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to satisfy "the need to attract and maintain state interest, state 
support, and state involvement while at the same time discouraging state control. "234 The 
Second Track, or Track II process is no stand-alone answer to Asia-Pacific security needs. 
However, it can go a long ways in supporting mainstream governmental forums such as 
ASEAN and APEC. 
Despite the apparent potential for ASEAN and APEC to perform as regional security 
arbiters, their limited foundations as purely Southeast Asian economic forums reveals a 
weakness in trying to become an effective forum for the Northeast Asian security 
environment. Whereas Southeast Asia has moved on gracefully into the post-cold war era 
by putting economic development first (economic security versus politico-military escalation; 
the purported Southeast Asian "arms race" notwithstanding), the Northeast appears to be 
trapped for the time being by long standing political hatreds. Torn by a variety of critical 
issues including the still volatile memories of Japanese colonialism throughout the region, 
widespread territorial disputes, the omnipresent fears of Chinese hegemony, the dangerously 
unstable North Korea and post-communist Russian Far East, efforts to establish true 
multilateral security arrangements in Northeast Asia have heretofore been entirely futile. 
While the continuity of the U.S. bilateral security links with regional nations is desired, a 
changing world demands the effort to add a multilateral dimension to international relations. 
Thus with the profound exception ofthe heritage ofthe Cold War on the Korean 
Peninsula, Northeast Asia has been relatively stable. Anchored by the US alliances with Japan 
and South Korea, Northeast Asia has been peaceful and prosperous. However, with these 
ties potentially threatened by an American administration intent on military downsizing and 
234 Woods, p.319. 
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focused on domestic issues, the Northeast Asian field is fertile for the sowing of insecurity. 
Additionally, "given the lack of an appropriate security regime in Northeast Asia like (that) 
in Europe, it is observed that greater independence from old restraints could lead to a 
precarious regional power vacuum. "235 Factors to consider as we 'cultivate the field': 
Northeast Asia represents the convergence of interests for four of the world's most powerful 
nations--the U.S., Russia, China, and Japan. The former three are nuclear weapons equipped 
(accompanied of course by the dangerously unpredictable North Korea). Equally crucial is 
Northeast Asia's collective status as the world's most dangerous vortex of economic rivalry. 
While no state in the region wants to risk nuclear confrontation, the slow but steady 
regional escalation in arms procurement suggests regional players may risk conflict involving 
conventional weapons. What is the outlook for peace and stability in the region? However 
grim the present may appear, if a new common international multilateral factor is added to the 
security establishment, peaceful solutions may be found for everybody's mutual benefit. The 
key is to agree upon common interests great enough to rise above deeply ingrained historical 
legacies, to overcome disabling nationalism, to dispel dangerous threat perceptions, and to 
allow the reasonable concessions of certain sovereign prerogatives for the sake of common 
interest. 236 
235 William T. Tow, "Northeast Asia and International Security; Transforming Competition 
to Collaboration," Austral Journal oflntemational Affairs Vol.46, No.1 (May 1992), p.2. 
As cited in Kook-Chin Kim, p.99. 
236 Tow, p.l 00. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Throughout the Cold War era the United States' objectives included the containment 
of international communism, the reconstruction ofWestern Europe, Japan, and Korea, and 
the development of global economic institutions to promote free trade. To this end the US 
participated in a multitude of international arrangements: NATO, the European Community, 
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the GAIT. In addition, America 
negotiated cornerstone security treaties with Japan and South Korea. While these measures 
were effective against global communism, their adequacy in the post-Cold War era has come 
into question. Although the threat of communism is largely eliminated, there is cause to re-
assess the Cold War activities and to find new methods to cope with a 'new generation' of 
political, economic, and security challenges. 
While the United States has security relationships with Japan and Korea, the evolution 
of Northeast Asian economic and political dynamics has precipitated a clamor for more 
'mature' and 'mutually beneficial' relationships with these states. The expansion of Asia-wide 
economic prosperity and cross-border economic integration have fostered an awareness of 
common interests with all Northeast Asian states that will be fundamental in defining the new 
era. America's interests in the region are obvious, well documented, and continually growing. 
For the more effective protection and promotion of its national interests in East Asia and the 
Pacific regions however, it is necessary to participate in and support the emerging multilateral 
arrangements. 
The Clinton administration has 'climbed on board' with the Asian Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) group as a means to effect multilateral economic discussion around the 
Pacific Rim. Although this organization is still embryonic, with continued support from all 
sectors it has great potential to enhance economic integration in the region. APEC has little 
chance of developing into a traditional security alliance. More importantly however, it will 
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promote American awareness of their interests rooted in the region, and cultivate an indelible 
sense of purpose in the US role of contributing to regional stability. Additionally, through 
the 'multilogue' process, APEC can help the Asian community develop a greater sense of 
mutual responsibility and ultimately foster regional collective security arrangements and 
higher levels of support for US forces. 237 
In the pursuit of regional security, the United States has no better forum than the 
rapidly evolving Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The trans-regional 
forum ASEAN (specifically the ASEAN Regional Forum, ARF) provides a context wherein 
potential antagonists can meet together without overt hostility. With the shared interests of 
economic development and desires for a tranquil, predictable environment, ASEAN is well 
suited for the negotiation of regional security initiatives. Unencumbered by the pitfalls of the 
global milieu, the ARF may well serve as an expeditious supplement both to the United 
Nations and to America's extant bilateral ties in the region. ASEAN's leaders have been 
visionary in soliciting a wide-spread and varied membership, recognizing the verity of shared 
national interests and thus the greater probability of meaningful dialogue. Fortunately, the 
Clinton administration has recognized that multilateral security arrangements can provide 
benefits that no single security arrangement can achieve. 238 
237 Promoting a sense of fortuitous integration with crucial Northeast Asian economies is 
essential. Although the US was ostensibly promoting national interests through NAFT A, 
such a device can be interpreted as an economic bloc; not beneficial to common interests 
with Asian alliances. Corresponding alliances with EA/P states are required. Recent 
Japanese and Chinese support for Malaysian PM Mahathir' s East Asian Economic Caucus 
(EAEC; a proposed economic arrangement which excludes the United States) suggests a 
potential divisiveness in the region. See Rodney Tasker, "Signs of Life: Japan Warms 
Towards East Asian caucus," Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 September, 1994. 
238 Bill Clinton, Speech delivered to the Korean National Assembly, Seoul, 10 July, 1993, 
Weekly Compilation ofPresidential Documents Vo1.29, No.28, (19 July, 1993), pp.l310-
1314. 
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A plethora of multilateral arrangements have been discussed, many of which deserve 
increased official United States participation. Full participation must be forthcoming only if 
it contributes to the national interests of the United States. Any internationalization of 
American interests in EA/P must be as 'building blocks' added-on to the existing bilateral ties 
to its traditional trading partners. Further, "the key to future stability in Asia is a continued 
American military presence ... the keys to assuring this presence are the long-standing US 
alliances and America's old and new friendships throughout the region. As Secretary 
Christopher has noted, maintaining 'our solemn treaty obligations' remains the United States 
first foreign policy priority. "239 That bilateral ties can overlap with multilateral arrangements 
is implicit; that they must be flexible and renewed to suit changing national interests is 
essential to maintaining economic and political stability. 
In the push to build a concerted Pacific Community (whether the current policy is 
referred to as 'enlargement' or as 'cooperative engagement'), the bottom-line is the same: that 
is, to strengthen and facilitate the growth of the world's community of free-market 
democracies. 240 Whether or not the United States participates is academic: US economic 
integration throughout the region requires it. Even without US involvement, the synergy of 
the congealing East Asian economic bloc is enough to ensure the durability of these 
239 Ralph A. Cossa, "Good News For Asia: The Bottom-Up Review," Asia-Pacific Defense 
Forum (Spring 1994), pp.16-17. 
240 
'Enlargement' is comprised ofthe following four strategies: 1) Strengthen the community 
of major market democracies; 2) Consolidate new democracies and market economies; 3) 
Counter the aggression, and support the liberalization of states hostile to democracy and free 
markets; and, 4) Pursue our humanitarian mission. 'Cooperative Engagement', the security 
incarnation of American foreign policy, is grounded in three areas of strategic emphasis: 1) 
Economic growth; 2) Military strength; and 3) Support for democracy. It capitalizes on an 
adaptive forward presence, strong alliances, and a multitude of evolving bilateral and 
multilateral alliances. See Anthony Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement: Current 
Foreign Policy Debates in Perspective," speech delivered at Johns Hopkins University School 
of Advanced International Relations, Washington, DC, 21 September 1993; and Admiral 
Charles R. Larson, USN, (CINCPAC), "Cooperative Engagement," Asia-Pacific Defense 
Forum (Summer, 1993), pp.2-6. 
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arrangements (witness the smoldering EAEC). That these arrangements are primarily Asian-
led is symptomatic of a traditional American reserve in its relations towards East Asia. 
Whatever the future, whatever the mechanism, American leadership will emerge through full-
scale, meaningful participation. At the very least, American participation in these 
arrangements is mandatory to ensure a 'place at the table'. 
The affirmation of American interest in the region must not be understated, nor should 
the active pursuit of the national interests by whatever means be underplayed. The United 
States has the military and economic strength upon which the future of the East Asia/Pacific 
depends. East Asian multilateral arrangements, with US support, will serve our interests as 
well as those of the regional states. While threats to states' sovereignty and bids for 
hegemonic power will ultimately be addressed at the United Nations, these regional 
'discussion groups' can go a long ways towards diffusing incipient tensions. The value of 
coordinated national interests via multilateral forums is clear. It is the United States alone, 
through its substantial support, which can provide the underpinnings for the search for a new 
world order in which all nations--whatever their political and social system--can enjoy the 
benefits of peace and prosperity. 
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